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Preface 
The present study aims at identifying the key issues in the field of indus-
trial policies and export promotion where present policies and practices of 
Vietnam may conflict with the rules and agreements of the WTO. Vietnam 
applied for WTO membership in 1995, exactly when the WTO succeeded 
the GATT Secretariat with a wider package of rules and agreements that 
had been negotiated during the Uruguay Round 1986–1994. It took some 
time until developing countries, incited by a rising tide of worldwide criti-
cism of civil society groups and heterodox economists, began to question 
the implications of the new agreements and commitments that had come 
out of the Uruguay Round in GATT, for their capacity to stimulate indus-
trial development with a mix of infant-industry protection, selective gov-
ernment support and export subsidies. Meanwhile, the narrowing of policy 
space has become one of the contentious issues in the debate about the 
development impact of the present multilateral trade negotiations, the 
Doha Development Round. 
To do a study on the implications of Vietnam’s WTO membership on its 
industrial policy options and export promotion capacity was motivated by 
the observation that outside the small circle of Vietnamese trade negotia-
tors there was very little information and awareness of the implications of 
WTO membership on Vietnam’s economic policies and its capacity to 
improve the competitiveness of domestic industries in the globalizing 
economy. This impression was gained during several WTO workshops 
that had been organized jointly by the German aid agency DSE/InWEnt 
and the NCIEC in Hanoi for Vietnamese government officials, representa-
tives of government agencies, of business associations and universities, to 
which I had been invited to present the WTO obligations for an accession 
country like Vietnam.  
Taking, in 2004, a team of young researchers from the postgraduate train-
ing course of the German Development Institute for a field study of two 
and a half months to Vietnam, offered the opportunity to gather more 
information on Vietnam’s economy and to conduct a wide range of inter-
views with government officials, state agencies in the field of industrial 
policies and export promotion, business representatives, aid agencies and 
research institutions on their experience with industrial policies and export 
promotion and their expectations on the implications of WTO member-
ship. The results of the field study were presented in Hanoi at the end of 
the field research, and again at more workshops in Hanoi and Berlin in 
  
  
2004 and 2005, organized by InWEnt, the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation 
(FES) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS). In the name of the 
team I wish to thank once again all institutions and companies which have 
supported the study by giving interviews and providing insights into their 
enterprises and institutions as well as offering additional written informa-
tion. We are especially grateful for the hospitality and professional coop-
eration we experienced at the Central Institute for Economic Management 
(CIEM) in Hanoi. Of course, the responsibility for errors and misunder-
standings remains with the German Development Institute (DIE) Team. 
After the team had been dissolved at the end of the training course in May 
2004, it took more time than expected to finalize the study for publication 
due to several other obligations of the team leader in his capacity as dep-
uty director of the German Development Institute. However, the delay 
provided more time for reflection on the fundamental question whether the 
new wave of books and papers criticising the unfairness of the WTO pro-
cesses for developing countries would lead to a different assessment of 
Vietnam’s decision to join the WTO.  
The answer is a cautious “no”. WTO membership will provide the frame-
work for the still ongoing economic reforms and prevent Vietnam’s eco-
nomic policy makers from slowing down the process of economic reforms 
that are still required for making Vietnam fit for international competition 
both at home and on export markets. The WTO itself does not prosecute a 
member country that does not fully comply with a WTO agreement. As 
long as Vietnam maintains the present good relationship with its major 
trading partners and is able to make them understand why the full imple-
mentation of the WTO agenda will take some more time, there should be 
no reason for taking Vietnam “to court” for non-compliance. Vietnam’s 
experience with complying with the full set of WTO rules and agreements 
will be carefully watched by the critics of the system, and this should be a 
guarantee for fair and flexible treatment. 
From a broader perspective, one could even argue that Vietnam has bene-
fited already, even as a non-member, indirectly from the past rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations und the GATT. Vietnam’s rapid economic 
recovery since the beginning of economic reforms has been facilitated by 
the openness of export markets. This favourable international environment 
is a result of the successful multilateral rounds of trade negotiations under 
the GATT which have led to a world-wide reduction of tariffs and other 
import barriers, especially in the field of industrial products. Trade liber-
alization together with the dramatic decline in costs of international trans-
  
port and communication had triggered off the process of economic global-
ization. The most important aspect of this process is that companies all 
over the world have gained experience with establishing production ca-
pacities overseas and organizing international trade within international 
production networks and supply chains. They were eager to find new loca-
tions like Vietnam for their international production and marketing strate-
gies.  
Thus, it seems fair from a global viewpoint that Vietnam gives up its free-
rider position and becomes a WTO member in its own right. As a WTO 
member committed to complete its economic reform programme, Vietnam 
will become even more attractive for foreign investors. The task for Viet-
nam’s industrial policy makers will now be to broaden the industrial base 
by helping domestic industrial enterprises to improve their capacity to link 
up to these international supply chains and become ancillary suppliers to 
foreign investors or direct exporters.  
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO which has been approved by the General 
Council on 7 November 2006, is not only a milestone for Vietnam, it is 
important for the multilateral trading system as well. This was expressed 
by the WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, at the General Council Meet-
ing when he said: “WTO membership is not only important for Vietnam, 
but for the organization too. With Vietnam joining in, we demonstrate to 
the world that the multilateral trading system continues to show its 
uniqueness, comprehensiveness and attractiveness.” Vietnam’s willing-
ness to accept the obligations of WTO membership should embarrass the 
incumbents who have not been able, in July 2006, to agree on a compro-
mise which would bring the Doha Development Round to a successful 
conclusion. As a WTO member, Vietnam will now be able to demand 
from the major players in the WTO that they contribute their share to the 
functioning of the system and to concluding the suspended round in a way 
that will take account of the special interests of the different groups of 
developing countries.  
 
Bonn, November 2006           Jürgen Wiemann 
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Summary 
Since the beginning of its economic reform programme (doi moi) in 1986, 
Vietnam has made an astonishingly great leap forward. However, export 
success was mainly based on increasing commodity exports and on ventur-
ing into new export markets for agricultural and fish products. In addition, 
foreign enterprises were invited to tap Vietnam’s relatively cheap, yet well 
educated and highly motivated workforce for their strategies of global 
sourcing. This commodity-based export strategy, however, will not allow 
maintaining the high growth rates of the early years of market reforms. 
The decline of coffee prices has revealed already that there are limits to 
growth for commodity exports even from one country only. Therefore, 
Vietnam, like other countries in the region, will have to diversify its ex-
ports towards manufactured goods and catch up with the more advanced 
competitors. In order to prepare for the shift towards export diversification 
and to get a better and secured access to the major export markets, Viet-
nam joined the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations), signed 
a bilateral trade agreement with the United States and applied for World 
Trade Organization (WTO) membership.  
WTO membership will be an important prerequisite for the strategy of 
export diversification: Firstly, because access to export markets of all 
WTO member states will be secured by the most-favoured nation (MFN) 
principle; secondly, because Vietnam’s import policy and economic policy 
in general will be subject to the multilateral rules of the WTO and will 
thereby become more stable, predictable and transparent; thirdly, WTO 
rules and agreements will provide the framework for reforming Vietnam’s 
economic and trade-related legislation and institutions. Thus, as a WTO 
member country, Vietnam will not only gain attractiveness for foreign 
investors, but also national entrepreneurs will be encouraged to invest in 
new plants and machines if they can rely on the stability of the legal 
framework and economic policies. However, there are reasons for taking a 
more sober look at the implications WTO membership will have for Viet-
nam’s ambitions to promote industrial development and new exports.   
When Vietnam submitted its application for WTO membership in 1995, 
the WTO had just been established as the successor of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As a result of the Uruguay Round in 
GATT, the WTO is now covering new areas like services and intellectual 
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property rights, and many of the old rules of the GATT, including the 
dispute settlement system, have been strengthened. Developing countries 
had more actively negotiated in the Uruguay Round than in previous 
GATT Rounds, offering own concessions, and they had accepted that the 
new agreements were binding their own policies and activities in the new 
areas, in return for concessions from the developed member countries. 
Only after some time, the implications for developing countries of the new 
rules and agreements of the WTO became visible and the real costs of 
some of the new agreements were calculated. This provoked a rising tide 
of criticism of the unfair bargain the developing countries had achieved in 
the Uruguay Round, and the new Round in the WTO, launched in Doha, 
Qatar, in 2001, was labelled Development Round to signal to developing 
countries that this time their concern about the unfairness of the system 
and the repercussions of some of the new disciplines would be taken seri-
ously. The debate on the developmental impact of the WTO system fo-
cuses on the narrowing of the policy space for developing countries result-
ing from the discipline that the new agreements impose on trade-related 
domestic policies. Can the latecomers like Vietnam apply the same active 
and selective industrial policies that the successful East Asian Newly In-
dustrializing Countries (NICs) used in their early phase of industrial de-
velopment and export diversification? And if not, is the narrowing of pol-
icy space good or bad for economic development and poverty alleviation?  
Sound macroeconomic policies encouraging savings and investment, open 
markets stimulating learning and adopting modern technologies, produc-
tion and marketing concepts will always be the key to successful devel-
opment. In addition to that, the advocates of modern industrial policy see a 
need for government support to private firms that take major risks when 
they venture into unknown territory, i. e. importing and adapting new 
technologies or venturing into a new export activity and getting an inroad 
into a new export market. Every country will have to find out what will be 
the most appropriate mix of macroeconomic and industrial policies to 
promote economic development most effectively and in a way that helps 
to reduce poverty and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.  
The debate on policy space under the WTO is relevant for Vietnam be-
cause the Government of Vietnam has applied and is still applying a num-
ber of industrial and export promotion policies that will no longer be al-
lowed under the WTO. Will that be an undue price for the vague promise 
of more secure access to export markets and increasing inflow of foreign 
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investment? After a brief summary of Vietnam’s transition to an open 
economy, the present study gives an overview of the new rules and agree-
ments of the WTO which confine the industrial policy space in general, 
followed by an introduction into the actual debate on industrial policy and 
the developmental state. The consequences for Vietnam will be to con-
tinue its economic reform programme and to creatively apply positive 
measures for encouraging the restructuring of industry so that the domestic 
industry will become technologically more competent and able to find new 
export markets directly or indirectly by becoming efficient suppliers to the 
foreign companies manufacturing in Vietnam for the world markets.  
With respect to time and capacity limits, the study focuses on the chal-
lenges for industrial policy and export promotion. The implications of 
WTO membership for agriculture and services could not be included in 
this study. The study illuminates five topics related to Vietnam’s industrial 
policy and export promotion against the background of its forthcoming 
WTO accession and multilateral economic integration. Taking into ac-
count the perceptions of interview partners on the level of government 
ministries and agencies, intermediate institutions like business associations 
and on the level of individual enterprises, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
Import liberalisation will have different consequences for the different 
industries and types of enterprises. Compared to the other WTO issues 
affecting industry policy, the reduction of tariffs seems to be a minor prob-
lem for Vietnam, but still a major problem for some industries. Vietnam’s 
average tariff level is comparatively moderate though at the higher end of 
its neighbouring states, which are already WTO members. However, some 
industries are still protected by very high tariff rates, e. g. the automotive 
and the textiles and garment industries. Therefore, the challenge regarding 
import liberalisation will be to harmonise and simplify the current tariff 
system and thereby to remove these high protection levels. Hence, all 
enterprises will have to prepare for stiffer competition on the domestic 
market. Private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) may be flexible 
enough to meet this challenge and will face less problems than the larger 
and often highly protected state owned enterprises (SOEs). The Vietnam-
ese government would be well advised to build on the flexibility of SMEs 
and strengthen their capacity for growth and for exporting. With respect to 
import liberalisation, the most important task will be the establishment of 
transparent and reliable trade policies with simplified and predictable 
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customs valuation and transparent regulations for imports and exports. 
This could be achieved by reducing and streamlining tariff rates for differ-
ent product categories required for WTO accession, which would reduce 
the potential for arbitrary classification of imported goods and for informal 
extra-payments. In addition to that, concerns that tariff reductions will lead 
to major losses of government revenues may not be justified. With lower 
tariff rates, imports to Vietnam may be growing so fast that the lower rates 
may be compensated by larger volumes of imported goods. Lower tariffs 
would also reduce the incentives for circumvention of customs through 
smuggling, thus more imports would be officially declared and generate 
additional tariff revenues. 
The need of phasing out the localization policy will require some impor-
tant changes in industrial policy. The Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs) Agreement requires governments of WTO member countries to 
phase out all measures distorting foreign trade from its “natural” level and 
patterns. This obligation refers especially to local content policies, which 
many developing countries have implemented until recently, mainly for 
automotive industries. Following their example, Vietnam is trying to de-
velop an integrated automotive industry by stimulating backward linkages 
of the automobile assembly plants and encouraging the development of 
local ancillary industries. The major challenge for Vietnam after WTO 
accession will be to establish and promote competitive ancillary industries 
without forced localisation policies, while competition with foreign sup-
pliers will increase at the same time. The TRIMs Agreement clearly pro-
hibits making the licensing of a foreign investment conditional upon the 
acceptance of certain performance requirements, like local content re-
quirements, that are no longer allowed under the TRIMs Agreement. 
Moreover, the WTO Dispute Settlement decision on Indonesia’s national 
car programme shows that not only direct but even indirect measures to 
encourage localisation like variable duty rates and tax incentives are con-
sidered trade-related investment measures covered by the TRIMs Agree-
ment. Therefore, the Vietnamese government will have to develop other 
strategies for encouraging and supporting the development of a national 
ancillary industry and lifting it to the technology and quality level required 
by the automobile assembly plants. Then these enterprises would purchase 
more domestic inputs out of their own interest and without being forced to 
do so by government regulations and restrictions.  
The enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs: patents, copy-
Vietnam – the 150th WTO-member – Implications for industrial policy and export promotion 
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rights, trademarks etc.) is an additional challenge for Vietnam and its in-
dustrial policy arising from global economic integration. In the Bilateral 
Trade Agreement with the United States (US BTA), Vietnam has already 
accepted to respect IPRs and to prevent infringements more effectively. 
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) will make this only a general obligation to respect IPRs of 
all other WTO member states. Even if the Vietnamese patent and copy-
right legislation has already been adjusted in view of the international 
requirements, there is still a huge gap between legislation and effective 
enforcement of IPRs on the micro level. Many Vietnamese are not aware 
yet of the meaning of intellectual property rights, and awareness is rising 
only slowly. Moreover, even Vietnamese experts state that the institutions, 
which are to enforce IPRs, do not yet work satisfactorily. There are prob-
lems of communication and co-ordination between the different institu-
tions involved, and training for the staff of these Organizations and for 
enterprises is lacking. Thus, the main challenges for Vietnam in the field 
of IPRs are to complete the adoption of TRIPS obligations in national 
legislation, to improve the work and co-ordination of the various enforce-
ment institutions, and, last but not least, to raise awareness on IPRs among 
the Vietnamese people. Technology policy will become an increasingly 
important aspect of Vietnam’s industrial policy. The enforcement of IPRs 
will not only make the country more attractive for foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), it should also encourage domestic innovation and technology 
transfer, provided there will be sufficient incentives and support for in-
vestment in technology renewal by enterprises. With respect to their ex-
port strategy Vietnamese enterprises are advised to strengthen their efforts 
to gain the advantages of registering their own trademarks, brand names 
etc. and build up customer confidence on export markets.  
Export promotion will have to be done without direct subsidies. The 
essence of the multilateral rules-based system for international trade is to 
provide every country and every enterprise with a level playing field for 
competition by preventing unfair trade practices like export subsidies, and 
also price dumping on export markets by individual enterprises. Having 
become a WTO member, Vietnam will have to phase out direct export 
subsidies. This is an economically sound policy because financial subsi-
dies cannot lead to sustained export success if the products are not com-
petitive. The debate is still ongoing as to whether indirect export subsidies 
like tax exemptions for enterprises in Export Processing Zones or Duty 
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Drawback Schemes belong to the measures banned. In any case, Vietnam 
would be well advised to concentrate on its genuine competitive advan-
tages in labour intensive and, at the same time, high quality goods and 
refrain from creating artificial competitive advantages through export 
subsidies. It should not be forgotten that export subsidies are a transfer of 
economic resources from the exporting to the importing country. The 
importing country could either impose a countervailing duty, which would 
skim off the subsidy margin and contribute to the state budget, or the con-
sumers could be given the opportunity to buy the subsidised import goods 
at a lower price. Of course, it would not make sense if Vietnam would 
transfer resources to the importing countries through subsidising its ex-
ports. Even then, the government can do a lot to promote competitiveness 
of Vietnamese enterprises on export markets by means compatible with 
WTO rules. In order to increase competitiveness, it is necessary to remove 
existing obstacles for (potential) exporters and to level the playing field 
between state-owned and private enterprises. The investment climate for 
foreign investors should be further improved to attract more export-
oriented Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In addition, export promotion 
activities can support domestic companies in their effort to become suc-
cessful exporters. These activities include the provision of information on 
export markets and better presentation of Vietnamese products in the de-
veloped countries, where not many buyers and importers know how de-
veloped and diversified the capacity of Vietnam already is for supplying 
not only a range of commodities, but also high quality handicrafts and 
manufactured goods (garment, household goods, furniture etc.). 
A precondition for successful exporting is to adjust Vietnamese export 
products to standards and norms of export markets. With the dramatic 
decline of tariffs in most countries as a result of past GATT Rounds – and 
the present and future WTO Rounds will bring down tariffs further –, 
other trade barriers have become more and more important. The host of 
new technical norms, health, environmental and social standards mainly in 
Europe, but to a lesser degree also in the other industrialised countries, can 
become effective trade barriers. Vietnamese firms having produced mainly 
for the domestic market in the past, still have little awareness of the stan-
dards, norms and quality requirements on export markets. Above all, there 
is a lack of knowledge of and direct experience with the importance of 
product standards. Many Vietnamese enterprises still focus on production 
process standards like International Standards Organization (ISO) stan-
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dards. In order to correct this bias, government agencies and business 
associations should provide more information and more assistance to ex-
porting enterprises for making their products comply with safety, health 
and environmental standards of export markets. In addition to that, the 
institutional infrastructure for testing and certification of export products 
has to be improved in Vietnam. Exporting firms need certificates from 
accredited agencies and testing laboratories to prove to overseas buyers 
and consumers that their products comply with the standards required by 
the EU and other developed countries. One should not be mistaken: The 
issue of standards and norms of export markets is relevant regardless of 
WTO accession. Compliance with these standards in general is a necessary 
precondition for exporting products. The importing country has the right to 
apply its national standards to imported products, as long as the standards 
can be justified by the need to protect public security or the health of con-
sumers and are not used in a way to discriminate against imported goods. 
Exporting countries have to comply with the standards of importing coun-
tries regardless of WTO membership. Vietnamese exporters of aquaculture 
products have already gained experience with tighter standards introduced 
by the EU to protect consumers’ health. In case of conflict, the WTO 
Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) provide some guarantee against misuse of 
standards and norms for protectionist purposes, but it will be extremely 
difficult to find evidence for abuse since these standards are routinely 
applied to the same domestic products. 
Successful East Asian industrializing countries have followed protectionist 
trade policies and dirigiste industrial policies at an earlier stage of their 
economic development. Today, WTO rules no longer allow implementing 
the core policies and instruments of the East Asian model, like infant-
industry protection, export subsidies or reverse engineering. However, in a 
globalizing world, such policies may no longer be appropriate in view of 
some of the new features of globalizing industries. Therefore, Vietnam 
should not focus too much on how to copy the example of earlier industri-
alising countries in the region. With such a strategy, Vietnam would only 
trail behind the other countries, which are also moving forward.  
To conclude, as a WTO member, Vietnam will have to change some of the 
instruments of its industrial policy. This has the following implications on 
the different levels: On the macro level, providing a level playing field for 
private, state-owned and foreign invested enterprises will probably be the 
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most important task. On the meso level, institutions like business associa-
tions and chambers of commerce have to gain influence on the macro level 
and publicity on the micro level. On the micro level, enterprises must 
increase competitiveness and inform themselves more intensive about the 
characteristics and requirements of export markets. Vietnam can expect 
effective support from the donors for its adjustment programmes and for 
the training of government officials and the business community in all 
aspects of WTO rules and agreements. The international debate on aid for 
trade has come to the conclusion that trade liberalisation is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for export expansion and diversification of 
developing countries. Whatever the outcome of the Doha Round will be, 
trade-related development assistance will have to play an important role to 
make a country like Vietnam capable of administering the various new 
WTO agreements and help its exporters to make use of the new trading 
opportunities that should be the result of a successful Development Round. 
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1 Background and research design of the study 
In 1995, Vietnam submitted the application for accession to the World 
Trade Organzation (WTO) and is now preparing to become the 150th 
WTO member state. Joining the WTO will be another important step in 
Vietnam’s economic integration into the global economy. Yet, in order to 
reap the fruits of international economic integration, Vietnam will have to 
improve the competitiveness of existing and new industries so that they 
will be able to withstand increasing competition at home resulting from 
import liberalisation and succeed on export markets. East Asian countries 
have shown how an active industrial policy stimulating and directing the 
industrialisation process can be combined with an export promotion policy 
that encourages the new industries to find their way to the world markets. 
Vietnam should be able to follow their example and become another Asian 
(transition) tiger (Van Arkadie / Mallon 2003). But will that be facilitated 
or hindered by WTO membership?  
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there is a heated debate about the rea-
sons for the East Asian Miracle. The conventional view, favoured by the 
Washington-based international financial institutions World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), sees the success of the East Asian 
Miracle countries as a result of sound macroeconomic policies based on 
extraordinarily high savings rates, combined with heavy investment into 
infrastructure and education and an open-door policy towards foreign 
investment. This interpretation of the East Asian Miracle has been chal-
lenged by a number of heterodox economists and political scientists who 
stress that developing countries in Africa and Latin America which applied 
the structural adjustment programmes prescribed by the World Bank and 
the IMF have not achieved the same growth rates as the East Asian coun-
tries with their specific policy mix of sound macroeconomic policies and 
active industrial policies plus export promotion to make the new industries 
gain experience on the world markets and become competitive with the 
industries of the developed world. The debate between mainstream 
economists and their heterodox critics on the best policy for industrial 
development of less developed countries remains inconclusive, both sides 
find empirical proofs in one or the other country for their viewpoint. Only 
one new aspect would be accepted by almost all development economists, 
and that is the decisive role of institutions in developing countries that are 
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either able or not to design and implement the set of economic and indus-
trial policies most appropriate for their country. 
Soon after the WTO had succeeded the GATT in 1995, it became the 
central target for the anti-globalisation campaign. During the Uruguay 
Round the GATT, Contracting Parties had negotiated several new agree-
ments that widened the mandate for the WTO, covering not only border 
measures like tariffs and quotas (that had been the area of the GATT), but 
also an increasing range of other trade-related policies – and more will 
come, since in the age of globalization it is difficult to think of an eco-
nomic policy that has no impact on international trade and competition for 
foreign investment. The new agreements had been signed by all WTO 
member countries (single undertaking), i. e. developing countries had 
committed, for the first time, to make their trade-related policies comply 
with the multilateral rules and agreements of the WTO. The obligation to 
full compliance with all WTO agreements is relaxed only by the special 
and differential treatment provisions based on Part IV of GATT and built 
into all WTO agreements. But in view of increasing competition from the 
rapidly industrializing countries, there is mounting pressure from devel-
oped countries that special and differential treatment should be confined to 
the least developed countries, whereas the more advanced developing 
countries should graduate from their special status and comply fully with 
all rules and agreements of the WTO. 
Whatever different motives and interests have brought the protesters 
against WTO ministerial conferences together – trade unions of industrial-
ized countries and environmentalists complaining about unfair competition 
from developing countries that do not apply the higher social and envi-
ronmental standards as the developed countries, Third World activists and 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) complaining about the asymme-
try of the world trading system and the unfair treatment of developing 
countries in the multilateral rounds of trade negotiations – through the 
anti-WTO campaigns governments of developing countries became aware 
of the potential repercussions of the extended and tightened rules and 
agreements they had signed collectively at the end of the Uruguay Round. 
Thus, they blocked the launch of a new round of trade negotiations at the 
1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, and accepted new negotia-
tions at the 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha only after the EU and the 
US had promised to take the concerns of developing countries about the 
Vietnam – the 150th WTO-member – Implications for industrial policy and export promotion 
German Development Institute 11
unbalanced outcome of the Uruguay Round seriously. The label Doha 
Development Round recognized this promise. However, neither the EU 
nor the US have met their promise yet, so the Doha Round has been sus-
pended mid 2006, revealing the deep disagreement between developed and 
developing WTO members on what would make the round a true Devel-
opment Round.  
The present study has been motivated by the new wave of criticism of the 
WTO and its impact on developing countries’ prospects for promoting 
industrial development and export diversification through active policies. 
The criticism has to be taken seriously, especially since a number of emi-
nent economists have contributed to it, blaming not so much the WTO, but 
the major players US and EU, for their neglect of developing countries’ 
interests to actively promote industrial development. According to the 
critics, the new agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round restrict the 
capacity of late industrialising countries like Vietnam to implement the 
same active industrial policies that the more advanced East Asian industri-
alising countries had pursued at an earlier stage of their development.  
The debate will be followed closely by the countries preparing for acces-
sion to the WTO. When the Vietnamese government and the Communist 
Party took the decision to apply for WTO membership in 1995, they may 
not have been fully aware of the implications of the widened WTO man-
date for Vietnam’s economic and industrial policy space. Even incumbent 
developing countries realised only some time after the end of the Uruguay 
Round what unfavourable deal they had accepted and what costs the im-
plementation of the new agreements (especially the TRIPS Agreement) 
would entail.1 Taking the critical arguments into account, should the Viet-
namese government reconsider WTO accession and rely instead on bilat-
eral and regional trade agreements with its main trading partners? Or will a 
closer scrutiny of the implications of the most relevant WTO rules and 
agreements reveal that the costs of implementing them are worth while to 
bear as part of the general programme of market economy reforms which 
                                                          
1 With the single undertaking of  the Uruguay Round (with only four exceptions, all WTO 
members subscribed all agreements negotiated during the round) developing countries 
had accepted a number of new obligations with a real price tag, whereas the developed 
countries had only promised to phase out in the medium term future protectionism against 
products of special interest for developing countries, i. e. agricultural goods, textiles and 
clothing, a promise which has not been kept until today in the case of agricultural trade. 
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Vietnam is pursuing since 1986? In that case, the costs of making Viet-
nam’s trade and industrial policies consistent with the WTO framework 
would be acceptable with respect to the benefits of secured access to ex-
port markets, and access to the effective WTO Dispute Settlement Proce-
dure in case of conflict with a trading partner.  
What can Vietnam’s economic policy makers learn from that debate, and 
what type of industrial policy and export promotion should they pursue in 
the future that does not conflict with the WTO rules and agreements and 
makes Vietnam’s industries fit for their integration into the global produc-
tion networks that have become a dominating feature of the present stage 
of global economic integration? In order to find answers, the study will 
first present the general implications of the new WTO agreements for 
industrial policies of member countries and discuss their economic ration-
ale from the different positions in the debate on industrial policy and the 
East Asian Miracle. After this introduction to the new WTO framework 
for industrial policies and export promotion, the most relevant implications 
for Vietnam’s industrial policies and export promotion will be reviewed in 
detail and conclusions drawn on how the remaining policy space for im-
proving the competitiveness of Vietnam’s industries should be used. After 
having joined the WTO, Vietnam will have to develop industrial policies 
and export promotion measures that are consistent with its own economic 
conditions and in conformity with WTO rules and agreements.  
The present study explicitly focuses on the challenges of WTO accession 
for industrial policy and export promotion – thus leaving aside other WTO 
issues, like agricultural trade and trade in services. This focus is based on 
the assumption that industrial development – and export diversification 
and promotion as part of it – is the most important prerequisite for Viet-
nam’s successful integration into the global economy. The experience of 
developing countries in general – and of East Asian newly industrialising 
countries (NICs) in particular – shows that a diversification of the export 
structure including industrial goods is needed for sustained economic 
growth and exports. 
The study does not attempt to assess the costs and benefits of WTO mem-
bership. The Vietnamese government will have done a rough cost-benefit 
calculation of WTO membership with the costs of adjusting legislation and 
trade-related policies to the WTO rules and agreements and the benefits of 
secured access to global export markets for Vietnam’s widening range of 
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agricultural and manufactured exports plus increasing attractiveness for 
foreign investors. However, three main benefits and opportunities for 
Vietnam can be mentioned here already: First, WTO accession will 
strengthen domestic policies and institutions by modifying existing laws 
and introducing new ones that are intended to liberalize markets and to 
strengthen the private sector. Second, WTO membership will improve and 
secure the access to major export markets – at least in the long run, be-
cause the US and the EU will treat Vietnam for the next decade as a non-
market economy which will facilitate launching anti-dumping measures 
against Vietnamese exports . Third, as a WTO member Vietnam will have 
access to the new dispute settlement mechanism for trade policy conflicts.  
In contrast, challenges and problems of Vietnam’s WTO accession are 
strongly related to the institutional framework. On the one hand, the co-
ordination of the negotiation concerns different ministries and lacks coher-
ence, communication and co-ordination. On the other hand, the coordina-
tion of policy reform seems to be weak and faces three problems in par-
ticular: a low level of awareness of the implications of WTO membership, 
opposition of potential losers and vested interests. Apart from institutional 
problems, there are economic challenges arising from WTO accession. For 
example, adequate adjustment policies to balance disruptive effects of 
trade liberalisation need to be developed. 
The present study starts from the Vietnamese government’s decision to 
become WTO member and asks what implications WTO membership will 
have for the country’s industrial policy and export promotion.  
Research design and empirical base 
The core chapters of the study dealing with the main implications of WTO 
membership for Vietnam’s industrial policies and export promotion are 
based on interviews with government officials, representatives of special-
ized agencies and business associations, with a sample of enterprises in 
and around Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, and with donor agencies in-
volved in WTO-related activities were carried out during the field visit of 
the team in 2004. The chapters on the new framework of the WTO for 
industrial policies and the debate on industrial policy, and on Vietnam’s 
reform process, as well as new information to the core chapters that came 
up in the meantime, have been added thereafter. 
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The interviews in Vietnam were conducted on three levels:  
– The macro level, representing the level of policy making. A major 
question asked by the study team on this level has been: Which re-
forms will the Vietnamese government and the different ministries 
have to implement in order to bring industrial policy and export pro-
motion into conformity with the various WTO Agreements?  
– The meso level, representing the level of intermediate institutions 
between the government (macro level) and the business sector (micro 
level) like, e. g., business associations. Influencing government policy 
making from below has taken place in Vietnam so far mainly through 
personal contacts and informal channels. However, meso level institu-
tions will become more important as interest representing and infor-
mation channelling institutions. The questions asked focused on the 
perception of meso institutions regarding the preparations of Vietnam 
to meet WTO requirements and the changes to be made regarding 
Vietnam’s industrial policy and export promotion aiming at integrat-
ing the country into the global economy. 
– The micro level, representing industrial enterprises. There are three 
different legal forms of industrial enterprises in Vietnam: state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), and Vietnam-
ese private owned, mainly small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Of 
course, each type of enterprise and the different industries will be af-
fected differently by the necessary changes of Vietnam’s trade and 
economic policies with respect to compliance with WTO rules and 
agreements. Therefore, the main questions of the study team focused 
on the perception of managers and entrepreneurs in industry of the 
challenges of the WTO accession as well as on their awareness and 
preparations regarding Vietnam’s economic integration into the global 
economy in general.  
The main instruments for data generation have been semi-structured inter-
views with institutions on the macro and the meso level and with different 
kinds of enterprises. On the macro level, interviews were carried out with 
relevant ministries and subordinated administrative institutions. On the 
meso level, business associations and chambers of commerce have been 
interviewed. On the micro level, different legal forms of enterprises 
(SOEs, SMEs, FIEs) in different industries have been interviewed. There 
was no explicit sectoral focus, but interviews were mainly carried out with 
enterprises in the following industrial branches: garments, textiles, foot-
wear, automobiles, motorbikes, electronics, processed food and furniture. 
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In total, 90 interviews and informal talks have been carried out by the 
study team (see Appendix: Table 10). Furthermore, relevant government 
documents, research papers and other material related to the issues of the 
report were taken into consideration. 
Road Map of the report 
Chapter 2 gives an introduction, especially for readers not familiar with 
Vietnam, to the country’s transition from a centrally planned socialist 
economy to a mixed economy integrating into the regional and world 
economy. It gives an overview over the political setting and an introduc-
tion to Vietnam’s global economic integration process from doi moi to 
WTO accession.  
Chapter 3 gives an introduction to the debate on industrial policy space 
under the new WTO rules and agreements. It is difficult to see today 
where the rising tide of criticism of the alleged unfairness of the system 
will lead to, but since the asymmetry between rich and poor, large and 
small trading nations will not change in the foreseeable future, and eco-
nomic power will translate into negotiating power in all international or-
ganizations, developing countries should not expect to gain much from the 
debate on the narrowing policy space, at least not in the short run. They 
should utilize the remaining policy space and promote their industries with 
measures that are not in conflict with WTO agreements.  
In chapter 4, the changing framework for Vietnam’s industrial policy un-
der WTO rules will be examined. What are the restrictions and remaining 
options for industrial policy under WTO rules? Each of the three topics 
studied in this chapter – import liberalisation, localisation policy and en-
forcement of IPRs – is examined in the following way. Firstly, the respec-
tive WTO Agreement will be sketched briefly: Regarding import liberali-
sation, corresponding parts of the GATT will be presented; regarding 
localisation policy, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs) will be studied and in the chapter concerning IPRs the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
will be dealt with. Secondly, challenges for Vietnam’s industrial policy 
regarding each of the topics will be discussed. 
In chapter 5, challenges for export promotion will be discussed. Firstly, the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures will be ex-
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amined in a similar manner like the WTO topics in chapter 3. Against this 
background, WTO compatible export promotion instruments will be dis-
cussed. Since compliance with technical, health and environmental stan-
dards and norms on export markets becomes an increasingly important 
challenge for exports of developing countries, these issues will be dealt 
with in detail. 
In chapter 6, conclusions will be drawn on industrial policy and export 
promotion in Vietnam. An overview of donor activities in the area of aid 
for trade is given with the recommendation to use training programmes not 
only for the necessary know-how transfer on many technical issues of the 
multilateral system of the WTO, but also to stimulate the debate in Viet-
nam between the government, the business community, the civil society 
and the academic community on trade and trade-related policies and how 
Vietnam will have to use the remaining policy space for making the three 
segments of its industry, i. e. state owned enterprises, foreign invested 
companies and private business, cooperating more effectively so that Viet-
nam will be able to diversify its exports and have a rising local content in 
manufactured exports. At the end, an overview is given on the donor ac-
tivities related to WTO accession and implementation of the new obliga-
tions. 
2 Vietnam’s transition to an open market economy  
2.1 The political framework: A constitutional, law-
governed single party state 
According to the 1992 Constitution (amended in 2001), Vietnam is a So-
cialist Republic with the Communist Party Vietnam (CPV) as the leading 
force of the state and society. Although the Communist Party shows no 
intention to give up its leading role enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitu-
tion, it has allowed and even propagated a remarkable process of govern-
ance reforms which aim at combining the goal of economic growth and 
development through market economy mechanisms with the goal of social 
stability and participation of the various social groups and regions in the 
process of political decision making and legislation. According to an offi-
cial source “Vietnam is a law-governed socialist state under the leadership 
of the Communist Party.” (Vietnam Trade Office in the United States of 
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America, Website, “Political System”.) The commitment of Vietnam’s 
Communist Party to a constitutional system and to the rule of law has deep 
roots in Ho Chi Minh’s Declaration of Independence (1945) which fore-
saw democratic elections and the adoption of a Constitution by the Peo-
ple’s Parliament that was legitimated by general elections in January 1946.  
The Communist Party of Vietnam has a well-defined internal decision-
making process. A Party Congress meets once every five years. The 10th 
Party Congress of the CPV met in April 2006 in Hanoi. A total of 1,176 
delegates representing 3 million party members attended the opening 
ceremony. The Congress elected a new Central Committee with 160 
members and a Politburo of 14 members. The Central Committee meets at 
least twice annually, usually to confirm the policy which is designed by 
the Politburo. As the Party’s supreme decision-making body with unlim-
ited policy-making powers, the Politburo sets the direction of the party and 
the government. Senior Politburo members hold high position in the gov-
ernment and the National Assembly, the Vietnamese version of a parlia-
ment. As all important government posts are filled by party leaders and 
party cadres, the government is mainly implementing party policies. The 
CPV dominates state institutions and mass organizations, such as the Con-
federation of Trade Unions, the Women’s and the Youth Union. The Party 
exercises its control within a decision-making paradigm that may be 
termed “consensus governance” which means a slow and careful decision-
making process involving and assigning responsibilities to many stake-
holders. This has made Vietnam’s fundamental economic and societal 
changes possible, without challenging the leading role of the Party.  
An important element in this consensus governance is the National As-
sembly in which legislation and government policies are debated. The 
National Assembly meets twice a year for 7–10 weeks each time. Its 500 
deputies are elected every five years. The deputies of the National Assem-
bly should represent all social groups and regions of Vietnam, including 
non-Party members. Besides its legislative function, the National Assem-
bly elects the president of the state and the prime minister, and approves 
the members of the government cabinet, nominated by the prime minister. 
Despite the central political role that the Constitution attributes to the 
Communist Party, the National Assembly plays an increasing role as the 
highest representative body and only institution with legislative powers. 
“All state bodies are held accountable to, and are appointed by, the Na-
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tional Assembly. Over time, the National Assembly has enhanced its legis-
lative role and oversight of executive government bodies, and the CPV is 
committed to further enhancement of the National Assembly’s role.” (ADB 
2001, 54) Of course, with about 80 % of the deputies being party mem-
bers, the National Assembly is not independent of the Communist Party. 
But there are increasingly open debates about the new economic legisla-
tion required for market economy reforms and international economic 
integration, and about other issues of government policies and even behav-
iour of government officials and party members, e. g. corruption cases. 
“As a reflection of the increasingly open dialogue between the state and 
society, the investment law draft was strongly debated in the National 
Assembly and the media, with many deputies and business groups openly 
criticizing it for exacerbating bureaucratic red tape for domestic inves-
tors.” (Luong 2006, 152) 
Despite the leading role of the Communist Party, Vietnam is not a mono-
lithic state in which the political centre can implement economic reforms 
top down without opposition and resistance from those groups and organi-
zations that fear to lose from economic liberalisation. And, what seems to 
be natural for a Communist Party, there is ideological opposition from 
within against the entire market economy reform programme. “The con-
servative members of the leadership in Vietnam are strong believers in 
socialist orthodoxy. After a lifetime of belief in Marxism, they are uneasy 
about the market economy. (…) The conservatives want funds and tech-
nology from outside but fear that ideas such as democracy, human rights, 
civil society, governance, and so on, will infiltrate the country and under-
mine Communist Party dominance. They perceive the market economy, 
albeit with a socialist orientation, as a corrosive force and that reforms 
have outpaced the capacity of the CPV to guide it.” (Dinh 2000, 365) The 
reformers on the other hand, argue for further economic and administrative 
reforms as a precondition for Vietnam to catch up with its more advanced 
neighbours, which have successfully implemented market economy re-
forms and integrated their economies into the globalizing economy. The 
political weight of the reformist faction is strengthened by Vietnam’s 
accession to ASEAN, the signing of the bilateral trade agreement with the 
United States and by the application for WTO membership. The process of 
gradual international economic integration makes past economic reforms 
irreversible and requires further legal and institutional reforms towards a 
market economy.  
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2.2 The legal framework 
The weakest element of Vietnam’s governance seems to be the legal sys-
tem. Since the beginning of the economic reform process in 1986, the legal 
system of Vietnam has developed rapidly, however unevenly, with its 
main focus on legislation, whereas the other elements of a functioning 
legal system – legal institutions, legal education and training, legal infor-
mation – have lagged behind. After more than a decade of legal reforms 
necessary to implement economic reforms and to establish a functioning 
market economy, the Vietnamese legal system is still a mixture of im-
ported commercial legislation and local traditional principles and prac-
tices. “Despite the enactment of commercial legal framework largely 
based on western legal transplants (laws and legal practices), Vietnam’s 
legal system overwhelmingly resonates with local rather than imported 
principles, precepts and processes.” (AusAID 2000, 1) “The quality of 
laws and regulations is weak in several respects. Superior and subordi-
nate regulations are often inconsistent. Sometimes provisions contradict 
each other. The resulting uncertainty is aggravated by the practice of not 
precisely specifying what provisions of previously issued legal documents 
are to be abrogated when a new legal document takes effect. The mecha-
nism for reviewing draft legal documents to check their constitutionality, 
legality, uniformity, consistency, and enforcement feasibility is also still 
weak.” (ADB 2001, 58) Finally, the enforcement capacity is weak. There 
are not enough lawyers and judges to implement economic legislation and 
to settle commercial disputes between economic agents. “Many judges do 
not have legal training and their appointments are based on patronages. 
The credibility of the system is low, and viewed as open to bribery.” (ADB 
2001, 60) An increasing backlog of unsettled civil lawsuits reveals the 
shortcomings of the legal system.  
As a special feature of a law-based state and a market economy in which 
private enterprises operate independently of government economic man-
agement but are subject to government regulations and licenses, there is a 
need for administrative jurisdiction. Thus, in the early 1990s, Vietnamese 
delegations studied the experiences with administrative courts and juris-
dictions in Western and Asian countries. As a first step, since 1996, ad-
ministrative divisions were established within the people’s courts at the 
central and provincial levels (Quang Nguyen 2004). Of course, it takes 
time before such a new system will be fully operational and effective. As 
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long as legislation itself is inconsistent and even contradictory, administra-
tive courts cannot fulfil their function to make government organizations 
more accountable to the people in case of conflict, and a wide discretion 
remains for the bureaucracy This leads to uncertainties as to whether one 
can rely on a decree or a law, even if it has passed the National Assembly.  
The Government – and even a representative of the Communist Party2 – 
has recognized the shortcomings of the legal system and formulated a 
“Comprehensive Needs Assessment For the Development of Vietnam’s 
Legal System to the year 2010” (Inter-Agency Steering Committee for 
Vietnam’s Legal System Development Assessment 2002). The report 
provides a balanced picture of the state of Vietnam’s legal system. On the 
one hand, it presents the achievements since the beginning of the reform 
policy in 1986: “In the last 15 years, the number of laws and ordinances 
promulgated were double the number of such legal documents promul-
gated during the preceding forty years (1945–1985). With such new laws 
and ordinances we have created a legal framework that facilitates the 
development of a socialist oriented market economy which will gradually 
replace the old centrally planned economy, and creates a legal basis for 
comprehensive reform of the country.” (Ibid., 9–10) The report points to 
the increasing number of international treaties signed by Vietnam, which 
have “gradually become an integral part of the Vietnamese legal system.” 
(Ibid., 10) On the other hand, the report of the Inter-Agency Steering 
Committee analyses in detail the shortcomings of Vietnam’s legal system, 
such as the imprecision and frequent changes of laws and regulations that 
leave too much room for interpretation by implementing agencies and the 
possibility that implementing guidelines contradict the objectives of the 
legislation. The report acknowledges that the capacity of judges is not 
adequate, a problem that is related to both imprecise and sometimes con-
tradictory legislation and regulation, and to the insufficient quality of legal 
education and training.  
                                                          
2 “Vietnam’s legal system generally remains weak and inadequate, failing to catch up with, 
and meet the requirements of, the process of national industrialization and modernization 
and building a law-governed State of the people, for the people and by the people.” 
(Nguyen Van Yeu, Member of the Party Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Na-
tional Assembly: Orientations for Perfection of the Legal System in the Coming Time, in: 
Vietnam Law & Legal Forum, 13.01.2005; online: http://news.vnanet.vn/vietnam-
law/Service.asp? CATEGORY_ID=5& SUBCATE GORY_ID=10&NEWS_ID=456 
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In view of the long interruption of a smooth development of the legal 
system during the 30 years of war for national liberation, and in view of 
the simultaneous changes that have taken place since the beginning of the 
reforms – “from an outmoded agricultural economy into an industrial 
economy; from the closed and barter economy into an open economy with 
international integration; from the centrally planned economy into a mar-
ket economy with a socialist orientation; and from a state managed by 
administrative commands into a rule of law socialist state” (Inter-Agency 
Steering Committee 2002, 18) – it is obvious that the legal system needs 
time – perhaps decades and not years – and technical assistance to become 
fully effective as a reliable framework for all actors in the market econ-
omy. On the basis of the comprehensive needs assessment presented by 
the Inter-Agency Committee, Vietnam can rely on the willingness of the 
international community to provide whatever donor assistance is necessary 
for the development of the country’s legal system. This is especially true 
in view of the additional requirements for legislation and institutional 
development for implementation related to the preparation for WTO ac-
cession. One can only hope that Vietnam’s implementing agencies and the 
judges and lawyers will be able to absorb and manage the huge amount of 
new economic legislation that Vietnam has to carry out and implement on 
the way to an open internationally integrated socialist market economy.   
2.3 The process of economic transformation  
The communist-led government of Vietnam has shown a remarkable flexi-
bility in responding to economic challenges. After the war and the unifica-
tion of North and South Vietnam in 1975, there was a ten-year phase of 
experimentation with Soviet-style central economic planning, nationaliza-
tion of all economic activities and concentration of investment on state-
owned industries. This strategy was not successful, especially the collec-
tivization of agricultural production which met with strong resistance from 
the farmers. There was a serious recession between 1976 and 1980, with 
both agricultural and industrial production declining, high inflation and 
sluggish growth during the 1980s. Due to low agricultural productivity, 
Vietnam had to import large quantities of food and became dependent on 
foreign aid, mainly from the Soviet Union. Exports were insignificant, and 
foreign trade was monopolized by the government. During the 1980s, it 
became obvious that the strategy had failed and that there was no alterna-
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tive to economic reforms. Vietnamese economic policy makers could refer 
to the example of China where the market economy reforms since 1978 
had triggered off a real “great leap forward”. With the breakdown of the 
Soviet economic block in 1989/90, Vietnam could no longer rely on for-
eign aid from the Soviet Union and had to approach Western donors and 
international aid agencies for technical and financial assistance.  
Early economic reforms in Vietnam started in 1982, when the Fifth Na-
tional Party Congress “sanctioned privately owned small enterprises and 
the ‘family economy’ for agriculture.” (ADB 2001, 53) Vietnam’s farmers 
and household enterprises made use of their new economic freedom, and 
the increase of agricultural production opened the door towards deeper 
economic reforms. In 1986, the full economic transformation from a 
command economy to a “socialist-based market economy” was endorsed 
by the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party under the slogan 
of “doi moi” (economic renovation). The transformation began in the 
agricultural sector by redistributing land to rural households and by leav-
ing production and marketing decisions to the farmers who responded to 
the incentives of market prices.  
The early doi moi reforms had four fundamental components: 1. disman-
tling of central economic planning in favour of letting market forces de-
termine prices, 2. encouraging private business development responding to 
price incentives, 3. macroeconomic stabilization, 4. opening the economy 
to international trade and foreign investment and promoting Vietnam’s 
integration into the regional and global economy. In contrast to the big 
bang style market reforms of some Eastern European countries, Vietnam’s 
economic reformers pursued a gradualist strategy of introducing market 
economy mechanisms without abandoning government control and man-
agement of the state-owned enterprise sector. Thus, the planned economy 
was replaced by a “multisectoral economy” (mixed economy in the termi-
nology of Western economics) in which different forms of ownership – 
state-ownership, cooperative and private ownership and foreign invest-
ment co-exist. The market is the principle coordinating mechanism, but the 
government still claims a strong steering function. Despite the explicit 
recognition of the private sector, the government still prefers the promo-
tion of the state sector and restrains the private sector.  
Gradual trade liberalization was an essential element of Vietnam’s eco-
nomic reform programme. Since 1989, the state monopoly in foreign trade 
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was dismantled step by step. The first step was to allow individual compa-
nies to enter into trading activities, however under relatively restrictive 
conditions. These could be met only by state owned enterprises. Restric-
tive trade licensing was relaxed in 1998 and abandoned in 2001. “From 
then on all domestic enterprises have been allowed to trade commodities 
or items freely, except those prohibited or under specialized management. 
(…) Since 2002, the foreign enterprises have also been granted the right to 
export goods other than those they produce.” (Vo Tri Thanh 2005, 77) 
Non-tariff barriers, especially quantitative restrictions, which had been 
used to balance supply and demand of the economy, to protect domestic 
production and to prevent foreign exchange crises were removed in 2001, 
except for a few sensitive products, like petroleum and sugar. Quantitative 
restrictions deemed necessary to protect certain agricultural products were 
replaced with tariff-rate quotas. The old system of monopoly state trading 
could do without import tariffs; they were first introduced in 1988. The 
tariff system was frequently expanded and adjusted according to the pro-
tectionist interests of individual industries and agricultural producers. 
When the quantitative restrictions were abandoned in 2001, tariff rates 
were increased to some extent in order to provide a similar degree of pro-
tection for the same products. Tariffs will have to be reduced again with 
the commitments to trade liberalization that Vietnam has accepted under 
various regional trade agreements and in view of WTO accession. 
The early doi moi reforms triggered off a rapid expansion of output, for-
eign trade and employment, which made Vietnam one of the fastest grow-
ing economies in the region at least until the Asian crisis in 1997/98 
caused a slowdown showing Vietnam’s increasing economic integration in 
the region.  
Until today, one of the most difficult and contested aspects of Vietnam’s 
economic reforms is the adjustment of the state-owned enterprise sector to 
the conditions of a market economy. The SOE sector was established in 
the 1950s and 1960s as part of the Soviet development model aiming at 
rapid industrialization of underdeveloped countries through nationalization 
of existing industries and massive government investment in newly estab-
lished public sector industries. “As a result of this development strategy, 
by the end of 1960, 100 per cent of industrial establishments, 99.4 per cent 
of commercial establishments, and 99 per cent of transportation facilities, 
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which once belonged to foreign and Vietnamese capitalists, were national-
ised and transformed into SOEs.” (Ngu 2002, 2–3)  
The reforms of the state enterprise sector started in the mid-1980s as part 
of the general economic renovation programme. SOEs were given more 
autonomy, and the budgetary support was made less automatic in order to 
enforce a higher degree of efficiency. During the 1990s, the next round of 
reforms aimed at consolidating the state enterprise sector by reducing the 
number of SOEs (from 12,297 in 1991 to 6,264 in 1994) through liquida-
tion, equitization and mergers. Nevertheless, the management remained 
dependent on superior authorities, like the central, provincial or municipal 
governments, ministries or the military, which act as owners of SOEs. 
Since then, the process of SOE reforms has slowed down due to a number 
of obstacles.3 Several interested groups resist equitization: Line ministries 
and people’s committees will lose the benefits from controlling and oper-
ating SOEs, the managers, often appointed by the Party, will lose their 
privileges, and the workers in SOEs may face the risk of losing their jobs. 
Managers of large SOEs have invited foreign investors for modernizing 
production and gaining access to export markets, thus defending the exis-
tence of their SOEs against full privatization. These anti-reform interests 
find ideological support from the conservative faction in the CPV that 
questions the rationale of giving away public assets and an important in-
strument of industrial policy for the sake of market economy principles. 
According to the ‘conservatives’, the government should keep majority 
shares in large SOEs, which are seen as strategic instruments for industrial 
development and for achieving certain social goals like employment or 
development of backward regions. As a consequence of WTO accession 
however, the pressure for continuing reform of the state enterprise sector 
will increase.   
SOE always kept and many still keep a dominant role in highly protected 
key industries counting for a large share in output and export volume. Due 
                                                          
3  “In general, the SOE reform process remained slow and failed to achieve the objective of 
basically completing the SOEs restructure and reform by 2005 as planned. (…) The eq-
uitized state assets remain low despite significant increases in the share from about 6-
7 % in 2004 to about 12 % in 2005. Equitization is mainly being implemented in small-
scale enterprises (…); few enterprises with state capital of more VND 20 billion are be-
ing equitized although there is almost no legal limit in place on that.” (CIEM 2006, 64, 
66-67) 
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to protection and preferential treatment from the government in every 
respect, the state sector will face difficulties with adjusting to higher com-
petition levels through international integration. In contrast to the private 
sector, SOEs never faced severe rivalry of competitors in their respective 
industry, and they had always access to unlimited financial resources. 
Thus, most of the Vietnamese SOEs have low performance indicators, lack 
competitiveness, suffer chronic losses, are overstaffed and have outdated 
technologies. However, some SOEs performed very well during and after 
their equitization and are gaining competitiveness. 
The Enterprise Law and the new Law on Foreign Investment have already 
improved the legal framework for a market economy. However, only slow 
progress has been made in the equitization of SOEs. In 2003, out of total 
4722 SOEs, 537 enterprises were equitized and another 408 enterprises 
rearranged (merged, unified, went bankrupt etc.) which accounts for only 
62 % of the original plan. Until 2005, the government plans to keep 1931 
enterprises with 100 % state capital. 2053 SOE will be equitized and 738 
rearranged. In almost half of the equitized SOEs the government will hold 
the majority of the shares. 
In 2003, SOEs still contributed 38 % of Vietnam’s Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) and 50 % of the export value. This is particularly striking on the 
one hand because SOEs bind a lot of Vietnam’s financial resources owing 
almost 80 % of total domestic credits. On the other hand, an estimated 
20 % of underemployment and redundant labour in SOEs are a big chal-
lenge for improving the efficiency of SOEs. Although SOEs employ only 
10 % of the total work force, reducing the inefficiency of SOEs will not be 
possible without some layoffs. 
Despite the declared goal of progressive equitization (the Vietnamese 
reformers avoid the word privatization) of SOEs, up to date only smaller 
and less profitable SOEs have been equitized, In contrast to the policy 
towards SOEs, the policy towards private enterprises tends to be restric-
tive. There are many restrictions on private enterprises like the licensing 
obligation and many administrative checks, which curtail the growth of the 
private sector and thus the creation of jobs. Besides, compared to SOEs, 
private enterprises still suffer discrimination concerning access to credit, 
land and foreign trade licenses.  
 Jürgen Wiemann et al. 
 German Development Institute 26
Concerning the financial sector, there was a cautious and gradualist ap-
proach to reforms: step-by-step liberalisation, a gradual transformation of 
existing financial institutions and the creation of new ones. The general 
focus has been on stability. This approach has proved successful on the 
whole and macroeconomic destabilisation has been avoided. Nevertheless, 
Vietnam is still far from having a modern market-economy financial sys-
tem. The credit supply to the business community, especially to small- and 
medium-sized enterprises is still insufficient. This is mainly due to the fact 
that commercial banks suffer from the burden of non-performing loans to 
the state-owned enterprises. The development of private enterprises is 
severely constrained by their difficult access to loans from the banks. They 
have to generate their investment funds from their own profits or have to 
borrow from relatives and friends, which leaves little room for major in-
vestments.  
Foreign direct investment contributes increasingly to economic growth, 
employment, exports and technology transfer. In the first years since the 
lowering of external barriers, investment was concentrated in the oil indus-
try and in real estate sectors. Nowadays export-oriented manufacturing of 
consumer goods in the clothing, footwear and food-processing industries 
and inward-oriented investment in domestic electronics and vehicle manu-
facture are gaining importance. However, Vietnam’s investment climate 
for foreign investors is regarded to be less favourable than that of other 
industrializing countries in Southeast Asia. There are many problems 
concerning the relationship between foreign enterprises and Vietnamese 
authorities, caused by arbitrary and often unpredictable interference by the 
authorities. 
2.4 Vietnam’s integration into the regional and global 
economy4 
Vietnam is strongly committed to open up its economy and to integrate 
into the global economy. However, its reintegration into the world econ-
omy takes place at a time when international trade policy is becoming 
increasingly complex. Besides the multilateral trading system of the 
                                                          
4  In this chapter only the most important integration projects are referred to, excluding for 
example the Asia-Europe-Meetings, that take place every two years since 1996. 
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GATT / WTO, a complex web of sometimes overlapping regional free 
trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral trade and economic partnership 
agreements is building up (cf. Bonapace 2005, Banda / Whalley 2005). 
The recent surge of new trade agreements among Asian countries and 
between Asian and overseas countries can be taken as an indicator of the 
weakening faith in the multilateral system, especially after the failed WTO 
ministerial conferences of Seattle 1999, Cancun 2003, and the present (fall 
2006) suspension of the Doha Development Round. But the increasing 
complexity of the web of bilateral, regional, interregional and multilateral 
trade agreements and the strain for the negotiating capacities, especially of 
late-coming countries like Vietnam, could become an incentive to concen-
trate again on negotiating for a successful conclusion of the Doha Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. Yet, the old debate among economists 
and trade policy makers whether regional and bilateral trade agreements 
are stepping-stones or stumbling-blocks to the multilateral trading system 
remains inconclusive. For the foreseeable future, there will be no change 
of the multi-layer trading system, and Vietnam will have to negotiate in 
parallel on all three levels, the multilateral, the regional and the bilateral 
level.   
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 
On 28 July 1995, Vietnam became a full member of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and committed itself to implement the 
necessary requirements resulting from the different ASEAN integration 
projects. At the 4th ASEAN Summit in Singapore 1992, the ASEAN 
heads of government had agreed to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) within a 15-year period; this was later reduced to a 10-year pe-
riod, ending on 1 January 2003. AFTA is flexible by providing the option 
to exclude goods temporarily or permanently from the obligation to tariff 
reduction (there are special exemptions for sensitive agricultural goods), 
and allowing new members to meet their obligations at a later date. When 
joining AFTA in 1995, Vietnam had committed to implement AFTA 
agreements on tariff reductions and removal of other trade restrictions by 
2006 (Lao PDR and Myanmar by 2008, Cambodia by 2010). 
With the implementation of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT), tariffs on a wide range of goods traded within ASEAN have to be 
reduced to no more than 5 %, and quantitative restrictions and other non-
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tariff barriers have to be eliminated. In addition to tariff reductions and 
elimination of quantitative restrictions, ASEAN aims at facilitating trade 
through harmonisation and simplification of customs procedures, stream-
lining customs administration, and the elimination of technical barriers to 
trade through harmonization of tariff nomenclatures based on the Harmo-
nised System of the World Customs Organization and through harmonisa-
tion or mutual recognition of technical regulations and conformity assess-
ments. However, ASEAN members do not always comply with the AFTA 
deadlines to lower tariffs on sensitive goods if they have a strong interest 
to protect domestic producers. And there seems to be a wide discrepancy 
between the low CEPT tariff rates and the applied rates.5  
Nevertheless, ASEAN member countries aim at both widening and deep-
ening their regional integration. With the conclusion of free trade agree-
ments with China, Japan, Korea, and, at a later stage, possibly India, 
ASEAN+X could become an ever larger and more integrated Asian market 
combining the most dynamic developing and countries in the world. And 
with the Hanoi Plan of Action (1998), followed by the Vientiane Action 
Programme (2004) ASEAN leaders have set the target of establishing an 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2020. The programme 
for a single market among the ASEAN member countries looks like a copy 
of the Single European Market programme, with free movement of goods, 
services, investment, capital and skilled labour. Yet, fundamental differ-
ences between the EU and the planned AEC remain. There are no indica-
tions that ASEAN will move from a free trade area toward a customs un-
ion and a fully integrated internal market like the European Union with 
supranational institutions and a single trade policy vis-à-vis the rest of the 
                                                          
5 “Calculations show that only 5 % of intra-ASEAN trade has been carried out using CEPT 
tariff rates. Experts say that local enterprises do not bother to go through all the neces-
sary formalities, or just do not know that their business transactions qualify for these 
preferential tariff rates. The authorities in countries still applying relatively high tariffs, 
do not bother to inform the local business sector about the CEPT, as they do not want to 
lose tariff revenues. In other countries, levying relatively low tariff rates, the difference 
between the CEPT and the ordinary rate is just too small to take the trouble anyway.” 
(Cuyvers, De Lombaerde, Verherstraeten 2005, 7) „Most worrying, however, has been 
the backtracking from original commitment by some members. Furthermore there has 
been little progress on the removal of non tariff barriers because there has been no 
agreement on what  this entails.” (Soesastro 2005, 2) 
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world.6 In contrast to the European Commission, the ASEAN secretariat 
does not have the capacity to enforce the rules and agreements, its man-
date is confined to coordinate and facilitate ASEAN-related activities 
(Feridhanusetyawan 2005, 16).  
ASEAN countries seem to accept that they will always be highly depend-
ent on trade and investment relations with the rest of the world. The share 
of intra-ASEAN trade as a percentage of total ASEAN trade has increased 
from 19.3 % in 1993 to 22.6 % in 2002, but even the higher percentage 
shows that ASEAN countries’ trade is oriented toward the global economy 
as its reception of investment from the major industrial countries. In view 
of their need to trade with the advanced industrialised countries, ASEAN 
countries have no interest in diverting trade from the natural patterns de-
termined by comparative advantages through large tariff differences be-
tween intra-trade and imports from non-member states. ASEAN is not an 
alternative to multilateral trade liberalisation and economic integration. 
“AFTA members have a strong tendency to apply the preferential tariff 
rates multilaterally, on an MFN basis, to non-members. AFTA tariff data 
show that the preferential and MFN rates are similar for a majority of 
tariff lines.” (Feridhanusetyawan 2005, 18) If Vietnam will comply with 
ASEAN’s open regionalism, i. e. fostering regional trade integration with-
out excluding the rest of the world, the AFTA-induced tariff reductions 
will anticipate what WTO membership will bring in the field of import 
liberalisation.7 
                                                          
6 “As the individual ASEAN countries are reluctant to give up national economic policies 
vis-à-vis non-members, the AEC set-up will not include a common external tariff. This 
should not be too surprising as one knows that there are huge discrepancies between the 
member states in average tariff levels. (…) All this implies that ASEAN is not following 
the example of the EU and rather endeavours to establish a single market without having 
installed a customs union or having created some supranational authority. This is not 
really surprising as ASEAN members have always been reluctant to delegate power to 
some supranational body. In this respect it is interesting to note that ASEAN was estab-
lished by a declaration and not by a treaty, meaning that ASEAN completely lacks legal 
personality.” (Cuyvers, De Lombaerde, Verherstraeten 2005, 14)  
7  “Vietnam (...) maintains similar tariffs in 61 percent of all tariff lines.“ (Feridhanusety-
awan 2005, 18) 
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Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
In 1989, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) was 
formally established, encompassing 21 member countries with Pacific 
shores, aiming at achieving free trade among developed member countries 
by 2010 and for developing countries by 2020. Vietnam became member 
in 1998, committing itself to liberalize its trade with APEC countries by 
2020. Each member country has to present Individual Action Plans (IAPs), 
which describe voluntary and non-binding liberalization measures. Until 
now, Vietnam has presented four IAPs. The one presented in 2001 is the 
most precise including the commitment to liberalize the conditions for 
joint ventures and to streamline the customs system. Although the com-
mitments are not as binding as AFTA-requirements and lack concrete 
implementation plans, they are also a step towards liberalizing the eco-
nomic system. Due to extreme differences between APEC members in 
terms of their levels of development and their economic policies, the ambi-
tious goals set for liberalising trade and investment within the APEC seem 
somewhat unrealistic, and this grouping has lost importance compared to 
the integration programmes among Asian countries.   
US Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (US BTA) 
The US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (US BTA) became effective 
in December 2001 and is regarded as a milestone for Vietnam’s economic 
transformation and integration process. After receiving Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) treatment by the US, the share of Vietnam’s exports going 
to the American market increased significantly from 16 % in 2002 to 22 % 
in 2003 (CIEM 2004, 20). 
In view of the WTO accession process, it is important to mention that 
many legal and technical commitments of the US BTA are identical or 
even stricter than WTO requirements. Therefore, implementing US BTA 
means anticipating most of the WTO requirements and should facilitate 
WTO accession. Nevertheless, one should not forget that after WTO ac-
cession, Vietnam has to grant most of the provisions of US BTA to all 
WTO member countries. Furthermore, Vietnam has stated not to discrimi-
nate against the European Union by US BTA, granting MFN status to 
European exports and investors. In ongoing talks between the EU and 
Vietnam, a bilateral trade agreement on the lines of the US BTA is negoti-
ated.  
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Other integration projects 
Apart from the bilateral and regional agreements mentioned above, Viet-
nam has signed other agreements concerning investment promotion and 
protection with about 40 countries. Most of these agreements have stricter 
requirements than those conceded in the Law on Foreign Investment, in-
cluding direct investments, portfolio investments, contract-based rights, 
tangible and intangible assets and intellectual property rights. 
2.5 Vietnam’s WTO accession process 
Vietnam submitted the application for WTO membership on 4 January 
1995. The Working Party on the accession of Vietnam was established on 
31 January 1995. It is open to all WTO member states interested in Viet-
nam’s WTO accession and bilateral negotiations on trade liberalisation 
The Working Party had altogether 43 members (counting the EU as one),  
which have negotiated with Vietnam on its “membership package”. 
On 24 September 1996, Vietnam submitted its “Memorandum on the For-
eign Trade Regime”, which explains its trade and economic policies and 
institutions relating to WTO agreements in detail. The first meetings of the 
Working Party were on 30–31 July 1998 and 3 December 1998. Before the 
first meeting, members of the Working Party had submitted several hun-
dred questions covering not only the foreign trade regime on goods, but all 
aspects of Vietnam’s economic and political system, the treatment of state-
owned enterprises and foreign invested companies, monetary and trade 
policies, including the bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements that may 
affect the competitive position of Vietnamese traded goods and the capac-
ity of Vietnam to implement the various WTO rules and agreements. Be-
fore the first meeting, the Government of Vietnam provided a first round 
of answers in written form (the Memorandum, the questions/replies docu-
ments, and other unrestricted documents on the preparation of Vietnam for 
WTO membership can be downloaded from the WTO website). Since 
1998, 14 meetings of the Working Party were held in parallel with several 
rounds of bilateral negotiations about the conditions of Vietnam’s WTO 
accession took place. In 2004, the results of the question and answers 
process during and between the meetings of the Working Party were com-
piled to a Draft Report of the Working Party, which was further discussed 
and refined in the subsequent meetings.  
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Meanwhile bilateral agreements have been concluded with all major trad-
ing partners, including Mexico, Japan, China, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and 
the EU. In May 2006, Vietnam was able to conclude the last bilateral ne-
gotiations with the US. The accord with the US will open Vietnam’s fi-
nancial sector and other services sectors wider for foreign investment 
(foreign banks will be allowed to establish 100 per cent subsidiaries), the 
US will remove existing quotas on Vietnamese textile and clothing ex-
ports, but will treat Vietnam as a non-market economy (NME) for 12 years 
after accession until the end of 2018, which will make it easier to impose 
anti-dumping duties in case US competitors feel unfair competition from 
Vietnamese imports (Financial Times, 16 May, 2006, 4). However, the US 
has changed Kazakhstan, Russia and, recently, the Ukraine from NME 
status to market economy (ME) status. Depending on the progress with its 
economic reforms, Vietnam should be able to convince the US – and other 
WTO Members – to grant it ME status before 2018. The transfer from 
NME to ME status can be applied even to individual industries or sectors 
if they can prove that they operate under market economy conditions.8 
Vietnam did not accept the wish of the US to insert a reference to core 
labour standards in the agreement, which could have been used by the 
Americans as another justification for imposing import barriers (Financial 
Times, 26 Oct. 2006). 
The last round of negotiations on Vietnam’s WTO membership took place 
in October 2006 with intensive consultations on the final documents which 
were accepted by the last meeting of the Working Party on 26 October. 
The accession package of documents consists of: 
                                                          
8  This is explicitly stated in the Report of the Working Party on Vietnam’s accession to the 
WTO: “Once Viet Nam has established, under the national law of the importing WTO 
Member, that is a market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) (simplified as-
sessment of dumping cases) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member’s 
national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, 
the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire on 31 December 2018. In addition, 
should Viet Nam establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, 
that the market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-
market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or 
sector.” (WTO 2006b, 66, para. 255 (d)) 
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– the Working Party’s 260-page report on the legal and institutional 
framework of Vietnam for trade and related policies including the 
commitments Vietnam has made in these areas,9 
– a 560-page list (schedule) of Vietnam’s commitments on goods – 
tariffs, quotas, tariff quotas and ceilings on agricultural subsidies, in-
cluding timetables for implementation of agreed tariff cuts and other 
market opening measures, 
– a 60-page list (schedule) of Vietnam’s commitments on services with 
the details on which type of access is given to foreign service provid-
ers in which services, and on the conditions of foreign ownership in 
service establishments. 
At its 7 November meeting, the General Council of the WTO approved the 
package and Vietnam’s membership. The Vietnamese Delegation was 
welcomed by the Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, as represen-
tatives of the next WTO member that would be able not only to benefit 
from the past multilateral negotiations on market access liberalisation, but 
also participate in the ongoing round of WTO negotiations. With its will-
ingness to carry out the negotiations for WTO membership despite the 
difficult situation of the WTO after the suspension of the Doha Develop-
ment Round in July 2006, Vietnam reveals its faith in the attractiveness of 
the multilateral rules-based trading system of the GATT and the WTO.10 
Vietnam will now have to ratify the deal, and become the 150th WTO 
member 30 days after it has informed the WTO that it has ratified the 
package deal. The National Assembly will have to approve and ratify 
Vietnam’s package deal with the WTO members to finally open the door 
to the WTO. It is expected that the National Assembly will ratify the 
agreements on December 5, so that Vietnam could become WTO member 
                                                          
9  WTO News Items, 26 October 2006 (WTO website). The three documents have been 
released to be downloaded from the WTO website (WT/ACC/VNM/48, Add. 1, Add 2). 
10 „WTO membership is not only important for Vietnam, but for the organization too. With 
Vietnam joining in, we demonstrate to the world that the multilateral trading system con-
tinues to show its uniqueness, comprehensiveness and attractiveness.” (Pascal Lamy: 
Welcome Address by the Director-General to Vietnam at the General Council Meeting on 
7 November 2006.)  
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at the beginning of 2007, no less than twelve years after the presentation of 
the application. 
In view of the cumbersome procedures on the way to WTO membership 
one might feel tempted to question the rationale of undergoing this pro-
cess. But critics should not forget that the alternative would be a host of 
bilateral agreements with major trading nations. As a relatively small 
country with a small market due to its low level of economic development, 
Vietnam would not have much leverage to gain better conditions for its 
trade with larger trading nations in bilateral negotiations. On the contrary, 
the evidence from the large number of bilateral trading agreements is that 
the developed countries tend to negotiate even more concessions from the 
less developed countries than are on the table of WTO negotiations 
(“WTO+”). In addition to that, there is the systemic threat that the criss-
crossing bilateral trade agreements produce intransparent conditions for 
international trade undermining the potential gains from trade in an open 
liberal trading system, in which multinational corporations can place their 
investment and organise their internationally integrated production accord-
ing to the comparative advantages of each country involved.  There is 
another advantage of multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO over 
bilateral negotiations: The WTO has become relatively transparent offer-
ing many documents to public scrutiny via its website, and there is a broad 
and informed global debate about the development impact of the WTO 
rules and agreements. What is being negotiated in bilateral negotiations is 
far less transparent, so that the risk for smaller and poorer countries to be 
treated unfairly by the rich and big countries is far greater. From Viet-
nam’s perspective, it makes sense to become a WTO member and contrib-
ute to the global debate and negotiations in the WTO about the future of 
the multilateral trading system and how to harness it for the interests of the 
developing countries and the world’s poor. 
3 The new rules of the WTO and their implications for 
industrial policy and export promotion 
3.1 The new rules of the WTO 
With the Uruguay Round (1986–94), the last multilateral round of trade 
negotiations in the GATT, the world trading system has changed gear from 
shallow toward deeper integration. Whereas the General Agreement on 
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided rules mainly for border measures 
(tariffs, quantitative import restrictions, prevention of unfair competition 
through subsidised exports and through dumping by private firms of other 
countries), the new WTO agreements on intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS), on trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), and on subsidies, 
impose stricter discipline on a widening range of domestic economic poli-
cies. With the new Agreement on Agriculture international trade in agri-
cultural products was brought into the domain of GATT rules and disci-
pline, and the new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) ex-
tends the rules to international trade in services including international 
investment of service companies and international migration of both ser-
vice providers and consumers. Finally, with a few exceptions, all WTO 
Agreements are obligatory for developing countries as well (Single Under-
taking of the outcome of the Uruguay Round), most of which are already 
WTO members or are applying to become WTO members, like Vietnam. 
Thus, the WTO rules and agreements are becoming the legal framework 
for global economic governance. 
In the following, an overview is given of the new WTO framework in 
order to show the implications for developing countries’ room for ma-
noeuvre for industrial policies and export promotion. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is still the main 
pillar of the WTO system and the rule book for trade in goods. Even in the 
area of tariffs, the Uruguay Round brought a fundamental change from 
shallow to deeper international economic integration of developing coun-
tries. Before the Uruguay Round, developing countries had not partici-
pated actively in GATT negotiations on tariffs, claiming that they needed 
high import tariffs and other protectionist measures to implement their 
preferred strategy of industrialization through import-substitution. The 
result of this non-engagement was that tariffs and other import barriers of 
developed countries remained relatively high especially in areas of export 
interest for developing countries. Therefore, during the Uruguay Round 
the more advanced developing countries were for the first time prepared to 
engage actively in the multilateral tariff negotiations by offering own 
“tariff concessions”. Of course, most economists argue that tariff reduc-
tions are not concessions in the sense of real costs to the economy, on the 
contrary, by opening one’s own markets to international competition en-
courages, a country will specialize on what it can best produce (or supply 
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as service) and import what it cannot produce at internationally competi-
tive prices. Import competition will force domestic producers to increase 
their productivity and to improve their products, or they will have to give 
up and their products (or services) be replaced by cheaper/better imported 
goods. Nevertheless, bargaining about reciprocal tariff concessions makes 
sense for governments because the perspective of open export markets can 
win political support from export sectors over protectionist interests of 
import competing sectors. Recently, some economists put again emphasis 
on the short term costs of trade liberalisation for developing countries, 
especially the least developed countries, which face immediate adjustment 
costs when some industrial or even agricultural production has to close 
down due to cheaper imports and the dismissed workers and employees do 
not find new jobs if there is already high unemployment, whereas the 
potential positive effects of additional exports will show only after some 
time and only if new exporting activities are supported by complementary 
government investment in infrastructure, technological capacity develop-
ment, education and market research. In this view, offering tariff reduc-
tions in trade negotiations can be seen as real concessions, and the mercan-
tilistic bargaining over reciprocal concessions makes more sense that seen 
from the perspective of economic textbooks. 
Developing countries had accepted, however reluctantly, the message of 
standard economic theory that import substitution may be good for the 
initial phase of industrial development, but that it will lose steam if import 
barriers are maintained at a high level for too long so that domestic indus-
tries do not follow the technological developments and manufacturing 
practices in the advanced countries and become less and less competitive 
with international firms. This was the experience not only of Latin Ameri-
can countries and India, but also of the entire socialist economic block. 
These countries have learned that open markets are a precondition for 
successful exports, at least of modern industries which need unrestricted 
access to state-of-the-art machines and inputs for manufacturing high 
quality goods for the world markets. With the overall lower tariff rates as a 
result of past GATT rounds and with the new active attitude of developing 
WTO members to tariff concessions, the countries applying for WTO 
accession have to follow and reduce their tariffs more than developing 
countries had to do under the GATT. Thus, the scope for promoting the 
development of new industries through tariffs and quantitative import 
restrictions has been reduced.  
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Yet, tariffs can still be raised unilaterally as long as the applied tariff rates 
are below the bound rates submitted to the WTO. In addition to that, Art. 
XVIII, C, GATT still allows infant industry protection for new industries 
through tariffs. However, this requires compensation through equivalent 
tariff reductions for other products (e. g. market opening for agricultural 
products). Therefore, developing countries have rarely used this option. 
They preferred to justify their import restrictions with Art. XVIII, B, 
which allows import restrictions to prevent a balance of payments crisis. 
Heavily indebted countries can still apply this article. In addition to that, 
there is the general escape clause of Art. XIX, which allows to protect a 
national industry against acute damage from increasing import competition 
resulting from previous trade liberalisation. Again, applying Art. XIX 
requires compensation through equivalent tariff reductions for other prod-
uct categories. Finally, the WTO does not rule out protecting and restruc-
turing an industry threatened by increasing import competition by means 
of subsidies, as long as there are no export subsidies involved.  
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) is 
one of the most controversial issues on the multilateral trade policy 
agenda. It rules out indirect import restrictions through local-content obli-
gations for foreign (and national) investors, which oblige them to reduce 
the share of imported inputs in favour of inputs from domestic ancillary 
industries. This strategy had been implemented in the past not only by 
many developing, but even by some developed countries like Australia, 
especially in the automobile industry (Pursell 2001; UNCTAD 2003). 
Foreign investors were forced to invest in assembly plants in developing 
countries through rising tariff walls or outright import bans for finished 
products. When the foreign investors tried to circumvent the import ban by 
simply importing completely knocked down (ckd) kits of the finished 
automobiles which were assembled in the developing country with little 
(or even negative) value added, the host governments invented a new 
policy known as local content policy, obliging the foreign investor to raise, 
within a given time span, the local content of his production in the host 
country. The foreign investor could meet the new obligation either by 
expanding his production upstream, i. e. by producing more of the inputs 
needed inside the assembly plant in the host country, or by searching for 
local suppliers or components and spares, or by persuading his suppliers 
back home to relocate some of their production capacities to the host coun-
try in order to remain the original equipment supplier to the automobile 
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plant in the developing country. Now the TRIMs Agreement of the WTO 
puts an end to this type of forced local sourcing through investment 
agreements or other indirect incentives (tax incentives, differential tariff 
rates depending on the local content achieved). Export obligations, i. e. the 
obligation of foreign investors to achieve certain export targets in order to 
balance the import content of local manufacturing, are also banned by the 
TRIMs Agreement.  
The brevity and vagueness of the TRIMs Agreement results from the 
compromise between the interests of developed countries, especially the 
US, the EU and Japan, in having a comprehensive agreement on foreign 
investment as an outcome of the Uruguay Round, and the defensive posi-
tion of most developing countries who feared their national sovereignty 
would be curtailed by restrictions on their policies on foreign investment 
and their capacity to apply certain performance requirements on foreign 
investments for balance-of-payments purposes and as instruments of active 
industrial policy (local content requirements) (Greenfield 2001, Bora 
2002). Many developing countries regard the transitional period of five 
years (seven years for least developed countries) as too short for adjusting 
their industrial policies, and several countries have applied for an exten-
sion of the transitional period. All acceding countries, however, had to 
agree to implement the TRIMs Agreement from the day of WTO acces-
sion (Brooks / Fan / Sumulong 2003, 16).  
There can be no doubt that the TRIMs Agreement reduces the policy space 
of developing countries (and even of developed countries as the dispute 
settlement case between the EU and Canada as the defendant country 
concerning measures affecting the automotive industry shows). Whether 
the overall effect of the ban of TRIMs will be negative or positive from a 
developmental viewpoint, however, is difficult to say. It depends on 
whether developing countries will be able to attract more and higher qual-
ity FDI when they phase out performance requirements like increasing 
local content. For a balanced assessment one should keep in mind that 
before the TRIMs Agreement came into effect, only the larger developing 
countries were able to apply local content policies and other TRIMs, be-
cause their domestic markets were attractive enough for foreign investors 
to accept local content requirements and other constraints as entry price to 
the large market. With the TRIMs Agreement, this advantage of the large 
developing countries will disappear. All developing countries can now use 
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the remaining policy space with positive measures to improve the techno-
logical capacity of domestic ancillary industries, so that foreign investors 
are prepared to consider buying components and spares from them. 
With the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) today’s late industrialising countries are denied the in-
struments of unofficial (grey) technology transfer like reverse engineering 
or illegal copies that both developed and the newly industrialising coun-
tries (NICs) had used at an earlier stage of their industrial development. 
The driving force behind taking the TRIPS Agreement into the WTO were 
the interests of knowledge intensive industries producing goods with a 
large share of research and development (R&D) costs in total production 
costs (e. g. pharmaceuticals, standardised software) which can be copied 
easily. These industries see their patents and copyrights as their most valu-
able assets and are highly interested in strengthening patent and copyright 
protection on a global scale and in having intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) enforced by their governments through effective instruments like 
trade sanctions. Patent protection establishes a time-bound monopoly for 
the IPR holder, which can reduce the welfare of the society. There is a 
growing awareness that the TRIPS Agreement has gone too far into the 
direction of protecting the interests of industries inventing new products 
and technologies vis-à-vis the interests of the society in disseminating the 
new technologies for the public good. The debate on patents for Humanes 
Immundefizienz-Virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/Aids) 
pharmaceuticals has shown that there may be a public interest in having 
new technologies disseminated for wide usage in order to protect a public 
good, like health in this case.  
The TRIPS Agreement is one of the most controversial issues in the debate 
about the justification and consequences of the deepening of the multilat-
eral rules-based system of the WTO. Even liberal economists who defend 
the general move towards free trade and deeper integration of developing 
countries into the globalising economy have questioned the economic 
justification for taking the intellectual property regime into the WTO and 
changing the balance between the interests of the intellectual property 
rights holders and the public interest of free access to new technologies 
and ideas towards the interests of the former by extending the time given 
to them for exploiting the exclusive rights for their inventions (Bhagwati 
2005). In view of the negative consequences for the poorest countries who 
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will not benefit from strengthened IPRs and only have to pay more for the 
utilisation of patented drugs and other technologies, prominent economists 
have advocated to scrap TRIPS completely (Birdsall / Rodrik / Subrama-
nian 2005). 
The problem of having to adopt a system of intellectual property rights 
which may not be suitable for less developed countries, is aggravated by 
the mushrooming of IPRs over the past decades especially in the United 
States, but also in the European Union. The scope of intellectual property 
protection has been extended and enforcement strengthened. The range of 
what can be protected as intellectual property has widened during the past 
decades. Software, business methods, geographical indications and even 
living things and materials have become patentable, the duration of patents 
has been extended and the enforcement mechanisms have been strength-
ened (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002, 2). Excessive 
protection of intellectual property has become a problem for scientific 
progress since universities follow the trend towards patenting even basic 
scientific concepts, research methods and results, a general trend that is 
most visible in the United States. It will become more difficult to build 
further research on the existing state of art if the researchers have to bar-
gain with the patent holders before they can do their own research using 
the results of other researchers. This can have detrimental effects on tech-
nological development even in the developed world.  
The trend in the US and other developed countries to reduce the area of 
open science through patenting the results of university research and pub-
lic research institutes will make it even more difficult for developing coun-
tries to narrow the gap to the frontier of scientific progress in the devel-
oped world. This is not a consequence of the TRIPS agreement but of the 
general trend towards privatizing basic scientific research in the developed 
world. In order to overcome the catch-up problem for developing coun-
tries, a proposal has been made to establish global funds for supporting 
research on issues of special relevance for developing countries (Birdsall / 
Rodrik / Subramanian 2005) and for negotiating a multilateral agreement 
on open access to basic science and technology. Such an agreement would 
aim at facilitating reciprocal access for the researchers of the signatory 
countries to the results of each other’s university research and other public 
research, and facilitate international cooperation in basic scientific re-
search. 
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The need for some ‘rebalancing’ reform of the TRIPS Agreement has been 
accepted in case of threats to (global) public goods. With the Doha Decla-
ration, developing countries in need of cheap pharmaceuticals for 
HIV/Aids treatment were given the right of compulsory licensing and 
trading of generic drugs. It remains to be seen whether this is the begin-
ning of a general relaxing of the TRIPS Agreement in favour of the least 
developed countries and developing countries in general. Such a readjust-
ment will be even more justified since the industrialised countries have not 
met their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement to encourage and facili-
tate technology transfer to developing countries (Stiglitz / Charlton 2005, 
Srinivasan 2002).  
The new Agreement on Subsidies distinguishes between prohibited sub-
sidies, subsidies that can be contested and permissible subsidies. Direct 
and indirect export subsidies are prohibited, whereas subsidies for research 
and development (R&D) are allowed. Countries with a per capita income 
below 1000 US$ are still allowed to use direct export subsidies. Once they 
have passed the threshold of 1000 US$, they have to phase out these ex-
port subsidies within eight years. Countries that have recently joined the 
WTO however, were not conceded this transition period. They were asked 
to phase out export subsidies as soon as possible. This means that the new 
WTO member countries cannot follow the strategy which most of the 
earlier industrialising countries pursued when they complemented their 
infant-industry protection through high import tariffs and quantitative 
import restrictions with an active policy of export promotion through ex-
port subsidies. This policy mix was necessary to avoid the shortcomings of 
excessive import substitution strategies (as implemented by, e. g. China 
and India for decades). The new industries established behind high tariff 
walls tend to lose contact with rapid technological progress in the industri-
alized countries and with the level of quality, reliability and customer 
satisfaction required for exporting to these markets. Export subsidies were 
a means to compensate the negative incentives to export for industries that 
had developed behind tariff walls – overvalued exchange rates and limited 
access to imported components. These negative incentives to export will 
be reduced, however, with the general trade liberalisation as a result of 
WTO membership. In an open economy, exports no longer require direct 
export subsidies.  
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Even with the WTO ban on direct export subsidies (interestingly, the de-
veloped countries have not phased out their export subsidies on agricul-
tural goods, and negotiations on the final date for phasing out these export 
subsidies have played an important role in the Doha Round), developing 
countries still have a wide policy space for promoting exports through 
technical assistance (provision of information on export markets, support 
for getting into contact with buyers overseas etc.) and financial support 
(export insurance schemes) for export marketing. Providing an efficient 
infrastructure and trade-related services (e. g. testing and certification 
institutions that help exporters to meet the widening range of product stan-
dards on developed countries’ markets), and reducing administrative ob-
stacles to international trade will be a more efficient way of trade promo-
tion than subsidies.  
With the new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) a mul-
tilateral framework has been established for cross-border provision of 
services (banking, insurance, transport, software, construction, tourism, 
professional services like doctors or architects).11 The GATS is part of the 
Uruguay Round package that commits all WTO member countries, includ-
ing developing countries. Yet the obligation to liberalise trade in services 
under the GATS is relatively moderate. Every country may define the 
services sectors for which it wants to allow foreign providers of services 
access to the domestic market. There is a host of market access barriers for 
services, e. g. investment regulations and other administrative obstacles 
which have to be identified first and then negotiated with a specific request 
and offer approach. And this process is especially difficult when devel-
oped and developing countries negotiate concessions in services trade 
because they have rather different interests in getting access to each oth-
ers’ markets. Developed countries are especially interested that developing 
countries open their markets for establishments of foreign banks, insurance 
companies and other capital intensive service industries, whereas develop-
ing countries have an interest in getting free access to developed countries 
for their labour intensive service providers, e. g. construction companies 
and even individual services providers like nurses, doctors, architects, 
engineers, software developers etc. However, there is strong opposition in 
the developed countries against opening their labour markets to cheap 
                                                          
11  The GATS and its implications for the service sector in Vietnam is not part of the present 
study on industrial policy and export promotion. 
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labour from developing countries disguised as service providers. There-
fore, developing countries are justified to oppose an opening of their ser-
vices markets which is not compatible with their development needs. This 
gives them some room for promoting their own new services companies 
(infant services protection). When they follow this strategy, they should 
take into account, however, that domestic service companies can be a 
burden for the rest of the economy if their services are less efficient and 
more costly than the services of foreign providers. Opening a country for 
international providers of essential services like telecommunication, 
banks, insurance companies, business and legal consultants etc. can help to 
raise the productivity level and export capacity of the entire economy.  
Finally, the new rules and agreements of the WTO can be more effectively 
enforced through the new WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. Deci-
sions can no longer be blocked by the defendant country – it has to comply 
(at least after the decision has be confirmed by the second stage of the 
Dispute Settlement Procedure, the Appellate Body). Certainly, the WTO 
has no enforcement capacity of its own, it can only allow the winning 
party to impose trade sanctions against the defendant equivalent to the 
damage caused by the action of the defendant. This means that small coun-
tries do not have much leverage against large countries even if they have 
won their case in a WTO Dispute Settlement. Nevertheless, there is reason 
for hope: It seems that the WTO rules-based system and the Dispute Set-
tlement Procedure is gaining credibility with every new decision so that 
even large countries feel obliged to accept a WTO Dispute Settlement 
decision and to change their policies accordingly. 
3.2 Industrial policy space under the WTO  
Recently, the debate on industrial policy under the WTO has gained mo-
mentum with the publication of new books and papers by eminent econo-
mists and economic historians showing convincingly that not only the 
rapidly industrialising countries in East and South East Asia had used a 
number of instruments for strategically promoting the development of new 
industries and for defending them against import competition during their 
learning phase, but that even the Western industrial countries had used far 
more active industrial policies at their early stages of development than 
would be allowed under the multilateral framework of today (Chang 2002; 
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Gallagher 2005; Stiglitz / Charlton 2006; Yong-Shik Lee 2006). If today’s 
industrialising countries are denied to apply the same active industrial 
policies which the developed countries had used at their early stages of 
industrial development and which they still apply for protecting declining 
industries (e. g. until 2005, their textile and clothing industries could be 
protected with import quotas) and for protecting their agricultural sector 
which has a comparative disadvantage against efficient producers in de-
veloping countries, this creates the perception of a fundamental unfairness 
built into the WTO system. Developing countries knew this all the time, 
but they felt less affected in the old times of the GATT when they did not 
play an active role in the negotiations on tariff reductions and did not to 
offer reciprocal concessions themselves. This has changed with the Uru-
guay Round and the replacement of the GATT Secretariat by the WTO. In 
principle, all agreements are binding all WTO member states (single un-
dertaking),12 and a number of the new agreements do have important con-
sequences for a widening range of trade-related economic policies thus 
limiting the policy space for all WTO member states. This is more relevant 
for developing countries as they were mainly using certain economic poli-
cies for developmental purposes, which are now ruled out by the new 
WTO agreements. 
Since the failed WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, there is 
increasing criticism from developing countries and the global civil society 
that the Uruguay Round in the GATT had been a bad bargain for develop-
ing countries. They had accepted a number of new agreements imposing 
stricter disciplines for trade-related economic policies that limit their pol-
icy space for active and selective industrial policy and export promotion, 
against the promise of the developed countries to open their markets for 
agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries.  
In the years after the end of the Uruguay Round, it became clear that full 
compliance with the new agreements would entail considerable costs for 
developing countries before they would have any benefit from them, 
whereas the developed countries postponed the implementation of their 
                                                          
12 Only least developed are not obliged to comply fully with the new rules and agree-
ments, at least they are given long transition periods, e. g. for establishing their systems 
of intellectual property protection. To what extent other developing countries can use 
the escape clause of special and differential treatment, is still a topic for debate and ne-
gotiations in the ongoing Development Round. 
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obligations from the Uruguay Round – they required another decade for 
phasing out existing import quotas on textiles and clothing, and the prom-
ised liberalisation of agricultural markets, especially the phasing out of 
export subsidies, is still an issue for negotiations in the new Doha Round 
of the WTO.  
The criticism of the unfair deal of the Uruguay Round has been supported 
by more detailed assessments by a number of heterodox economists and 
economic historians arguing that the narrowing of the policy space through 
the new WTO rules and agreements is detrimental for economic develop-
ment through industrialization in developing countries. Orthodox econo-
mists on the other hand, counter that the new disciplines for economic and 
industrial policies will force developing countries to pursue more transpar-
ent and predictable market oriented policies which will result in increasing 
investment from both domestic and international firms and lead to higher 
growth rates and economic development.  
The debate on the implications of the new WTO rules and agreements is 
fuelled by the controversial debate on the origins and ingredients of the 
East Asian Miracle, i. e. the exceptionally high growth rates of East Asian 
Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) for several decades, interrupted 
only by the short interlude of the Asian crisis 1997/98. The debate has 
generated certain widely shared conclusions which are summarized here: 
– With the exception of Hong Kong, which was a special case as Main-
land Chinas export window to the world, all East Asian NICs did ap-
ply some sort of active and selective industrial policy, at least during 
the early phase of their industrial development (World Bank 1993) 
The vast literature on East Asian countries’ development experience 
provides ample evidence that active and selective industrial policies 
did play an important role in the early phase of industrial develop-
ment.  
– Whether selective industrial policy has been effective in raising eco-
nomic growth above the level that these countries would have 
achieved without selective interventions is difficult to measure due to 
the lack of counterfactual evidence. However, there is empirical evi-
dence that East Asian governments have managed to stimulate indus-
trial development, export diversification and economic growth of their 
countries. Some interventions were more successful than others, espe-
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cially if they were performance-based, as for instance export subsidies 
(Bora et al. 2000, 13, 33). Many of the structural transformations oc-
curring in these countries would not have taken place without indus-
trial policy interventions. High tech industries in countries that had 
been mainly commodity exporters (e. g. Malaysia) would not have es-
tablished without some form of government support. On the other 
hand, there are examples for failed policies, e. g. the failed automotive 
policies in Malaysia and Indonesia.  
Box 1: The meaning of Industrial Policy 
There is no single definition of “industrial policy”. Recent definitions are: 
“Industrial policies comprise a variety of actions designed to target specific 
sectors to increase their productivity and their relative importance within the 
manufacturing sector.” (Pack 2000, 48) 
“…industrial policy is basically any type of selective intervention or government 
policy that attempts to alter the sectoral structure of production toward sectors 
that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth than would occur 
in the absence of such interventions, i. e., in the market equilibrium.” (Pack / 
Saggi 2006, 2) 
“…restructuring policies in favour of more dynamic activities generally, regard-
less of whether those are located within industry or manufacturing per se. (…) 
The nature of industrial policies is that they complement – opponents would say 
‘distort’ – market forces: they reinforce or counteract the allocative effects that 
the existing markets would otherwise produce.” (Rodrik 2004, 2) 
Thus, the general understanding is that industrial policy comprises selective 
government intervention to change the structure of industry (and the sectoral 
composition of the entire economy if selective intervention in favour of certain 
agricultural activities or services are included) from the market pattern. The 
objective of industrial policy is to stimulate the diversification of the economy 
towards higher value-added activities that generate new employment and ex-
ports. 
The economic rationale for industrial policy is to correct market failures. Mar-
kets do not work perfectly if there are entry barriers due to economies of scale, 
which large companies enjoy as a result of large-scale mass production. Another 
market failure results from risk aversion of private entrepreneurs who will not 
invest much in research and development (R&D) of new products and new 
technologies if there are not sufficient guarantees that they will be able to reap 
the profits from successful inventions or product development. Especially at an 
early phase of industrial development, markets alone will not trigger off major 
industrial investments with economies of scale and linkages to other invest-
ments. There can be a need to coordinate investment strategies and projects in 
several industries each of which would not be profitable alone. A  similar market 
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failure prevents that exports are triggered off by opening of export markets 
alone. The first company venturing into exports will face a number of institu-
tional obstacles (customs procedures, convincing customers of the quality and 
reliability of his products) and economic risks (obtaining export credits and risk 
insurance), which require substantial initial investment, including the risk of 
failure, before exports thrive and generate a return on investment. The pioneer 
will avoid venturing into exports and taking the risks of pre-investment if he 
cannot prevent other companies to learn from his experience and start exporting 
with lower transaction costs and risks. This market failure is a justification for 
government subsidies to exports, especially during the pre-investment phase of 
pioneering companies (market research, risk sharing schemes etc.) These typical 
market failures at an early stage of industrial development and export orientation 
call for some type of consultation between economic policy makers and the 
business community in which targets are defined and complementary activities 
of both sides negotiated. 
The East Asian type of industrial policy differs from the two other models for 
promoting industrial development through government interventions: In contrast 
to the socialist countries, East Asian NICs did not believe in the virtues of cen-
tral planning and public ownership of all enterprises. They avoided the pitfalls of 
the ideological Cold War between central planning and pure market economy 
and tried to find a pragmatic compromise between the market and the state in 
directing industrial development and allocating the necessary resource. In con-
trast to the preoccupation of Latin American development thinkers with import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1950s and 1960s, East Asian policy 
makers saw no virtue in delinking industrial development from the world mar-
kets. By combining some degree of infant-industry protection with an early 
orientation of the  new industries towards exports, they avoided the risks of 
excessive import substitution strategies, which undermined international com-
petitiveness of domestic industries. When all developing countries changed their 
development strategy from import substitution to outward orientation and inte-
gration into the global economy, East Asian NICs were in a better position to 
manage a more gradual change towards complying with the rules of the game 
than many former socialist and Latin American countries. 
– Neoclassical economists tend to deny any positive impact of industrial 
policy and point to examples of failed projects (e. g. Indonesia’s and 
Malaysia’s national automobile policies). They emphasise the risk of 
rent seeking by industries and individual companies benefiting from 
selective industrial policy measures they were able to demand from 
economic policy makers and bureaucrats. Neoclassical economists see 
the risk of misallocation of scare resources, rent seeking and corrup-
tion as a justification for pleading neutral and generic economic poli-
cies, especially for weak governments and countries which do not have 
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a meritocratic bureaucracy with a strong commitment for the public good 
instead of pursuing selfish interests (Jwa 1999; Noland / Pack 2003).  
– On the other side, there are economists who regard industrial policy of 
East Asian style, i. e. with its strong emphasis on promoting interna-
tional competitiveness of national industries instead of protecting 
them from international competition as the old fashioned import sub-
stitution strategy had done, as beneficial for economic growth (Ams-
den 2000, 2001; Wade 2000; Westphal 2000; Lall 2003, 2004; Stiglitz 
2001; Stiglitz / Charlton 2005). In this camp, there are some who ar-
gue that the impact was positive in general, however relatively small 
compared to other factors like political stability, a legal system with 
reliable property rights and effective courts for contract enforcement 
and transparent procedures for the settlement of disputes between 
companies, a sound macroeconomic framework favouring exports, 
good infrastructure, openness for technology imports and foreign di-
rect investment, support for R&D as a prerequisite for technology ab-
sorption and adaptation to local conditions and upgrading, emphasis 
on education and vocational training, high savings rates as a special 
feature of East Asian people. And at the other end of the spectre of 
views on industrial policy there is an increasing number of heterodox 
economists, who argue that the good macroeconomic policy frame-
work alone would not have triggered off the exceptionally high 
growth rates of East Asian countries. The advocates of an active in-
dustrial policy see a strong need for government interventions assum-
ing that the market does not always lead to optimal outcomes. For 
them, the critical question is not whether the state should intervene in 
the market, but how to intervene in a way that accelerates economic 
development (Lee 2002, Jomo 2001).13 “The argument for a more bal-
anced assessment of the contribution of industrial policy to late indus-
trialization in the Southeast Asian HPAEs (High Performing Asian 
Economies) does not suggest that all industrial policy in the region 
has been the best possible or even consistently desirable. There have 
been many instances of bad industrial policy, but the existence of bad 
industrial policy is not proof that all industrial policy has been bad. 
Many of the structural transformations occurring in the region would 
                                                          
13  The Taiwanese example may be especially relevant to study : “ …the Taiwanese gov-
ernment continues to be intensively involved in technology acquisition and in driving 
the small and medium enterprises to upgrade their products and processes, and in me-
diating the integration with the international economy. Much of the regulation and the 
assistance is now camouflaged to make the economy look WTO compatible…” (Wade 
2000, 12).   
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not have taken place without industrial policy. Good industrial policy 
is needed.” (Jomo 2001, 489) Therefore, the relevant question is not, 
whether governments should pursue any kind of industrial policy at 
all, but what kind, and with what instruments and what are realistic 
goals? “(…) the key issue should not be government intervention or 
not, although this is the current preoccupation. Instead, analytical 
concern should focus on appropriate government interventions in 
light of specific conditions and policy goals.” (Jomo 2001, 482) 
– With respect to the impact of the new WTO trading rules and agree-
ments there seems to be a consensus that they do rule out some of the 
industrial policy measures and instruments like reverse engineering, 
local content rules for foreign investors, or export subsidies.14 But 
even the critics of this trend do not expect that it can be reversed, at 
least in the present round of the WTO. Bilateral trade and investment 
agreements between developed and developing countries reveal the 
opposite trend towards even deeper obligations that constrain develop-
ing countries’ policy space. The interests of powerful transnational 
corporations in the developed world push into the direction of widen-
ing the rules for economic policies and an effective and transparent 
legal framework for foreign investment in all countries integrating 
into the globalising economy. Even the rising stars, China and India 
seem to evaluate the existing multilateral rules and agreements as 
beneficial for their highly successful export-oriented development 
strategies that are already causing concern on the side of the Western 
developed countries about the impact of the rising economic powers 
in Asia on their own policy space in the global economy and the insti-
tutions of global governance. Both countries use the policy space left 
                                                          
14  At UNCTAD XI, Sao Paulo, June 2004, the possible conflict between the commitment 
to multilateral trade rules and the national policy space has been recognised for the first 
time in an intergovernmental consensus document. Paragraph 8 of the Draft Sao Paulo 
Consensus states: “The increasing interdependence of national economies in a globaliz-
ing world and the emergence of rule based regimes for international economic relations 
have meant that the space for national economic policy, i. e. the scope for domestic 
policies, especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development, is now 
often framed by international disciplines, commitments and global market considera-
tions. It is for each Government to evaluate the trade-off between the benefits of accept-
ing international rules and commitments and the constraints posed by the loss of policy 
space. It is particularly important for developing countries, bearing in mind develop-
ment goals and objectives, that all countries take into account the need for appropriate 
balance between national policy space and international disciplines and commitments.” 
(UNCTAD 2004)   
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by the WTO framework in a creative way, knowing that their increas-
ing economic power will give them more room for manoeuvre in case 
of conflict with the interests of Western firms.  
– A realistic if sober view of the challenges of globalization sees the 
new WTO rules and agreements as a reflection of new trends and pat-
terns in the global organization of industries and markets. According 
to this view, globalization is more than trade liberalization, it also in-
duces a fundamental change of the global organization of industries. 
New transport and communication technologies in combination with 
new concepts of modularization of production processes have made 
global integration of industries possible. Multinational companies 
were the first to integrate developing countries into their global out-
sourcing and production strategies relocating standardized and labour 
intensive parts of their manufacturing processes to developing coun-
tries in order to benefit from their low labour costs plus additional ad-
vantages like tax rebates and other investment incentives. Smaller and 
more specialized firms have followed and are able to organise interna-
tional production and marketing networks in which several firms work 
together and organize internationally integrated value chains for new 
products. These production networks can be even more flexible than a 
single large multinational corporation in organising new international 
production based on modularized and standardized elements of inte-
grated manufacturing and marketing processes. Of course, the interna-
tional integration of manufacturing processes requires open markets 
and transparent and predictable economic policies determining the 
costs of producing in a country. Companies organising international 
production networks need transparency and reliability of economic 
policies and trade policies in particular in all countries involved. This 
is the rationale for governments to enter into tighter trade agreements 
and become members of the WTO and negotiate ever more precise 
WTO agreements and rules. It guarantees internationally operating 
companies that their investment and cooperation strategies within 
global production networks will not be jeopardized by irresponsible 
governments who do not understand the new patterns and modalities 
of global industries. 
– A preliminary conclusion from the present state of the debate on in-
dustrial polices under the WTO would be: Even the East Asian NICs 
which had applied, at an early stage of their industrial development, 
active and selective industrial policies with considerable success, had 
to change their old selective interventionist policies and adopt more 
generic policies which are in accordance with the legal framework of 
Vietnam – the 150th WTO-member – Implications for industrial policy and export promotion 
German Development Institute 51
the WTO (and regional or bilateral trade and investment agreements) 
and which support manufacturers in general to play an increasingly 
active role within the new international production and marketing 
networks. With appropriate generic policies (reliable legal framework, 
effective property rights, efficient infrastructure, promotion of R&D 
capacities in research centres and industry, protection of intellectual 
property rights, education and training), governments can help their 
industries to climb the ladder from suppliers of standardized low 
value-added intermediary goods to the value chains of companies in 
Europe or the US to producing higher value-added products within 
global value chains and, finally, to becoming original brand manufac-
turers who produce newly developed and designed products under 
their own brand name (Akyüz / Chang / Kozul-Wright 1998).  
Latecomers like Vietnam will not be able to copy the old industrial poli-
cies of the East Asian NICs. This may not be as unfavourable as some 
critics of the narrowing policy space put it. In today’s globalizing econ-
omy, it is no longer a realistic goal to develop integrated industrial com-
plexes in one country. Modern high tech industries with short product 
cycles and high investment into R&D for new products and production 
technologies need the world markets as outlet to recover the investment 
and R&D costs as quickly as possible. Industries that are not connected to 
the global production networks will fall behind. Therefore, it is imperative 
for developing countries trying to promote industrialisation to become 
attractive locations for multinational companies and companies integrated 
into global production networks that will produce for the world markets. 
Several factors make a country attractive for outsourcing strategies of this 
type of foreign investors: Political and macroeconomic stability, a trans-
parent legal system, an efficient infrastructure, an educated and diligent 
workforce, and, not to forget, local industries that can become efficient 
suppliers of components for the export production of the foreign firms. 
Thus, there is a strong case for industrial policies that encourage the de-
velopment and technological upgrading of local ancillary industries as an 
important complement to the other policies that make a country an attrac-
tive location for multinational firms and international production and mar-
keting networks (Hausmann / Rodrik 2002; Hoekman / Javorcik 2004). 
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3.3 Implications for Vietnam 
After the first round of market reforms which triggered off a great leap 
forward in economic growth and export expansion driven by a commer-
cially motivated population eager to make use of the new opportunities for 
establishing small enterprises and testing the markets and by a rising in-
flow of foreign direct investment, Vietnam will have to accomplish a sec-
ond round of reforms which are necessary, first, to make its legal and 
institutional framework compatible with the multilateral standards for 
international economic transactions and second, to enhance the structural 
transformation of its industry so that it will be able to meet the challenges 
of international economic integration. The first generation of market re-
forms aimed at the removal of barriers against the establishment of private 
enterprises, foreign investment and international trade by individual enter-
prises. With the second generation of reforms, Vietnam will have to de-
velop and strengthen the institutional framework for a modern open mar-
ket economy, and the government will have to change its role from direct 
involvement in the production of goods and services through state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to the more indirect role governments play in a market 
economy. Thus, Vietnam has to learn and implement the lessons, which 
other East Asian NICs had to learn in view of the fundamental changes in 
the world economy in which markets for sophisticated goods are increas-
ingly being organised by international production and marketing networks, 
and the related changes of the multilateral trade policy framework. 
As a latecomer on the global stage, Vietnam will not have much time for 
implementing the necessary reforms. Other countries in the region are 
more advanced and are also reforming their systems in order to become as 
open as possible to the global markets. Vietnam can study their successes 
and avoid some of their mistakes. If it will become an open economy with 
a transparent legal system and an economic administration willing to listen 
to the business community and to implement the reforms requested by 
industry, Vietnam will benefit from the economic dynamics in the 
neighbouring countries, where infrastructural and qualification bottlenecks 
(especially in China) will raise costs for manufacturing, so that interna-
tional investors will search for alternative locations and find out that Viet-
nam has become a good and politically stable location for export process-
ing manufacturing industries. 
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In view of the necessary legal and institutional reforms, the decision to 
join the WTO is well founded. The promise to comply with the rules and 
agreements of the WTO is more than the price to be paid for having better 
and transparent access conditions to the markets of all other WTO member 
states. It is good economic policy for the country itself. The WTO rules 
and agreements provide Vietnam’s economic policy makers with a com-
prehensive reference guide for the necessary legal and institutional re-
forms. By signing international trade agreements, the government binds 
itself against a policy reversal under the pressure of protectionist and rent-
seeking lobbies. As long as the government can argue that attempts by 
import-competing industries to roll back the reform programme would put 
the export interests of new industries (and agriculture) at risk, it will be 
able to contain the protectionist pressures. Making Vietnam’s economic 
reforms sustainable and credible for the outside world is one of the most 
important effects of WTO membership. It will certify the country as attrac-
tive platform for producing components within global production net-
works.  
Compared to the positive effect of WTO accession for Vietnam’s perspec-
tives to join the league of rapidly industrialising East Asian countries, the 
negative effect of a reduced policy space for selective industrial policies 
seems to be acceptable. Of course, some of the new rules like the TRIPS 
Agreement on intellectual property rights, or the TRIMs Agreement do 
reflect the business interests of multinational companies in the developed 
world who try to defend their leading position in the world markets based 
on advanced technology, management and production systems against new 
competitors from developing countries, especially if they get excessive 
subsidies or other direct support from their governments. But the same 
companies are the main agents for integrating developing countries into 
their global outsourcing strategies. If they want to find a place in the world 
markets for sophisticated manufactured goods, developing countries have 
to cooperate with the lead firms in modern industry and to comply with the 
rules of the game.  
This does not prevent governments of developing countries from searching 
for creative industrial policies geared to promote and facilitate industrial 
restructuring of domestic industries and enterprises so that they become 
high quality ancillary suppliers to foreign investors and reliable business 
partners within international production and marketing networks. Most 
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governments, including those of Western developed countries, pursue 
some form of industrial policy geared to increase competitiveness of na-
tional producers. The long list of disputes between WTO member states 
over hidden subsidies and other industrial policy measures that distort 
international competition reveals the strong interest of governments in 
supporting national champions and national industries in general against 
foreign competitors. The multilateral trading rules have developed in re-
sponse to unfair practices of supporting national producers at the expense 
of foreign producers. And the complexity of the system is an indication for 
the creativity of governments searching for new forms of subsidies and 
protectionist measures in favour of domestic industries. 
The effect of the WTO rules is not to prevent a government from playing 
an active role in development, but to make it replace direct and selective 
intervention (such as import protection, licensing procedures and subsi-
dies) with more generic policy instruments (such as incentives to attract 
FDI, to foster human capital formation, infrastructure development, capac-
ity building, promotion of R&D through subsidies, research centres, uni-
versities, and trade promotion) that support firms in their efforts to succeed 
in foreign markets (Bora et al. 2000, 25, 33; Altenburg et al. 1998, 10–12). 
There is, however, no blueprint for the most effective model for a modern 
developmental state that encourages and supports the development of new 
industries and services that are able to meet the challenges of international 
competition. Each country must find a policy mix that suits best its devel-
opment conditions. 
If Vietnam wants to take full advantage of the global economic system, the 
country needs to find its own way for integrating into the global economy 
that is consistent with its specific institutional framework and economic 
conditions as well as with the requirements of the WTO. Even if the policy 
space for active and selective industrial policy may be more limited today 
than it had been for the more advanced East Asian NICs before the new 
WTO rules and agreements came into effect, the agenda for Vietnam’s 
“second generation reform programmes” is ambitious enough that the 
government will have to mobilize all its capacities to implement the pro-
grammes in a coordinated and effective way. The major tasks the Viet-
namese government will have to solve are:15 
                                                          
15  The following is based on: Consultative Group (2005).  
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– Reform of the legal system: Economic legislation in accordance with 
the WTO rules and agreements and, what is no less important, more 
effective enforcement of laws, regulations and business contracts by 
the courts. The legal profession in particular will need a lot of training 
to be prepared for the new tasks (e. g. judging disputes over trade 
marks and counterfeit goods). 
– Reform of public administration: Instead of direct involvement in 
the production of goods and services by SOEs, the economic admi-
nistration has to adopt a new role in the impartial implementation of 
general rules, stimulation and regulation of competition especially 
between public and private, foreign and domestic companies. In gen-
eral: increasing transparency and accountability of all levels of gov-
ernment and public administration, phasing out of preferential treat-
ment of SOEs and foreign investors linked to SOEs compared to 
treatment of small private enterprises, establishment of a level playing 
field for all economic agents. There may be some room for industrial 
policy in the sense of encouraging private investment into new ven-
tures which could be facilitated not only by venture capital provided 
by State owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), but also by close coope-
ration and information sharing between industrial enterprises (organi-
sed in business associations) and economic administration on invest-
ment plans, and the complementary activities the government has to 
perform in order to facilitate innovation, especially by small private 
enterprises. The reform of customs administration is especially urgent 
in view of trade facilitation. Another aspect is the need for improve-
ment of administrative performance of provinces that lag behind oth-
ers: There is scope for competition between provinces, for improve-
ment of transparency and accountability of provincial administration 
through publication of benchmarks and comparison of economic per-
formance indicators and resources used for infrastructure development 
and attracting industries. 
– Restructuring of industry: Equitization of SOEs is already under 
way, preferential treatment should be phased out, but this may need 
some sort of cultural revolution as the old personal ties between SOE 
managers and government officials will play a role for some time to 
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come.16 In order to counterbalance the political influence of SOE ma-
nagers, formalisation of small and medium enterprises, removal of 
obstacles for their growth (land rights, access to credits, support for 
R&D and absorption, adaptation of modern technologies, training of 
entrepreneurs in modern management and marketing methods….), 
equal treatment of foreign investors is needed most. There may be 
some room for industrial policy when dealing with foreign investors 
even if the heavy handed methods of the past like local content obliga-
tions will no longer be allowed under the TRIMs Agreement of the 
WTO. But the WTO does not prevent governments from consulting 
foreign investors about their preconditions for increasing inputs from 
domestic sources. The government will not be constrained to provide 
the necessary complementary services in terms of technology upgra-
ding of local ancillary industries, improvement of vocational training 
for raising workers’ capabilities in handling modern machines and 
performing high quality work that is required by foreign firms sear-
ching for capable and reliable ancillary suppliers to their global pro-
duction and marketing networks. Provision of adequate infrastructure 
and logistical services would also be part of the cooperation with fo-
reign investors and induce them, through positive measures, to raise 
the local content of their production. One of the most important tasks 
for industrial policy will be bringing Vietnam’s private enterprises in-
to closer supplier relationship with the foreign firms manufacturing 
for exports. They seem to be not yet repared to obtain a major share of 
their inputs to export production from local suppliers and rely on im-
ports from their technologically more advanced and experienced 
suppliers abroad. (Consultative Group 2005, 35). For attaining that 
goal, it may be necessary to encourage and support the restructuring 
process of the private sector in which the majority of companies are 
                                                          
16  An interesting recommendation is to transform Vietnam’s SOEs gradually instead of 
outright privatization. “Given the political unpalatability of, and arguably large welfare 
losses associated with, large-scale privatization (i. e., on account of the absence of the 
requisite market and regulatory institutions), China and Vietnam might very well find 
well-regulated business groups an attractive transitional model for cultivating dynami-
cally efficient networks that cut across ownership forms. Such networks can, under a 
good policy framework, help promising firms in the two countries to economize on 
scarce managerial skills and high transaction costs, ease risk management by providing 
a mechanism for mutual insurance, and accelerate technological diffusion.” (Abegaz 
2005).  
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relatively small. So far, there is a “missing middle” of private compa-
nies producing on a sufficiently large scale so that they can become 
efficient suppliers to foreign firms with their requirements for timely 
delivery, high quality and state-of-art technology. 
– Reform of the banking system: Equitization (privatisation in Viet-
namese terminology) of state owned commercial banks is ongoing. 
There is still a need for better governance of banks and better risk as-
sessment to avoid further accumulation of non-performing loans. A 
financial system in which private banks play a major rule needs su-
pervision by a government body to avoid banking crises that can en-
tail systemic risks. 
– Development of a modern infrastructure: Bottlenecks leading to 
port congestion etc. have to be removed, the necessary investment for 
improving infrastructure services may be mobilised by allowing pri-
vate investment where possible. 
– Strengthening of technological capacity of enterprises, stimulation 
of R&D in research centres and universities. According to a United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)-sponsored 
report on Vietnam’s scientific and technological capacity, the country 
has a relatively large number of science and technology personnel and 
institutions. “… there are nearly one million graduates from appro-
ximately one hundred universities or colleges spread throughout the 
country and some 1.3 million have attended technical training institu-
tes.” (Bezanson 2000, 18.) But the quality of the personnel seems to 
be insufficient and the S&T system not geared to support the techno-
logical upgrading of local enterprises. Industrial policy will have to 
focus on improving the national innovation system and strengthen the 
links with domestic industries.  
– Strengthening the institutional framework for quality production: 
There is a need to improve the capacity of the standards organizations, 
of testing and certification agencies for disseminating information and 
offering training programmes to an increasing number of enterprises 
who have to understand the importance of technical standards and 
quality requirements as a precondition for export marketing in devel-
oped countries where the consumers demand high quality goods and 
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for linking to international production and marketing networks that 
have their own quality standards. 
– In addition to the economic reforms, there is a need for reforms of 
public services in the fields of health, education and social security in 
order to improve the quality and provision of the services to remote 
regions and poorer segments of the population. With the privatisation 
of state owned enterprises they will have to reduce their labour force 
and their internal social security systems. In-firm security systems 
will have to be replaced by general government-backed social security 
systems that are open to employees from both public and private en-
terprises and that facilitate economic restructuring. This is even more 
important for a modern economy in which people move from rural ar-
eas to the cities in order to find new jobs in industry and services. 
With urbanisation, the family-based social security systems will 
erode, so that the state has to substitute a general social safety net in 
order to prevent growing inequalities and discontent with the evolu-
tion of the market economy.  
To achieve all this, a number of reforms have to be implemented at the 
same time, which do not require policies, and measures prohibited by 
WTO rules and agreements. Whether this ambitious agenda will leave 
room for and require additional selective industrial policy measures is an 
open question. The costs of a potential conflict with other WTO member 
states (the WTO itself does not initiate legal proceedings against an of-
fending member state) have to be carefully weighted to the potential bene-
fits of such policies or measures. When Vietnamese economic policy mak-
ers consider the options for selective industrial policy left by the multilat-
eral trading rules of the WTO and the obligations and disciplines involved 
in regional and bilateral agreements, they should concentrate first on the 
enormous tasks the government is facing with the second generation of 
reforms which can be implemented without conflict with the WTO rules 
and agreements.  
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4 Challenges for industrial policy 
4.1 Import liberalization 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Tariff cuts and elimination of quantitative import restrictions are one of 
the ‘entry fees’ countries aiming at WTO membership have to pay.17 
Countries joining the WTO today and in future have to accept deeper tariff 
cuts than in the past because of the general lower tariff levels of the in-
cumbents who have negotiated successive rounds of tariff reductions un-
der the GATT (the present Doha Round is the first multilateral round of 
trade negotiations under the WTO). With the exception of a few tariff 
peaks, tariffs in the developed countries for most manufactured goods 
have been reduced close to zero, whereas the advanced developing coun-
tries still apply higher tariffs in general, but have also followed the general 
tariff reductions resulting from the GATT rounds and from their abandon-
ing the earlier strategy of import substitution in favour of a more export 
oriented strategy. Before joining the WTO, Vietnam will have to adjust its 
tariffs downward in a very short time. This will not be a major problem in 
principle, since the tariff levels are already relatively low for a wider range 
of goods, only the reduction of some peak tariffs will cause adjustment 
problems for the industries and producers affected.18  
                                                          
17  Of course, economists view tariff reductions as advantageous for a country as a whole. 
The more open the economy becomes, the more it will specialise according to its com-
parative advantages and make use of economies of scale in production for larger export 
markets. The winners from improved specialization should always be able to compen-
sate the losers. Therefore, economists advocate even unilateral market opening. The 
mercantilistic bargaining between two countries over “tariff concessions” can only be 
justified as a way of winning the support of one’s own export industries to a trade liber-
alisation programme.  
18  “As of 20 April 2005, Viet Nam’s trade weighted average tariff was 11 per cent and Viet 
Nam’s simple average tariff was 17.8 per cent. The simple average tariff on major im-
ported items was 21.4 per cent for agricultural products, 38.4 per cent for transporta-
tion equipment, 37.3 per cent for textiles, 13.5 per cent for minerals, 18.46 per cent for 
machinery and electrical equipment, and 8.05 per cent for metals. Tariffs ranged from 
zero to 60 per cent, with about 52 per cent of the tariff lines falling into the 0-5 per cent 
range.” (WTO 2006b, 38, para. 149)  
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The purpose e of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the challenges 
Vietnam is facing with the removal of trade barriers on imports in order to 
comply with GATT / WTO rules. Meeting GATT / WTO requirements 
means making Vietnam’s tariff structure more uniform, with deeper tariff 
for highly protective tariff levels and removal of non-tariff barriers in the 
coming years. 
Regarding required tariff reductions, Vietnam has already paved the way 
for WTO accession through its commitments to the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) and to the US BTA. Furthermore, the average tariff level is 
comparatively moderate, though it has recently increased and is now in the 
upper range of East Asian countries. Moreover, due to its long border with 
China and its long coast which are both difficult to control, Vietnam is 
already a relatively open economy, especially for light industrial goods. 
However, Vietnam’s tariff structure shows very high protection rates for 
some industries. In these sectors, the required tariff harmonization may 
become a major challenge for Vietnam.19 
Regarding the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB), Vietnam has 
already taken important steps according to the “tariffication” rules of 
GATT Art. XI. Yet, “de-facto NTBs” in particular, are still a major prob-
lem. Therefore, a consistent customs valuation system and consistent and 
reliable customs procedures are needed. This might go easily hand in hand 
with the necessity to harmonise Vietnam’s tariff scheme since less and 
lower tariff rates provide the ground for easier and more transparent cus-
toms valuation.20 
                                                          
19  This chapter on import policy does not aim at giving recommendations about what 
would be an optimal tariff structure for Vietnam. Not knowing which industries will be 
competitive in the future, it is difficult if not impossible – and probably not advisable – 
to estimate how much protection might be necessary. On the contrary, the following 
remarks are made having in mind that priority tasks for Vietnam will be the provision 
and improvement of sufficient and adequate infrastructure, the development of a cost-
efficient services sector and a reliable economic framework for the development of a 
competitive and prospering private business sector. It will then be mainly up to the 
market forces to decide which industries will be the most competitive ones. 
20  At present, customs procedures are being discussed especially among WTO member 
states since industrialized countries have put the issue of “trade facilitation” on the 
agenda of the current negotiation round. Facilitating trade means first and foremost the 
implementation of transparent and reliable customs valuation and procedures for all 
trading partners. 
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In this section on GATT requirements, firstly, a general description of 
Vietnam’s current tariff scheme, major adjustment requirements and the 
implications that this might have for the business sector is given. Sec-
ondly, major NTBs currently in use in Vietnam are described. Since Viet-
nam will have to put special effort into the improvement of cumbersome 
customs procedures, special attention will be given to this de-facto NTB. 
In the second section, some concluding remarks are made on the resulting 
challenges of import liberalisation for industrial policy of Vietnam. 
Box 2: Provisions for tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade of  
GATT / WTO 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded in 1947, con-
stitutes the major legal framework of the WTO aiming at fair and equal treat-
ment of all signatory countries and progressive dismantling of barriers to interna-
tional trade. The use of measures other than duties to restrict either imports or 
exports is prohibited by GATT Article XI. Policy instruments to protect domes-
tic industries, like licensing quotas, state-trading, subsidizing and non-tariff 
barriers to trade are prohibited under WTO law. 
Hence, the commitment to cut tariffs is the central feature of the GATT. WTO 
member states are required to bind as many tariffs as possible in GATT. Bound 
tariffs cannot be raised unilaterally without further negotiations and compensa-
tions for affected member countries. If the bound tariff rate for a specific product 
category is for example 20 %, the applied rate may be lower, e. g. 5 %. Thus, 
there is still some room for raising the applied tariff rate up to the bound rate. 
The binding refers to a maximum tariff, which restricts contracting parties to 
allow the tariff of a particular product to exceed the GATT binding. GATT 
bindings are part of WTO Annex 1A (Article II of GATT), and they are docu-
mented in individual national schedules (schedule of tariff concessions). For 
goods without tariff binding any tariff rate may be charged. With the general 
trade liberalization under GATT and WTO, developing countries are obliged to 
expand their tariff bindings to new products and to bind their tariffs at lower 
levels, thus closing the gap between bound and applied tariff rates. 
4.1.2 Vietnam’s tariff scheme: in need of harmonization  
Vietnam’s tariff structure is biased in favour of import-substituting indus-
tries, particularly those dominated by SOEs. Tariff rates are higher for 
manufactured products which are also produced in Vietnam – particularly 
for some consumer goods like garments, footwear, ceramic products and 
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leather goods. Selective protection is also provided for upstream industries 
related to textiles (silk, cotton, certain fibres) and certain intermediate 
goods (metal products, cements, glass). 
After several adjustments, the current export and import tariff law is in 
effect since 1st January 1999. Regarding imports, it consists of 97 chapters 
and 6247 items under a six-digit Harmonised System (HS) of product 
classification. Based on this law, the current tariff schedule has 16 tariff 
bands, down from 35 in 1997. The maximum tariff rate on imported goods 
has come down from 200 % to around 150 % between 1997 and 2003, 
accompanied by some reduction in the number of lines at the top end of 
the distribution. By 2003, less than one per cent of total tariff lines had 
tariff rates above 50 %. This accounts for around 5 % of the total import 
value. Maximum tariff rates are concentrated in four HS chapters: HS 22 
(Beverages, spirit and vinegar), HS 87 (Vehicles, other than railway), HS 
24 (tobacco and manufactured tobacco) and HS 63 (worn clothing). Be-
sides, petroleum products, cosmetics, glass and glass products are also 
highly taxed products. 
However, the development of the current import tariff system seems to 
have a short-term character to solve acute problems instead of preparing 
for long-term commitments to trade liberalization required for WTO 
membership. Vietnam has not always followed a steady policy of reducing 
and harmonizing tariff levels. The (weighted) average tariff rate has in-
creased from 12.8 % in 1995 to 15.7 % in 2002 (13.4 % on manufactured 
goods and 17.2 % on primary products) and up to 18.53 % in 2003. In 
addition to this slight increase, the dispersion in tariffs has also remained 
rather high and the decline from 131 % in 1997 to 116 % in 2002 was even 
reversed by rising to 120.8 % again in 2003. The first decline was caused 
by a reshuffling of rates in the middle range (20 % to 30 %) in favour of 
relatively higher rates (30 % to 50 %). Until 2004, middle and higher 
range tariffs of 20 % and more had been increasing again, accompanied by 
a decline in tariff lines between 0 % and 20 % (Athukorala 2004, 29). 
The current tariff schedule is composed of three different categories of 
tariff rates: 
– Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rates are applied to imports from 
countries with which Vietnam has already MFN status. These count-
ries are the European Union, Japan, most Asian countries outside 
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ASEAN, New Zealand, Australia and the USA. By 2002, most im-
ported goods entered Vietnam under MFN rates (Athukorala 2004, 
28). 
– Preferential tariff rates apply to goods imported under the CEPT 
(AFTA) agreement and textiles and garments under the Vietnam-EU-
Agreement. 
– Normal tariff rates are usually set at 50 % higher than the MFN ones 
for all other countries and under all other circumstances. 
Like many other countries, Vietnam applies tariff rates in a cascading 
manner. Lower tariff rates are applied mainly to material inputs for pro-
duction such as machinery, equipment etc., whereas higher tariff rates are 
applied on imported finished products. Thus, nominal tariff rates do not 
always reflect the effective level of protection, which is higher if inputs 
are taxed with lower rates than finished products. In Vietnam, this is par-
ticularly the case in the production of home appliances, textiles, clothing, 
motorcycles, bicycles, motor vehicles and other product categories where 
high Effective Rates of Protection (ERP)21 persist. ERP in these sectors 
range between 50 % and 148 % whereas all other sectors have ERP below 
50 %. However, ERP for manufacturing in general has declined from 
121.5 % in 1997 to 96.0 % in 2001 and 46.3 % in 2003 (Athukorala 2004, 
30). 
Required adjustments in the tariff scheme 
During the past decade, Vietnam has already made efforts towards trade 
liberalisation, in particular through signing AFTA and the US BTA. A 
brief account of liberalisation steps required under these agreements will 
be given below before focusing on WTO requirements and remaining 
adjustment requirements. 
                                                          
21 The ERP is an approach to measure the net impact of trade policies on producers. 
Overall protection to value added depends on the relationship of output and input tariffs 
and the share of imported inputs in production costs. Thus, the overall tariff structure 
has both a tax and a subsidy element. Tariffs on the final good can be seen as a subsidy 
for domestic producers, tariffs on inputs as a tax on their production. The ERP measures 
the respective interplay of “subsidies” and “taxes” on the value added of local produc-
tion: it is positive (negative) if higher (lower) tariffs are applied on finished products 
than on inputs. 
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Regional liberalisation – AFTA: Since 1995, Vietnam is a member of 
ASEAN. The centrepiece of ASEAN is AFTA, which again has the key 
element of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT).22 
Under CEPT, Vietnam has to reduce tariffs by the year 2006 to less than 5 % 
on all but few sensitive items from AFTA member countries.23 By 2001, the 
number of items on which tariffs were already reduced to less than 5 % 
reached 5.000. During the final period until 2006, Vietnam will have to 
adjust the last 1200 tariff lines. The impact of these tariff reductions on the 
average tariff level of Vietnam could be higher because those items to which 
currently high tariff rates are applied can still not be found in CEPT schemes 
(“sensitive items”). However, besides tariff reductions, ASEAN as a com-
prehensive agreement also addresses the harmonization of tariff nomencla-
ture, customs valuation, elimination of non-tariff trade barriers, removal of 
restrictions on foreign exchange etc. Therefore, ASEAN membership can 
be seen as an important step towards WTO accession. 
Bilateral liberalisation – US BTA: The Vietnam US BTA which is in 
force since 2001 has only a minor impact on trade liberalisation. Vietnam 
has agreed to a limited range of tariff cuts on 244 items (195 are agricul-
tural products) with a transition period from three to six years. The aver-
age tariff level for non-agricultural products through US BTA commit-
ments is 22.86 %. 
Multilateral liberalisation – GATT / WTO: Regarding import liberalisa-
tion, Vietnam’s offer24 for the sixth (April 2003) and the seventh (Decem-
                                                          
22  Products eligible for concessions under CEPT must be included in the inclusion list (IL) 
for both exporting and importing, have a CEPT tariff of 20 % or below and contain at 
least 40 % of ASEAN local content. 
23  It consists of four categories of products for reducing tariffs among ASEAN countries. 
Firstly, the inclusion list (IL) comprises those products, for which tariffs have to be re-
duced to 0 % to 5 %. Secondly, the Temporary Exclusion List (TEL) which comprises 
those products that are temporarily excluded from tariff reductions and which Vietnam 
has to gradually include in IL. Thirdly, the General Exemption List (GEL) which com-
prises those goods which are totally excluded from tariff reductions and fourthly, the 
Unprocessed Agricultural Products (UAP). 
24  Once again: For an economist, the term “offer” is not appropriate from the viewpoint of 
a country as a whole, since tariff reductions and import liberalization in general open 
the door for a more effective integration of a country into the international division of 
labour and international competition for both cheaper and better products and push the 
economy toward higher efficiency and income levels. “Offer” is only a reflection of the 
mercantilistic bargaining process in international trade negotiations.  
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ber 2003) WTO Working Party meeting includes the binding of 96 % of 
the tariff lines with an average level of 21 % for non-agricultural products. 
These offers are not much different from the status quo of the currently 
applied average tariff level of 18.5 %. The final outcome of the bilateral 
negotiations shows that Vietnam has been able to defend in principle its 
tariff structure with a number of high tariffs to protect some of its infant 
industries and sensitive agricultural products.  
The report of the Working Party does not reveal the details of the bilateral 
tariff negotiations, it focuses on structural issues of Vietnam’s import 
policies that are of interest to the Members of the Working Party, such as 
existing specific duties which should be converted into ad valorem duties 
as these are more transparent and predictable for traders (WTO 2006b, 39, 
para. 154). Another contested issue are tariff rate quotas for a range of 
products, i. e. low tariff rates for a certain import volume above which 
higher tariff rates are applied. They were criticized by Members of the 
Working Party as outmoded and trade distorting. “Vietnam was reminded 
that a tariff quota system should be simple, transparent, timely, predict-
able, uniform, non-discriminatory and non-trade restrictive, and be ad-
ministered in a way that would not distort trade or cause more burdens 
than absolutely necessary.” (WTO 2006b, 41, para. 163)25 Working Party 
Members especially complained about application of internal taxes (e. g. 
excise tax on automobiles) in a way discriminating imported against do-
mestic products. “In their view, the preferential tax treatment for domestic 
producers was inconsistent with the national treatment principle of Article 
III and should be abolished prior to accession. These Members sought 
commitment from Viet Nam that it would equalize the excise tax rates on 
these products by the date of accession and that from this date Viet Nam 
would apply its taxation measures in full compliance with Article III of the 
GATT without affording protection to domestic production.” Interestingly, 
the Vietnamese delegation defended the application of discriminatory 
internal taxes as an instrument of industrial policy for promoting the de-
velopment of a national car industry: “As for motor vehicles, he (the repre-
                                                          
25  It should be noted however, that developed countries also apply tariff quota systems for 
their preferential duties offered under their General Systems of Preferences (GSP) to 
developing countries. For sensitive products, the application of the preferential rates is 
often limited to a certain import quantity. Once the tariff quota is exceeded, the MFN 
(normal) duty is applied even for imports from developing countries.  
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sentative of Viet Nam) noted that the manufacturing of automobiles was 
still an infant industry in Viet Nam. To support this sector, preferential 
excise tax rates had been granted to automobile manufacturing enterprises 
when investment licenses had been issued. However, as a compromise 
between the need to support this industry and the potential negative effects 
that could result from the imposition of lower excise tax rates, Viet Nam 
had agreed to phase-out the excise tax incentive granted to domestically-
produced automobiles by the end of 2006.” (WTO 2006b, 49, para. 190) 
It was mentioned during the Working Party negotiations that the still exist-
ing high tariffs for some product groups contribute to “rampant smug-
gling” which would put officially declared goods paying high duties at a 
competitive disadvantage with the same smuggled goods (WTO 2006, 63, 
para. 245). Thus, with illegally imported products from China there is 
already water in tariffs.26 The implementation of the AFTA / CEPT 
scheme has lowered average tariff levels slightly. On the other side, Viet-
nam’s tariff structure does not yet reflect these average levels.  The aver-
age tariff level of the last seven countries joining WTO ranged from 4.8  to 
8.9 %, and the average tariff level on industrial goods among all WTO 
members is only 3.5 %.27 Furthermore, and most important from this point 
of view, Vietnam’s protection scheme shows some very high peaks in 
specific industries (e. g. garment, textiles, motor vehicles) leading to a 
high dispersion in tariffs. Being forced to cut tariffs in these industries by 
50 % and more in the near future due to WTO accession may lead to se-
vere adjustment problems for some industries. 
Summing up, one can say that even with reduced and simplified rates, 
Vietnam’s tariff scheme still leaves much to be desired in terms of har-
monization. Tariffs of WTO members are considerably lower and the 
dispersion rate of Vietnam’s tariff scheme is causing concern. Further-
more, negotiating tariff cuts and transition periods is much more difficult 
                                                          
26  “Water in tariffs” on specific items means that the de-facto tariff level on certain 
(mostly light industry) products is lower than the officially applied tariff rates suggest. 
Thus, the domestic product price is already lower than the price that the officially re-
quired import duties on it, plus the market price, would come to (Athukorala 2002, 19). 
27  Generally speaking, average tariff rates are less than 20 % in most countries, although 
they are often quite a bit higher for agricultural commodities. In the most developed 
countries, average tariffs are less than 10 %, and often less than 5 %. On average, less 
developed countries maintain higher tariff barriers, but, for many countries that have re-
cently joined the WTO, tariffs have recently been reduced substantially to gain entry. 
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for countries acceding the WTO today and in future, since overall tariff 
levels have come down considerably.  
A note on the fiscal impact of tariff reductions28 
A major concern for the Vietnamese government with regard to tariff 
reductions for its WTO accession is whether and to what extent this will 
have an adverse impact on the state budget (Cuong 2004, 18–19).29 A 
single reduction of tariff rates would only lead to decreasing tax revenues 
if the volume of imports remained unchanged. But when protection is 
reduced, the volume of imports will probably increase and broaden the 
domestic tax base. Thus, government’s revenue may even increase. More-
over, reduced tariff rates will diminish incentives for informal trade and 
thus reduce the losses from tax evasion. 
Box 3: Yarn and textiles industry 
Vietnam’s textile industry profits from the comparatively low wages. However, 
labor costs are less important in this highly capital-intensive industry. The level 
of technology in this industry tends to be lower in Vietnam than in competing 
countries. Thus, the overall productivity tends to be low, design capacities are 
limited and only a small spectrum of products can be produced in Vietnam. In 
spinning, only short staple yarns are competitive with imports. Long staple yarns 
have to be imported. In the textile industry and in dyeing, the machinery stan-
dard is still quite low. Only about 40 % of the requirements for garment exports 
can be produced locally by suppliers and the revenue from exports of textiles 
and yarn is low. 
Production of textiles with export quality is limited to some FIE. They are en-
couraged to export through government incentives in order to prevent excessive 
competition with the local textile industry (mainly state-owned enterprises). The 
industry is protected by high tariff rates of up to 50 %. Similarly high tariff rates 
up to 40 % are applied on raw materials like silk, cotton, wool and vegetable 
textile fibers. However, joining AFTA has already increased competition in this 
industry and by 2006, tariff rates have  to  be reduced  to 5 %  within  the  CEPT 
                                                          
28  This sub-section does not aim at giving a full assessment of the implications of import 
duty reductions, tax changes and the development of import quantities since this would 
go beyond the scope of this study. A detailed analysis is provided by Athukorala (2004, 
50). 
29 Import and export duties count for an estimated 19 % of government’s budget in 2003. 
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scheme. WTO accession will probably further increase competition, among 
others because upstream industries are weak (e. g. spinning). Policy measures to 
balance the disruptive effects of higher competition should aim at connecting the 
development of the textiles industry to the garment industry, since the garment 
industry shows higher competitiveness on international markets. Policy meas-
ures in this industry should allow private enterprises to make their own invest-
ment decisions rather than prescribing the structure of investment. 
Implications of adjustments in the tariff scheme for industries 
Of course, the reduction of tariff levels will result in stiffer competition 
from cheaper or higher quality imported products. Both, private sector 
SMEs and SOEs will face this challenge. But import substituting FIEs will 
also face the challenge from cheaper imports once tariffs will come down 
to international levels. However, implications and resulting challenges 
differ among industries.  
Box 4:  Garment industry 
The garment industry is characterized by labour intensive production. Therefore, 
foreign investors were attracted to produce garments in Vietnam by its large low 
wage labour force that can be trained very quickly. This led to a rapid increase in 
production and exports in recent years. Vietnamese garment exports can compete 
with those from other countries in quality and price. However, this industry is – 
like in many other successful garment exporting countries of the region – mostly 
processing imported textiles into finished garment exports. Particularly among 
private enterprises, difficulties exist in the management of designing, material 
purchasing, production process and quality control. These factors level out the 
advantages of low labour costs to a certain degree. Therefore, it is questionable 
whether the competitiveness of this industry will be sustainable in the future. In 
the garment sector, product cycles are becoming shorter and there is increasing 
competition through rapidly changing fashions. To remain competitive, Vietnam-
ese enterprises would need to invest in technology, marketing etc. 
The present maximum tariff rates for garments and apparel are at high levels 
around 50 %. In 2002, on HS 63 (other made-up textile articles) even an import 
tariff of 100 % was applied. The required lowering of these protection levels will 
further increase competition in this industry. However, competition is already in-
creasing due to illegal imports from China. In any case, an important ingredient 
for further development of this industry will be training of skilled labour, im-
provement of management capacities, technology upgrading, improvement of 
quality control and increasing productivity. Furthermore, local value added needs 
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to be increased through improved fashion design and product development. In 
addition, concentrating on the domestic market could support further develop-
ment since the demand of textiles is still low in Vietnam. A transparent and flat 
tariff rate system might encourage these changes. 
Enterprises are relatively well informed about the upcoming changes. 
However, the majority of them expect that Vietnam, being still a relatively 
poor developing country, will be able to negotiate longer implementation 
periods for lowering tariffs that are necessary to protect industries. They 
fear increasing import competition resulting from lower tariff rates. Com-
petition from China with its low cost mass production is regarded as a 
major challenge. Most SOEs already feel the competition from increasing 
numbers of private enterprises in Vietnam and also through the step-by-
step implementation of ASEAN / AFTA and US BTA. Most of the enter-
prises say they try to meet these challenges through the production of 
higher quality goods in their respective field. This can be observed espe-
cially for the garment and footwear industries. Downstream industries, of 
course, expect to improve their competitiveness through lower prices on 
imported inputs. 
Generally speaking, smaller private enterprises are expected to be more 
flexible and thus to have less problems with adapting to higher competi-
tion levels than bigger enterprises, especially state-owned enterprises. The 
reactions to ASEAN / AFTA membership and to the US BTA have al-
ready shown this. In addition, this assessment is supported by the observa-
tion that there is already an increase in competition in Vietnam due to 
widespread smuggling. 
However, although differing from one industry to the other, it can be said 
that the overall competitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises (both, SME and 
SOE) is still quite low (UNDP 2000, 6). The size of most industrial enter-
prises is relatively small. Many goods produced in Vietnam are simple, 
with still rather low quality due to a low level of technology and outdated 
equipment. The productivity of Vietnamese enterprises is lower than in 
other countries in the region and the value added remains small (around 
20 %). All this is to a large extent caused by a lack of finance and incon-
sistent government policies that do not provide the necessary reliable busi-
ness environment. 
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In addition, one can conclude from the interviews in the business sector, 
that time consuming and cost intensive customs procedures are another 
obstacle for the development of a vigorous private sector engagement in 
trading. Therefore, customs procedures will be discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
4.1.3 Non-tariff barriers to trade in Vietnam: obstacles 
through de facto NTBs 
There is no comprehensive and detailed list of non-tariff measures (NTBs) 
applied in Vietnam. This section sketches briefly some of the NTBs that 
were mentioned in the interviews with businesses and have a direct influ-
ence on them. 
Quantitative restrictions (QRs): import quotas and licenses: Vietnam 
has reduced the use of QRs substantially. At present, only petroleum prod-
ucts and sugar are still subject to licensing while the government has 
committed itself to lifting quotas on sugar imports by 2005. SOE dominate 
in imports that are regulated by QRs because only few private enterprises 
are able to pass the strict and steadily changing registration procedures. 
Foreign exchange regulations: Due to a favourable balance of payment 
situation, foreign exchange controls have been loosened in recent years. 
The foreign exchange surrender requirement for trading businesses, which 
was implemented in 1998 by the State Bank of Vietnam, came down from 
80 % in 1998 to 50 % in 1999 to 40 % in 2001. In 2004, businesses had to 
transfer 40 % of their foreign exchange earnings into their accounts within 
15 working days of transfer of these funds. In 2000, the foreign exchange 
balancing requirement for FIEs was relaxed, too. FIEs are now able to 
purchase foreign currency from domestic banks to repay loans obtained 
from offshore banks. However, although officially all firms are entitled to 
buy foreign exchange from banks, in practice, only large firms, mostly 
SOEs, receive foreign exchange from state-owned banks. 
Non-automatic licensing: At present, there is no legal discrimination 
against domestic private enterprises and FIE through non-automatic licens-
ing. Any formally registered enterprise that is also registered for foreign 
trade can import and export goods that are not on the list of “special” 
goods (commodities with import quotas, prohibited commodities, com-
Vietnam – the 150th WTO-member – Implications for industrial policy and export promotion 
German Development Institute 71
modities under government management and commodities under special-
ized management, e. g., automobiles, motorcycles, steel, writing and print-
ing paper, cement, beverages and fertilizer). This goes back to the Gov-
ernment’s Decree 57 of 1998. Since then, all businesses are allowed to 
trade the goods registered in their business. However, enterprises still have 
to register export/import goods to receive trading codes from the province 
or municipal customs office. Moreover, firms are only allowed to trade in 
commodities registered in their business license. This prevents them from 
reacting to changing market conditions by moving from one kind of busi-
ness to another without approval. Mainly private SMEs stated that this 
means a considerable loss of profit, because they cannot take decisions 
about imported items on demand. Reduced flexibility is a serious disad-
vantage for the competitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises. 
De-facto NTBs: Administrative rigidities and delays in the customs ad-
ministration have continued to remain an important de-facto NTBs. Cus-
toms procedures are time consuming and raise transaction costs of enter-
prises.30 These costs arise not only through delayed customs procedures 
but also through unofficially required extra payments, which seem to be a 
common practice. Although some progress has been made through the 
new Law on Customs Valuation, which is in force since January 2002, 
customs procedures are still quite cumbersome and hurt private enterprises 
disproportionately. Since these difficulties were mentioned in most of the 
interviews as main obstacles for importing, special attention should be 
given to this topic. 
Removal of non-tariff barriers to trade 
For the phasing out of NTBs, some important steps have already been 
made by the Vietnamese government committing itself to ASEAN and US 
BTA. These adjustments will be outlined briefly before presenting the 
WTO requirements. 
Regional trade liberalisation – ASEAN: The CEPT requires Vietnam to 
remove all NTBs by January 2009. Vietnam is already requested to list all 
                                                          
30 In processing imports of goods, Vietnam’s Customs still requires a range of documents 
such as invoices, bills of landing, customs declaration, packaging protocols, purchase 
contracts with price lists included, quotas granted, specific licenses like licenses for 
temporary imports and re-exports, document of exemption of tariff, etc.  
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quantitative restrictions (QRs) currently in use on a yearly basis. In 2001, 
the government issued a trade management mechanism for 2001 to 2005 
under which it proposed to abolish several NTBs. Furthermore, ASEAN 
obliges Vietnam to calculate the customs value in accordance with the 
Customs Valuation Agreement (CVA) by the year 2000. However, for a 
full implementation of the CVA, Vietnam still needs training for the cus-
toms staff. Thus, only the Harmonised System (HS) has been implemented 
in 2000. 
Bilateral trade liberalisation – US BTA: In Annex B1, B2 of the US 
BTA, Vietnam commits itself to remove all QR on imports of 69 agricul-
tural products within a period from 3 to 5 years after the BTA has come 
into effect. In the case of sugar, a delayed period, which extends up to 10 
years, was accepted. Furthermore, through Chapter I, Art. 3(4) of US BTA 
Vietnam has to adopt the CVA. In addition, the general transparency pro-
visions of US BTA go beyond WTO requirements. 
Multilateral trade liberalisation – GATT/WTO: After accession to the 
WTO, all NTBs will have to be eliminated in accordance with GATT Art. 
XI. Of course, this does not mean that Vietnam cannot apply the necessary 
safeguard measures to protect its economy, but under the strict WTO rules 
for reversing trade liberalization. Furthermore, Vietnam has to implement 
the CVA in its national legislation. Then, tariff calculation based on the 
transaction prices will be more precise. 
However, Vietnam has applied for an extended transitional period to fully 
implement the CVA because the required experience, expertise, knowl-
edge, technical facilities, and equipment seem not yet available in Viet-
nam. Nevertheless, first steps have been made through the new Law on 
Customs Valuation. It introduces the internationally required Transaction 
Value as a basis for the valuation of imported items according to WTO 
law. Yet, the new law lacks some important specifications. Since six addi-
tional valuation categories have been introduced as alternative means of 
valuation instead of valuation standards with different priorities, the Viet-
namese valuation system does not yet fully comply with WTO standards. 
As necessary transparent valuation rules and procedures are not yet im-
plemented, customs offices still provide fertile ground for arbitrary classi-
fications. 
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De-facto NTB: customs valuation and procedures 
In theory, the Law on Customs Valuation sets only one tariff rate for a 
certain item. But in practice, different tariff levels are applied to the same 
product in different provinces31 due to the fact that customs offices in the 
provinces work rather “independently”. Thus, a predictable environment 
for investment in import-export business is missing.  
Furthermore, cumbersome customs procedures were repeatedly mentioned 
as a core problem for enterprises in Vietnam. High administrative costs for 
delayed and opaque certification and licensing procedures are still a diffi-
culty, especially for private and foreign invested enterprises (see Appen-
dix: Table 2; cf. Perkins 2001, 261). In the interviews, it was repeatedly 
stated that “it all depends on the officer in charge”. Unofficial fees are 
said to be common practice.32 For companies producing for the local mar-
ket, extra-payments and delayed delivery from customs offices were men-
tioned in particular when asked for difficulties with importing. Companies 
producing only for exporting face less administrative difficulties. But still, 
the administrative costs are quite high due to very detailed verification 
requirements for the duty drawback regulations. This is especially true for 
the textile industry where every single piece of fabrics added to the export 
product has to be verified and approved by the customs office. Although 
foreign investors do not assess these difficulties as a serious disadvantage 
for increasing investment in Vietnam compared to other countries in the 
region, these administrative requirements represent a considerable disad-
vantage for Vietnamese enterprises in terms of competitiveness on interna-
tional markets and hinder the development of the private business sector. 
Therefore, many companies would like to see better-qualified staff at the 
customs offices and more efficient control and enforcement mechanisms. 
                                                          
31 One entrepreneur of a FIE reported that he has to pay three different tariffs for the same 
item in three different ports with a range from 0 % to 10 %. 
32 The following “standard” unofficial fees were reported for the footwear industry to 
process income shipments. According to Boye (2002), in 2002 US$ 20 for clearing a 20 
foot container, US$ 40 for a 40 foot container and US$ 100 late inspection fee. Accord-
ing to another study conducted in the garments and textile industry by the Institute for 
Market and Price Research in 2002, customs procedures make up for the second most 
difficult task for enterprises after duty drawback procedures (see Appendix: Table 2). 
This resembles the perceptions that the interviewed businesses contributed to the pre-
sent study. 
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Some of the interviewed government institutions are aware of the need for 
additional training of customs officers in order to fully implement the new 
valuation system, too. Furthermore, especially FIEs see some difficulties 
due to insufficient technical equipment as well as capacity constraints of 
ports and port facilities. 
In addition, it was often mentioned that many SMEs and also FIEs do a 
large share of their trading through bigger enterprises, mainly SOEs. This 
is caused, on the one hand, by foreign exchange regulations and by the 
above-mentioned rigidities through non-automatic licensing regulations on 
the other. This third party trade leads to delays for the production and 
additional costs through fees of 7 % to 10 % that are normally charged for 
these transfer services. This again represents a disadvantage for interna-
tional competitiveness of Vietnamese businesses. Furthermore, these con-
ditions are another obstacle to the development of a thriving private busi-
ness sector.  
Summing up, a quick improvement of customs procedures is needed – 
first, through the consistent implementation of the CVA and simplified 
tariff structures and second, through additional training of staff and re-
structuring of customs offices. Furthermore, improved technical facilities 
are needed. In many of these fields, multilateral development co-operation 
can (and does) offer technical assistance and training. 
The problems of customs valuation were discussed at length at the meet-
ings of the Working Party on Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. “Some 
members noted that Viet Nam’s customs procedures were complicated and 
at times unpredictable depending on the discretion of customs officials.” 
(WTO 2006b, 63, para. 245) The Vietnamese delegation replied that an 
action plan for the implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement 
was implemented in order to reform Vietnam’s customs procedures and 
bring its valuation system into conformity with the Customs Valuation 
Agreement. It was confirmed that “from the date of accession, Viet Nam 
would fully apply the WTO provisions concerning customs valuation (…). 
Viet Nam would ensure that any customs valuation method to be applied 
would be in accordance with these WTO rules.” (WTO 2006b, 61, para. 
238) However, both “customs officers and the business community needed 
training to use the new valuation procedures.” (Ibid. 59, para. 228) 
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4.1.4 Challenges for Vietnam’s industrial policy 
Vietnam’s industrial policy has relied mainly on trade policy instruments. 
Infant-industry protection, i. e. a temporary closure of the domestic market 
in order to provide newly developing industries with the necessary learn-
ing phase for becoming able to compete successfully with imports and on 
export markets has been the first stage of industrialization in most coun-
tries of the world (Chang 2002). Vietnam as a latecomer in industrializa-
tion faces the twin challenge that neighbouring countries have already 
captured major shares of regional and global markets for a wide range of 
manufactured products on the lower and medium technology level that 
newly industrializing countries can command, making it difficult for new 
entrants to find their market niches without active government support, 
which, however, may not be offered in the same way and with the same 
simple but effective instruments as the East Asian Miracle countries ap-
plied at their early stages of industrial development. Today, WTO rules 
and agreements restrict the use of protectionist trade barriers and other 
instruments of selective industrial policy and export promotion. Thus, 
Vietnam’s industrial policy is faced with the challenge of replacing tradi-
tional protective instruments like high tariff rates and NTBs with WTO 
compatible industrial and trade policy measures to support domestic indus-
trial development. 
Vietnam will have to remove peak tariffs on specific industries like for 
instance motor vehicles, garment and textiles and the traditional heavy 
industries like steel and cement. It remains to be seen what transitional 
arrangements Vietnam will be able to negotiate for some strategic indus-
tries like automobile industry where the interests of international investors, 
who had established auto assembly plants in view of the import protection 
provided, might also call for a gradual liberalization process. The major 
challenge for the Vietnamese government will be to develop appropriate 
policy instruments to avoid disruptive effects of the removal of industry 
protection and the change in industrial policy-making. The major task will 
be to shift industrial policy to complementary measures and policies in-
stead of specific interventions. These could include, e. g.:  
– Provision of an efficient infrastructure, on the one side through road 
building, ports and railways etc. and on the other side through a non-
SOE-biased service sector. An efficient infrastructure could facilitate 
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enterprises to grow and profit from economies of scale, for instance in 
research and development (R&D), marketing etc. 
– Support to R&D within the business sector to gain competitiveness in 
faster changing product cycles through technological innovation. 
– Support for the formation of industrial clusters and the formation of 
business networks, first and foremost through existing intermediary 
institutions like business associations or Vietnam Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry (VCCI) etc. The competitiveness of Vietnamese 
businesses could increase through this form of concentrated interac-
tion between suppliers, services and supporting institutions and even 
universities. 
– Support for human resource development, particularly in the forma-
tion of high skilled labour with specific qualifications. 
However, these modern industrial policy instruments that will have to 
replace industry protection can only be implemented efficiently if the 
Vietnamese government is able to develop a level playing field for private 
and state-owned and foreign invested enterprises. Uneven treatment in tax 
and tariff policy or in customs procedures needs to be removed. Then, the 
focus should lie on the provision of a reliable economic framework for 
private companies, state-owned enterprises and foreign invested enter-
prises. This includes developing adequate adjustment policies to balance 
disruptive effects of import liberalisation on the labour market or the bank-
ing sector.  
It becomes clear that intermediary institutions at the meso level will play 
an important role in the process of policy change. For an efficient imple-
mentation of most of the instruments mentioned above, the government 
needs to rely on suggestions from the enterprises concerned through their 
respective network like business associations etc. Otherwise, a trial-and-
error search process for appropriate alternative measures of industry sup-
port instead of protection would probably impose high extra-costs. Hence, 
it seems to be obvious that the Vietnamese government needs to support 
intermediary institutions. Industrial and trade policy instruments can be 
improved and adjusted more efficiently with the integration of meso level 
institutions channelling information from the business sector to the gov-
ernment and vice versa.  
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4.2 Phasing out of trade-related investment measures 
In many developing countries, governments used to invite foreign invest-
ment in industries on condition that the foreign companies committed 
themselves to gradually increase the utilization of local inputs (local con-
tent requirements) within a given time frame of some five to ten years, 
and/or that they accepted the obligation to export a certain proportion of 
their output (trade balancing requirements). These requirements were 
regarded as effective instruments to encourage the development of domes-
tic ancillary industries and to have a positive effect on the balance of trade, 
but they affect international trade in several ways (WTO 1999, 77). An 
obligation to increase the value of domestically produced inputs may pre-
vent or limit the use of imported inputs. An obligation to export may 
handicap (foreign) producers who are confronted with competition in the 
export markets of goods that may be only exportable because of dumping 
or subsidising measures. Therefore, during the Uruguay Round an agree-
ment was negotiated that prohibits such trade-distorting measures. As a 
result, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
was signed and became effective on 1st January 1995. 
The purpose of this chapter is: 
– to explain what measures of localisation policy are no longer allowed 
under WTO law and have to be phased out, 
– to sketch the challenges for Vietnam’s industrial policy, 
– to give an illustrative example for TRIMs applied in Vietnam (the 
automobile industry), and  
– to make recommendations on how to reach the goal of supporting the 
domestic ancillary industry in conformity with WTO law. 
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4.2.1 The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) 
Although it is only five pages long, the TRIMs Agreement has become a 
central issue for developing countries in the WTO. Its main objective is to 
reduce barriers to investment and trade and make investment conditions 
more favourable, transparent and predictable. The TRIMs Agreement 
explicitly prohibits member countries to make the approval of foreign 
investment conditional on compliance with national laws, policies or ad-
ministrative regulations that favour domestic over imported inputs. Local 
content requirements are prohibited because they are contrary to the obli-
gations of the national treatment principle (GATT Article III). Foreign 
exchange balancing restrictions are not allowed because they violate the 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions (GATT Article XI). Since trade-
related investment measures have been applied by many developing coun-
tries (and even developed countries like Australia and Canada) especially 
in the automobile industry, this industry will be mainly affected by the 
TRIMs Agreement. 
Table 1:  Illustrative list of TRIMs inconsistent with GATT articles 
GATT provisions Inconsistent measures 
Article III: National treatment  Local content requirements – a certain 
amount of inputs in production 
should be of local origin 
Trade-balancing requirements – im-
ports are restricted or are linked to 
the amount of exports 
Article XI: Prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions  
Trade-balancing restrictions – as above 
Foreign exchange balancing restrictions 
– limiting the availability of foreign 
exchange for imports to a proportion 
of foreign exchange earned by exports 
or otherwise transferred 
Domestic sales requirements – a certain 
proportion of production is reserved 
for the domestic market 
Source:  World Trade Organization (2000a, 56) 
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The TRIMs Agreement does not define explicitly what a trade-related 
investment measure is, but it provides an illustrative list of measures that 
are inconsistent with GATT articles. 
The lack of a precise definition has led to considerable disagreement as to 
whether or not certain measures are covered by the agreement. A distinc-
tion can be made as to whether a measure is “trade-related” or an “invest-
ment measure”. In a third step one has to examine whether the measure is 
inconsistent with the provisions of Article III and thus violates the TRIMs 
Agreement. A WTO Dispute Settlement Panel on “Indonesia – Autos” had 
to investigate these problems (WTO 2004a, 3). Concerning the definition 
of “investment measure” the Panel stated that the TRIMs Agreement is not 
limited to measures taken specifically in regard to foreign investment. 
Therefore, the agreement is ownership neutral. It simply addresses trade-
distorting policies, regardless whether they are targeted at foreign or do-
mestic companies. Moreover, even measures, which are not clearly de-
fined as “investment measure” but have a significant trade-related impact 
on investments, are also subject to the TRIMs Agreement. Concerning the 
definition of “trade-related”, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel on Indo-
nesia’s national car policy stated that especially local content requirements 
favouring the use of domestic products over imported products have the 
same effect as other barriers to imports and therefore are inconsistent with 
the TRIMs Agreement. 
4.2.2 WTO dispute settlement on TRIMs 
Until now, in the TRIMs area some 16 requests for consultation were 
initiated. Three of the cases proceeded to the next stage of establishing a 
Dispute Panel. It should be noted that in each case the complainant listed 
other policies in addition to those that were claimed to be inconsistent with 
the TRIMs Agreement. This is an important point because it reveals the 
use of multiple types of measures in the context of general industrial pol-
icy objectives as opposed to an isolated or targeted use of intervention. 
(Bora 2002, 171) 
The WTO Dispute Settlement case on Indonesia revealed two aspects: 
First, local content requirements were identified as trade distorting and, 
therefore, have to be phased out. Secondly, a WTO member state has to 
respect and implement all WTO agreements (with very few exceptions).  
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Box 5:  The WTO Dispute Settlement case against Indonesia on 
 TRIMs 
The WTO Dispute Panel case on Indonesia demonstrates how Indonesia’s plan to 
develop a national automobile industry was affected by WTO law and how the 
Dispute Panel interpreted the measures applied by Indonesia. 
The main reason for the complaint against Indonesia was its tax and tariff system 
concerning completely built-up units (CBUs) of imported motor vehicles. Prod-
ucts entering the country were subject to an import duty rate and when the prod-
uct was sold it was subject to a sales tax. These taxes were not the problem, but 
the Indonesian scheme allowed an exemption from these duties on the basis of the 
local content ratio. Moreover, an agreement between an Indonesian company (PT 
Timor Putra Nasional) and a Korean company (Kia) gave preference to imports of 
CBUs from the Korean company. 
In 1998, the European Community, Japan and the United States complained about 
the discrimination in favour of imports from Korea, the discrimination of im-
ported goods in favour of domestic goods and the bias in the tax system in favour 
of domestically produced automobiles. Moreover, they complained about viola-
tions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
The panel decided that the measures in use in Indonesia violated various Articles 
of both the TRIMs Agreement and the GATT, whereas the SCM and TRIPS 
Agreement were not violated seriously. Since no consensus could be reached on 
how to implement the ruling, the parties agreed on an arbitrator who decided a 
12-month implementation period for reconciling Indonesia’s legislation with 
WTO law. In July 1999, Indonesia informed WTO members that it had elimi-
nated the inconsistent measures in compliance with the panel’s ruling.33 
Source:  UNCTAD (2000, 41) 
 
                                                          
33  It should be noted that TRIMs can be misused as any selective industrial policy measure 
for rent-seeking purposes. This has been conceded even by a strong critic of the TRIMs 
Agreement. “The fact is that TRIMs often operate as a form of corporate welfare for lo-
cal capitalists. For example, Indonesia’s National Car Program was ruled a violation 
of the TRIMs Agreement. Yet the local content policies and tax exemptions involved pri-
marily benefited President Suharto’s youngest son, Tommy, who owned the local auto 
company PT Timor.” (Greenfield 2001, 7.) In India, the national car project Maruti-
Suzuki had been given to Indira Gandhi’s elder son, Sanjay Gandhi.  
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The acceding countries were not conceded long transitional periods for 
adjusting their policies toward foreign investment, and with the USBTA 
and in the negotiations on WTO accession, Vietnam has already accepted 
to phase out all existing TRIMs. 
4.2.3 Implications of the TRIMs Agreement for industrial 
policy 
Developing countries often argue that local content requirements are vital 
for their development, mainly because of three reasons: Firstly, it encour-
ages the use of domestic inputs, which means saving scarce foreign ex-
change. Secondly, it fosters the creation of additional domestic employ-
ment. Thirdly, it stimulates domestic economic activity in general and 
forces foreign investors to search for local suppliers and to help them 
meeting their technology and quality requirements which are those of the 
export markets. Thus, TRIMs had been widely applied as a tool for pro-
moting the development of local industries. The Vietnamese government 
stated in a similar way: “The main purpose of introducing local content 
requirements in Vietnam is to promote the parts industry, to upgrade tech-
nology, to improve quality and to reduce production costs of automobile, 
motorcycle and mechanical-electric-electronic products; to enhance ca-
pacity of production from local raw materials.” (WTO 2001a, 8) There-
fore, many developing countries see their industrial development restricted 
by the TRIMs Agreement.34  
The TRIMs Agreement does not rule out any industrial policy. However, it 
requires a radical change of investment-related policies – governments 
have to find other measures and incentives to build up a competitive ancil-
lary industry without being able to protect it with high tariffs or import 
quotas against competition form the original component suppliers in the 
home country (or from third countries) of the foreign investors.   
Since 1995, the Vietnamese government has pursued a localisation policy, 
including two programs and various incentives to build up an ancillary 
industry (WTO 2001a, 1): The Localisation Program, the Domestic Raw 
                                                          
34  Pakistan e. g., asserted that TRIMs conformity might be contrary to its development 
interests; opening the economy to import competition would hinder the country from 
exploiting domestic resources optimally or from promoting transfer of technology, em-
ployment, and domestic linkages (Bora 2002, 173). 
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Material Development Program and two kinds of incentives: First, incen-
tives in the form of digressive import tariff rates which decrease with the 
rising level of local content an importing company has reached; second, 
incentives in the form of corporate income tax the rate of which goes 
down with rising local content level. 
There are local content requirements for three industrial sectors:  
– automobile manufacturing and assembling projects, 
– motorcycle manufacturing and assembling projects, 
– mechanical, electric and electronic products assembling and manufac-
turing projects. 
Up to December 2001, about 100 enterprises had registered to implement 
the localisation program, of which 64 % are FIEs and 36 % are local com-
panies. These enterprises had registered local content ratios for 700 prod-
ucts, most of which are spare parts for motorcycles, electronic products, 
refrigerators and air-conditioners as well as household appliances. Apart 
from the localisation policy, investors in some industries were obliged to 
export a certain proportion of goods as a precondition for the investment 
license, e. g. in the bicycles, motorcycles, textiles and garments industries. 
This requirement was phased out in 2004. 
The current legal framework in Vietnam  
Various laws and regulations are relevant to investment in Vietnam: the 
Law on Foreign Investment, the Law on Domestic Investment Promotion 
and other legal documents, e. g. Decree No. 24/2000/ND-CP of 31st of 
July 2000 spelling out in detail the implementation of the Law on Foreign 
Investment in Vietnam. 
Localisation policy measures are imposed on both FIE and local enter-
prises on a non-discriminatory basis. However, the laws do not treat busi-
nesses equally in terms of investment procedures and forms, management 
and incentives, etc. Therefore, the different laws were combined into two 
laws only: the Enterprise Law and the Investment Law. 
Adjustment Requirements for WTO accession 
Compared to other agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement, in the 
TRIMs case the drafting of legislation to prohibit local content schemes is 
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fairly simple and straightforward. In addition, there are no substantive 
technical requirements for compliance. However, phasing out all measures 
inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement has proven to be difficult. The 
Vietnamese government has submitted an Action Plan for the Implementa-
tion of the TRIMs Agreement, which describes the changes of laws and 
measures already done and planned until 2007. The Action Plan demon-
strates the government’s commitment to phase out the local content and 
raw material programs by 2007 in order to comply with WTO law. The 
policies and measures mentioned above are not in conformity with the 
TRIMs Agreement and have to be phased out gradually.   
Compliance with the TRIMs Agreement was a hotly debated issue for the 
Working Party on WTO accession. Some members of the Working Party 
criticized Vietnam for having introduced most TRIMs after the application 
for WTO membership, although “acceding governments were expected not 
to implement new restrictive measures.” (WTO 2006b, 85, para 329) Viet-
nam should “comply fully with the TRIMs Agreement from the date of 
accession to the WTO without invoking a transition period.” (Ibid.) This 
has been accepted by the Vietnamese delegation. Especially the preferen-
tial import tariff rates contingent upon localization ratios, which had been 
applied for a number of industries (motorbikes, cars, mechanical-electric-
electronic industries have already been terminated (WTO 2006b, 71, para 
275). 
The case of incentives in the form of subsidies is less clear: TRIMs are 
typically used in combination with other policies. The question is how the 
phasing out of certain TRIMs, without regarding related policies, would 
affect trade. For example, local content policies are usually combined with 
a subsidy (Bora 2002, 174). The TRIMs Agreement restricts trade policy 
instruments but not the subsidy policies. However, the WTO Dispute 
Panel case on Indonesia has clarified that even incentive programmes 
(direct and indirect ones) are considered as TRIMs and, therefore, prohib-
ited.  
What policy space will be left for Vietnam after WTO accession? 
The greatest challenge for industrial policy in Vietnam resulting from 
WTO accession and complying with the TRIMs Agreement will be to 
develop and technologically upgrade the ancillary industry so that foreign 
investors will buy more spares and inputs from local sources. This will be 
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even more demanding in future when import liberalization will make ac-
cess to imported inputs even easier than today. Regarding the localisation 
ratios achieved during the last ten years, the motorbike sector has done 
quite well, while the automobile sector lags behind the targets for localisa-
tion. Thus, the government must find new measures for strengthening the 
ancillary industry.  
Regarding the situation of FIEs, two trends can be expected: Foreign in-
vestment in import-substituting industries will decline with the lowering of 
import tariffs and other barriers. On the other hand, foreign investment 
into export industries may increase with easier access to imported inputs 
and with the expected rise in competitiveness of domestic ancillary indus-
tries from which foreign companies will buy their inputs without local 
content obligations, once these ancillary industries meet international 
levels of quality, reliability and costs. 
4.2.4 The case of the automobile industry in Vietnam  
The development of Vietnam’s automotive industry is ridden with the 
typical problems of a latecomer lagging about 30 years behind other coun-
tries in the region. The first modern car assembling plant, Mekong Auto, a 
joint venture of South Korean, Japanese and Vietnamese companies, was 
licensed in 1992. It was followed by no less than twelve foreign car manu-
facturers establishing assembly plants through joint ventures with Viet-
namese investors. The rush of foreign car manufacturers to gain a foothold 
in the Vietnamese market must have been fuelled by excessive expecta-
tions about the growth of the market which have not materialized until 
today. Due to the low average per capita income, the market for cars in 
Vietnam is still relatively small. If today’s optimal plant size for manufac-
turing passenger cars is around 200,000 units per year, Vietnam’s 13 
automobile joint ventures which have a combined annual capacity of only 
173,000 units (according to the Vietnam Automobile Manufacturers Asso-
ciation, VAMA) rank far below international levels of optimal plant size. 
In 2002, only 27,000 cars were produced in Vietnam, whereas Thailand 
produced half a million cars, and South Korea more than 1 million cars, 
(Saigon Times Weekly, 24 May 2003). Since then, sales of domestically 
produced cars peaked with 43,600 units in 2003 (Vietnam Economic Times 
122, 4 Jan. 2004). But even with this volume, the foreign and joint venture 
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car manufacturers in Vietnam used only a small fraction of their already 
relatively small combined production capacity.   
Due to lower scale of production, cars assembled locally are far more 
expensive than the same or similar models on the international markets. 
Thus, car manufacturing is only viable in Vietnam as long as it is protected 
by high import tariffs and other measures. This protection was provided by 
a combination of high import duties and a special consumption tax, which 
was higher for imported than for locally assembled cars. But the high price 
level creates a vicious circle by restraining the demand for cars so that the 
industry cannot escape from the low volume trap. With this low volume 
split into 11 (today 13) plants producing a wide range of different models, 
it was impossible to create a sufficient demand for making a modern ancil-
lary industry viable. Thus, the target for the localisation ratio of 25 per 
cent by 2005 as set by the Vietnamese industrial policy authorities could 
not be reached. If they want to meet the local content requirements im-
posed by the government, the foreign automobile companies cannot rely 
on an efficient local ancillary industry but have to produce their own 
spares and parts in-house which again is not cost-effective in comparison 
with international best practices of automotive industries. 
Legal requirements for automobile manufacturing and assembling projects 
The implementation of the automobile components production program is 
a condition for granting an investment license. This means in detail: The 
value of components and spare parts manufactured in Vietnam must ac-
count for at least five per cent of the finished automobile value no later 
than five years from the date of commencing production and must annu-
ally increase to reach at least 30 per cent of the automobile value at the 
tenth year of production (Circular No.215/UB-LXT 8/2/1995). One incen-
tive for raising the local content ratio is the application of differential 
import tariffs on imported inputs and parts depending on the localization 
ration achieved.  
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The application of different import tariffs according to the localisation 
ratio achieved will no longer be allowed under WTO law and will have to 
be phased out gradually.35 
Table 2:  Incentive scheme for the production of automobile and 
 motorcycle parts 
MFN import tariff rates contingent upon localization ratios
(in per cent) 
Achieved 
localization 
ratio (in per 
cent) 
With respect 
to parts 
which are 
subject to 
MFN import 
tariff rate of 
30 % 
With respect 
to parts which 
are subject to 
MFN import 
tariff rate of 
40 % 
With respect 
to parts 
which are 
subject to 
MFN import 
tariff rate of 
50 % 
With respect 
to parts 
which are 
subject to 
MFN import 
tariff rate of 
50 % 
1. Above 0 
    to 15 
2. Above 15 
    to 30 
3. Above 30 
    to 40 
4. Above 40 
    to 50 
5. Above 50 
20 
15 
10 
5 
3 
20 
15 
10 
5 
3 
30 
20 
10 
5 
3 
40 
20 
10 
5 
3 
Source:  WTO (2001a, 4) 
In view of the low local content ratios reached so far, it seems that the 
Vietnamese government had expected too much from mandatory local 
content requirements for the foreign car manufacturers and did not invest 
enough effort in supporting the development of a competitive local ancil-
                                                          
35  Another incentive is a preferential corporate income tax for export manufacturing and 
processing projects using 30 per cent local raw materials (WTO 2001a, 6). But this is 
not relevant for the automotive industry which is producing only for the domestic mar-
ket. 
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lary industry that would meet the quality requirements of the foreign as-
sembly plants. 
Table 3: Average local content ratio in the automobile sector in 2004 
Company Local Content 
All Foreign Joint Ventures together 2 %–10 % 
Toyota  13 % 
Trucks and Buses (below 24 seats) 10 %–20 % 
Trucks with more than 24 seats > 30 % 
Source:  Thanh (2004, 38) 
Only Toyota is aiming at a localization ratio of 20 per cent with the estab-
lishment of a new spare parts manufacturing plant (Vietnam Economic 
Times, 1 Jan. 2005).  
Box 6: Toyota’s strategy towards SME suppliers 
Toyota is open to any potential suppliers, regardless of nationality, size or 
whether this company is a first-time supplier or not. Toyota’s co-operation with 
suppliers is solely based on business considerations, i. e. basically the economic 
and technological capacities of the supplier. Toyota expects its suppliers to excel 
in five key areas that characterise a competitive enterprise: quality, cost, delivery 
(regarding on-time delivery of the required quantities of inputs), engineering 
(including technology) and management. Since Toyota believes in developing 
mutually beneficial, long-term relationships with suppliers, trust and confidence 
as well as reliability are considered key factors. Finally, Toyota expects the 
enterprises to be able to continued improvement and enhancement of products, 
services and management. 
Toyota realised the importance of a local ancillary industry and wants to assist its 
suppliers. Therefore, often a preparatory process is needed for the suppliers 
before entering a business partnership with Toyota. Although Toyota has special 
programs to support SME suppliers, the support of the national government 
regarding policies and support measures for SMEs is decisive for overall success.
Source: Muramatsu (2000, 1) 
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The Ministry of Industry’s strategy until 2010 
According to the Ministry of Industry’s strategy until 2010, Vietnam will 
focus on state-owned and large foreign companies to produce ancillaries 
(Thanh 2004, 37). A Vinamotor project aims at producing 50,000 auto 
parts per year by 2010, meeting a localization rate of 30 % by 2005 and 
50 % by 2010. In October 2003, another project was approved to produce 
spare parts to meet 33 % of localization rate by 2005 and 50 % by 2010. 
This project, which is believed to cover market demand for popular cars in 
Vietnam, seems to be over-ambitious. However, projects focusing on 
assembling and manufacturing specialized vehicles such as trucks, vans 
and buses, and those focusing on manufacturing spare parts, will be facili-
tated and encouraged.  
Recently, Vietnam’s industrial policy toward the automotive sector has 
become somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, it still aims at develop-
ing a healthy automotive industry with increasing local content, on the 
other hand, there is the need to gradually liberalize imports and abandon 
differential treatment of domestically produced and imported cars in view 
of AFTA obligations and WTO accession, and, thirdly, there is a new 
problem coming up even on Vietnam’s low level of development: Traffic 
congestion in the major cities requires action that may counteract the tar-
get of promoting the development of the automotive industry. The debate 
has started in Vietnam whether it will be necessary to cap the number of 
additional cars in the congested cities, and it may be taken as a justifica-
tion, e. g. for maintaining the special consumption tax of 50 % (Vietnam 
Economic Times, 1 Jan. 2005). Under the trade liberalisation imperative, 
the Government of Vietnam has decided to allow from May 2006 the 
import of second-hand cars (up to five years old), however with an import 
tariff of 150 per cent, compared to the import tariff rate of 90 per cent for 
new cars. This will make it even more difficult for the existing car manu-
facturers to increase their sales and grow. Nevertheless, the government is 
reported to have licensed in 2005 two additional automobile projects, one 
for cars (Honda Civic) and one for trucks and buses (English.eastday.com, 
20 March 2006).36 
                                                          
36  One can only speculate whether the new foreign investors base their market projections 
on the estimation that the shadow economy in Vietnam may add 50 per cent to the offi-
cial GDP (Tenev et al. 2003, 15). 
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A development strategy for ancillary industries in conformity with  
WTO rules  
It is rather unlikely that Vietnam will be able to break out of the vicious 
circle of a low volume car industry by applying the traditional set of na-
tional industrial policy instruments. In view of the large scale of produc-
tion that is needed for reaching international levels of cost competitive-
ness, the only realistic perspective is to encourage regional integration of 
automotive and ancillary industries in South East Asia. Trade liberaliza-
tion within ASEAN and on the multilateral level under the WTO may pave 
the way towards deeper regional integration and specialisation of ancillary 
industries. However, overcoming the relatively fragmented structure of the 
auto industry in the region as a result of nationalistic industrial policies of 
the past era (cf. Ravenhill 2005) – which Vietnam has copied rather un-
successfully – would require the combined will and coordinated action of 
the governments and industrial policy makers of the ASEAN and associ-
ated countries.37  
With the necessary adjustments, Vietnam could become an attractive loca-
tion for an automotive industry and ancillary industries linked to industries 
in other countries of the region. Automobile producers have started to 
investigate the possibility of out-sourcing the production of component 
parts to Vietnam, and whether it will be viable to produce for the world 
markets from there. To reach this goal, the regional trade for automobile 
components and finished cars must be further liberalised in the framework 
of AFTA and CEPT. 
Vietnam does have comparative advantages in the region that make the 
country attractive for foreign investors in ancillary industries: It is a politi-
cally and economically stable country, not facing religious conflicts or 
strikes organised by trade unions. Its geographical location in South-East 
Asia and its long coastline make it easily accessible. Vietnamese are hard 
                                                          
37  “So far, Vietnam has not taken an active role in ASEAN efforts to pool resources and 
enhance the region’s competitiveness. While a nationalistic tendency to create ‘com-
plete’ industries in Vietnam is understandable given the nation’s hard-won struggle for 
independence, and may have fit well with the geopolitics of earlier times, it will only be 
through international integration and cooperation that economic development will pro-
gress rapidly in Vietnam, especially given the lack of modern industrial techniques cur-
rently in use.” (Sturgeon 1998, 16.) 
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working people eager to learn and to operate new technologies, which is 
very important in industries that face frequent changes of models, design, 
production patterns etc. Therefore, Vietnam should be well endowed for 
becoming a reliable partner for long-term relationships. Nevertheless, to 
build up an ancillary industry and increase its competitiveness, some re-
forms and efforts are needed:  
– First, the Vietnamese government should provide coherent policies 
that are consistent with suppliers’ demands, co-operate and interact 
closely in defining a development master plan, include upstream in-
dustries in their strategies, promote the development of human re-
sources and of technological capacities and research and development 
(R&D). 
– Second, to implement this plan successfully, the development of an-
cillary industries could be encouraged by general tax incentives (not 
related to trade performance). Provision of technical assistance for 
component and ancillary manufacturers should be encouraged through 
tax incentives. Industrial parks for clusters of component manufactur-
ers should be established, where investors can profit from incentives 
for capacity building and from co-operating with each other in areas 
where similar tools and technologies are required. 
– Third, to avoid overlapping investments, a close relationship and co-
ordination between assemblers and component manufacturers is 
needed. The supporting industry should become specialised to pro-
duce large enough quantities so that they can benefit from economies 
of scale and increase their competitiveness (Duc 2004, 25). 
Apart from these factors, foreign investors need transparent and reliable 
investment conditions. They are most concerned about the stability of 
policies and preferences. Laws should be clear and their changes should be 
minimised, and if any change is necessary, it should not be retroactive.  
4.3 Enforcement of intellectual property rights  
As a WTO member state, one of Vietnam’s obligations will be to imple-
ment the rules of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) within one year. Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) are legal and institutional devices to protect creations of the mind 
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such as inventions, designs, and works of art and literature. They also 
include trademarks to distinguish a firm’s product from similar ones sold 
by competitors (Dutfield 2003, 5). The economically most significant IPRs 
are patents, copyrights, and trademarks.  
The purpose of this chapter is first, to assess the main challenges for Viet-
nam through the implementation of the requirements of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. Second, the meaning of IPRs and of technology transfer for indus-
trial development will be discussed. After a general introduction, the pre-
sent situation in Vietnam will be analysed and conclusions drawn for 
Vietnam’s future industrial and technology policy. The leading questions 
in this chapter are: 
– What are the main challenges for Vietnam regarding the implementa-
tion and enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement? What remains to be 
done?  
– What role do IPRs and technology transfer play regarding Vietnam’s 
industrial development? Where should Vietnam focus on?  
4.3.1 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
According to the Ministry of Science and Technology, when the govern-
ment filed its application to the WTO in 1995, Vietnam’s “industrial prop-
erty system was far from compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. Generally 
speaking, the system was inadequate and ineffective.” (MOST 2003, 13) 
This deficiency has three dimensions: the legal framework, the protection 
mechanisms, and the public awareness of IPRs in Vietnam. The following 
paragraphs assess the development and challenges regarding the imple-
mentation of IPRs legislation and the protection mechanisms available at 
present. 
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Box 7:  The TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement is the third pillar of the WTO alongside the agreements 
on goods (GATT) and services (GATS). It came into force in 1995. Since Janu-
ary 2000, all members of the WTO are obliged to comply with it. The TRIPS 
Agreement is to promote international harmonization of legislation on the pro-
tection of IPRs at a high level. Its aim is to improve the protection of IPRs, 
especially in the developing countries. 
The agreement covers three aspects in particular: Firstly, it sets high standards 
for the protection of IPRs for the most important areas regarding industrial pol-
icy: patent rights, copyright protection, trademarks, geographical indications, 
industrial designs, layout-designs of circuits and undisclosed information. Sec-
ondly, the agreement contains detailed procedural guidelines that aim to ensure 
the enforcement of rights. Thirdly, if conflicts arise due to IPR infringements and 
non-compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, WTO member countries can submit 
the case to the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. 
Therefore, the regulations of TRIPS go beyond all other existing conventions for 
the protection of IPRs, which are managed by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization ( ). 
Although the implementation of the agreement is obligatory for all new WTO 
members since 2000, the agreement does not call for a complete international 
harmonization of protection. Therefore, countries retain a degree of flexibility in 
incorporating the agreement into their national law. Further room for manoeuvre 
exists because certain parts of the TRIPS Agreement are in need of and open to 
interpretation. 
Source:  WTO (2005a, 42); Liebig (2001a) 
4.3.1.1 Implementation of IPR legislation in Vietnam 
Today, Vietnam’s national legislation on IPRs seems to be close to com-
pliance with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. An initial step for 
the Vietnamese government was the promulgation of the Civil Code in 
1995, which contains a chapter on the protection of IPRs part (Part VI 
“Intellectual Property Rights and Technology Transfer”). Additionally, 
Vietnam signed the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Prop-
erty Co-operation in December 1995 and committed itself to the protection 
of internationally recognised IPRs (ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Cooperation 1995). 
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However, the most important milestone until today with regard to imple-
menting IPR legislation was the signing of the US-Vietnam Bilateral 
Trade Agreement (US BTA) in 2001. Chapter two of this trade agreement 
contains obligations comparable to the WTO TRIPS Agreement: the US 
BTA refers to patent rights, copyright protection, trademarks, industrial 
designs, layout-designs of circuits and undisclosed information. In some 
areas the US BTA even goes beyond the TRIPS Agreement; for example 
according to Art. 5 encrypted program-carrying satellite signals are pro-
tected, an issue not mentioned under TRIPS. In comparison, additional 
provisions of the TRIPS agreement include MFN and geographic indica-
tions. As the implementation phase of the BTA rules ended in June 2004, 
the implication of the TRIPS Agreement for strengthening the protection 
of intellectual property rights in Vietnam will just be the final step towards 
full compliance with international legislation on IPR.  
The current situation regarding the implementation of the required legisla-
tive provisions for IPRs can be assessed as follows: The last review of the 
Implementation of Vietnam’s Action Plan, February 2004 (MOST 2004) 
demonstrates that Vietnam’s national laws and circulars meet almost all 
TRIPS related areas, although in some areas only basically. Therefore, the 
action plan focuses on a variety of improvements to be made during the 
year 2004. According to the Review of the Implementation, the following 
measures are intended (MOST 2004, 11): Ensuring national treatment in 
establishing, maintaining and implementing IPRs; expanding the scope of 
protection of trademarks according to the TRIPS Agreement; providing im-
plementing regulations on geographical indications; expanding the list of 
protected plants; providing concrete regulations on the establishment of IPRs 
regarding layout-designs (topographies) of integrated circuits and undisclosed 
information (Thang 2004, 9). Law experts state that, from the formal legal 
point of view, the laws and decrees on intellectual property rights are one 
of the best pieces of legislation in Vietnam.  
Legislation on intellectual property has been streamlined in 2005 with the 
amended Civil Code of 2005 replacing the 1995 Civil Code, which entered 
into force on 1 January 2006, and with the new Intellectual Property Law 
of 29 November 2005, which came into effect on 1 July 2006. A number 
of decrees guiding the implementation of the new legislation were adopted 
in September 2006 (WTO 2006b, 95–96, para. 378). Of course, it will take 
some time before all state agencies involved and the courts will be fully 
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aware of and be able to implement and enforce the new legislation against 
infringements of intellectual property rights.    
In addition to the efforts to bring Vietnamese national legislation in har-
mony with the TRIPS requirements, the government has initiated the pro-
cess for signing and ratifying international treaties on important IPR is-
sues. Since 2002 Vietnamese authorities have conducted studies for the 
participation in international conventions on IPRs such as: the Berne Con-
vention on Copyright, the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Phono-
grams as well as the Brussels Convention relating to the Distribution of 
Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (Thang 2004, 9). 
The accession to these conventions is planned for 2004.38  
Regarding the implementation of IPR legislation and according to the 
opinion of several experts interviewed, chances are high that the legal 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement will be fulfilled before Vietnam’s 
scheduled WTO accession in 2006 (Nguyen / Toan 2003). At the moment, 
the main challenge for the Vietnamese government is to create more de-
tailed legal devices for the different IPR issues and to provide implementa-
tion guidelines for the different laws and ordinances in order to fully com-
ply with international standards and to provide assistance for the IPR 
holders and enforcement institutions. 
In addition, the discussions between the National Office for Intellectual 
Property (NOIP), the Copyright Office and the Ministry of Justice regard-
ing the attempts to separate the IPR legislation from the civil code demon-
strate some remaining deficits in the area of legislation: according to 
statements of some of their staff, there exists a huge variety of different 
legal regulations39 referring to the various TRIPS rules, sometimes even 
contradictory in their meanings. Separate laws for each IPR topic would 
provide a more transparent structure and would make the changing of 
provisions more flexible. 
                                                          
38  Besides these steps the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) Secretariat has stated conformity of Vietnam’s IP legal framework with the 
UPOV convention on new plant varieties after the incorporation of the UPOV’s com-
ments in the Vietnamese draft Ordinance on new plant varieties. Vietnam’s accession to 
this convention is expected for 2004. 
39  This refers to the mixture of laws, decrees and circulars: Circulars are decisions of the 
minister to stipulate the provisions of decrees. Decrees are promulgated through the 
government in contrast to laws which have to pass the National Assembly. 
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4.3.1.2 Mechanisms to protect IPRs in Vietnam 
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement requires effective enforcement of IPRs 
through civil and criminal codes and administrative remedies and proce-
dures, including border control measures. In addition, Part IV of the 
TRIPS Agreement stipulates simple and expeditious procedures for acqui-
sition and maintenance of IPRs. Regarding the enforcement agencies, the 
agreement calls for timely, effective, fair and simple enforcement proce-
dures.  
The major challenge for Vietnam to comply with the TRIPS Agreement 
seems to be the remarkable divergence between the well developed legal 
framework and the frequent infringements of IPRs in Vietnam: One hears 
about business people copying products and designs and selling them 
under their own trademark or label. Recently, these problems have been 
contained to some extent. For example, in 2003 the Market Management 
Organization detected and handled 5805 cases of production and trading of 
counterfeit goods out of which one third was related to IPRs.40 This, how-
ever, may be only the tip of the iceberg.  
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement was another hot issue during the 
sessions of the Working Party on Vietnam’s WTO accession. Even the 
final report contains a number of very revealing questions and answers 
like the following: “Some Members observed that it had been brought to 
their attention that some agencies of the Government of Viet Nam used 
computer software that had not be authorized by the right holder. (…) The 
representative of Viet Nam confirmed that prior to the date of accession, 
Viet Nam would issue appropriate legal instruments mandating that all 
government agencies use only legitimate computer software and not in-
fringe the copyright of such software. (…) The Working Party took note of 
these commitments.” (WTO 2006b, 101, para. 403)41  
                                                          
40  The Market Management Office in Hanoi confiscated, e. g., thousands of fake articles 
of goods bearing “Nike” trademark of the Hanoi Textile Company. 
41  “A Member urged Viet Nam to implement the TRIPS Agreement upon accession without 
recourse to a transitional period, stressing the importance of establishing appropriate 
laws and regulations, and adequate enforcement mechanisms. Some Members noted 
that although Viet Nam had implemented many intellectual property laws, Viet Nam 
also needed adequate enforcement mechanisms and sanctions to ensure protection of 
intellectual property rights, including civil procedures allowing plaintiffs to bring for-
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The underlying hypothesis of this chapter is: On the one hand, there is a 
lack of awareness of and information about IPRs and their official protec-
tion among Vietnamese people. On the other hand, the enforcement is still 
too weak to solve Vietnam’s problems regarding the infringement of IPRs 
due to a lack of specific regulations, a lack of capacity regarding the regis-
tration area, a lack of co-ordination of the variety of enforcement institu-
tions and a lack of knowledge among their staff.  
The following box gives an overview about the structure of Vietnam’s 
enforcement institutions. 
Box 8: Institutions implementing and enforcing IPRs 
The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the legislation on IPRs in the Civil 
Code. Bodies working in the field of IPRs registration and protection in the 
broadest sense are the National Office for Intellectual Property (NOIP) under the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, responsible for trademarks, patents, copy-
right on scientific work and software; the Copyright Office under the Ministry of 
Culture and Information for copyright of literature and artistic works; the Plant 
Variety Office under the Ministry of Agriculture. These governmental institu-
tions have the responsibility to assist their ministries in the management of IPRs 
but have no responsibilities to enforce IPRs directly. Recently, there has been a 
new struggle about responsibilities for different IPRs between the NOIP, the 
MOT and the Copyright Office regarding trademarks and the different copy-
rights. These struggles lead to an uncertainty among the business community and 
to permanent restructuring. Although this issue will not be discussed in detail 
here, the government should be aware that uncertainty is not a good base for 
domestic as well as foreign business development. 
Administrative procedures 
The power to enforce IPRs is given to various authorities, such as the People’s 
Committees at all levels, the Market Management Bureau, the Economic Police, 
the Inspectorate for Science and Technology and the Inspectorate for Culture and 
Information and the customs offices. The legislation gives these authorities 
sufficient power to deal with IPR infringements which are subject to administra-
tive remedies. Without the authorization of the courts they can impose any ap-
propriate statutory administrative measures within their competence. The sanc-
tions range from admonition to fines between 5 and 100 Mio. VND. The law-
breaker may also receive sanctions like revoking the business license, confisca-
                                                                                                                         
ward actions regarding infringement, enforcement by the police, and border measures 
by the customs authorities.” (WTO 2006b, 118, para. 469) 
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tion or destroying counterfeit goods, especially goods that may be harmful for 
human health or the environment (Nguyen / Toan 2003). 
Criminal Procedures 
As the production or distribution of counterfeit goods is a crime in Vietnam, 
there is the possibility for criminal procedures: the definition is that counterfeit 
goods are goods of inferior quality and utility; trademarks, industrial designs, 
indication of sources, appellation of origins and goods labels. Depending on the 
severity of crime, sentences can range from two years imprisonment to even 
capital punishment (Nguyen / Toan 2003). The application of death penalty for 
serious counterfeiting of trademarks has been criticised by some members of the 
Working Party on WTO accession as unacceptably severe (WTO 2006b, 117, 
para. 467). 
Customs 
In January 2002, Vietnam enacted the new Customs Law. The law provides that 
the clearance of imported and exported goods may be suspended in case the IPR 
owner submits evidence that his rights are infringed (e. g. through a certificate of 
trademark registration, primary evidence of the infringements involved etc.). The 
suspension shall not exceed the time limit of ten days or a maximum of 20 days 
(such time limits also conform to those set forth in the US BTA). 
4.3.1.3 Challenges of IPR enforcement 
As statements of interview partners show, Vietnam’s SMEs are not well 
informed about the meaning of IPRs, and they do not have the capacity to 
bring newly invented products on the market and therefore feel forced to 
copy goods. In addition, there are more “professional” enterprises focus-
sing on increasing their profits by using well-known brand names or 
trademarks without licences. What should be done to improve the situation 
in Vietnam? On the one hand, more information has to be disseminated 
about IPRs, the possibilities of registering own creations and the protec-
tion mechanisms, as well as about the possible punishment measures. On 
the other hand, nothing will change if the legislation protects all kinds of 
IPRs, but implementing regulations are missing and the enforcement bod-
ies are weak. There is some similarity with China’s problems of enforcing 
IPRs: “In fact, IP rights are something foreign to Chinese culture. Confu-
cian teachings encourage learning by copying, in stark contrast to con-
temporary principles of intellectual property rights. This philosophy re-
sounds throughout Chinese culture. The ancient art of calligraphy is 
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taught by copying the style of great masters. It is not until a person has 
perfected the style of another that they are ready to develop their own 
unique style.” (Gregory 2003, 324)     
There are various ways to improve IPR enforcement in Vietnam. The first 
possibility to improve enforcement is through the implementation of spe-
cific regulations regarding enforcement remedies and procedures required 
by TRIPS. In February 2004, the government still assessed a lack of spe-
cific regulations on these remedies and procedures for the handling of 
infringement of IPRs as well as shortcomings within newly issued admin-
istrative procedures (MOST 2004, 13). The action plan for 2003/2004 
therefore envisages perfecting the Civil Procedure Code and several other 
regulations. For example, it is planned to publish a circular guiding the 
proceedings of court cases concerning IPRs, to amend a government de-
cree on the handling of violation of administrative regulations and to regu-
late the border control measures and procedures of handling IPR infringe-
ments in export and import activities. To guarantee compliance with the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, Vietnam is on the right way to 
strengthen its efforts to implement the envisaged regulations.42 
Secondly, the capacity for the registration of IPRs has to be improved. 
Referring to the necessary regulations for procedures for the acquisition of 
intellectual property rights (Part IV of the TRIPS Agreement), Vietnamese 
officials state their concern: Although the automation of administration of 
industrial property has been improved since 1996, it was not possible to 
significantly build up the capacity of the registration offices to ensure 
high-qualified procedures (MOST 2004, 16). For the future, NOIP plans to 
renovate the Organization and operation of the enforcement mechanism 
into a one-door system in which each body has its function (without over-
lapping of jurisdiction as today). A new idea is that one of the enforcement 
institutions would be designated as the co-ordinator to receive all com-
                                                          
42  E. g., in 1997/8 and 2001, even Sweden and Denmark were forced by the United States 
to bring their enforcement procedures in accordance with TRIPS requirements (see dis-
pute settlement cases nos. 83 and 86 on the WTO website). The conflict cases were an-
nounced before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO but the different parties 
agreed on a mutually satisfactory solution: the defendants changed some civil proceed-
ings to bring their national law in accordance to TRIPS. This might also happen so 
Vietnam, if the intended plans are not put into action. 
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plaints and co-ordinate the operations of the other bodies (MOST 2004, 
17). 
Thirdly, coordination and communication between the variety of enforce-
ment institutions as well as the knowledge of the staff members need to be 
improved. In 1996, the Vietnamese government itself assessed the work-
ing of the institutions as cumbersome and bureaucratic, because the agen-
cies had overlapping functions and their work was not well co-ordinated. 
According to several government officials and taking into account the 
voices of IPR holders in Vietnam, the situation has not yet notably im-
proved, neither regarding the co-ordination among the different institu-
tions, nor their level of knowledge and expertise.  
The court system may serve as an example: the law agency Pham & Asso-
ciates concludes that the lack of knowledge and the inexperience of judges 
often results in too long trials (normally, cases last up to three years) and 
that the court often does not take into account the rights holders’ costs 
when calculating the damage. This prevents businessmen from bringing IP 
disputes to courts (Nguyen / Toan 2003). Foreign IPR owners seem to be 
more interested in effective measures to stop the infringement as soon as 
possible than taking an infringement case to the courts for compensation 
for the damage. While administrative measures seem to be more time- and 
cost-effective, infringements are more likely to be settled through adminis-
trative than through civil procedures. As long as there will not be a funda-
mental improvement in the handling of IPR infringements, foreign inves-
tors will be cautious to bring their latest technologies or inventions to 
Vietnam.  
According to government officials interviewed there is still a lack of 
knowledge on IPRs even among the staff of enforcement institutions. This 
was debated even during the session of the Working Party, when the Viet-
namese representatives had to concede that the general law enforcement 
agencies “had no officials specialized in this area”, and that “no particu-
lar incentives were available to these officials to encourage investigation 
and prosecution of IPR infringements.” (WTO 2006b, 113, para. 453) 
Training courses for ministry officials as well as for enterprises have taken 
place during the last years. However, these measures were not enough to 
educate all involved officials sufficiently on the relatively new issue of 
IPR. Reasons for that were the limited capacity of training measures and 
the reported theoretical bias and lack of practical orientation of the semi-
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nars. This is one area where the Vietnamese government wants to concen-
trate its efforts because knowledge is the most important prerequisite for 
improvements for the whole enforcement system. 
Box 9: Action plan of the Ministry of Science and Technology 
Details of the action plan from 1996 according to TRIPS, Part III, enforcement 
agencies (still pending): 
− Establish separate courts responsible for industrial property/copyright matter 
in three to five regions. 
− Concentrate enforcement functions into two agencies (customs – border 
control; market control office – domestic market) and strengthening the ca-
pacity of enforcement agencies. 
− Strengthen the capacity (equipment, techniques, staff) for the enforcement 
agencies. 
Source: MOST (2004, 16) 
Another issue is the reported informality problem within the enforcement 
institutions, especially regarding the handling of IPR violations. One in-
terview partner of an intermediate institution said that if the certificate for 
the trademark or label for exporting goods is missing, one could easily 
solve the problem with extra payments. This is another major obstacle for 
effective protection of IPRs.   
Box 10:  Enforcement of intellectual property rights in China 
The situation of enforcement of IPRs in Vietnam is often compared to the 
situation in China, however with a question mark: Although China is a WTO 
member since December 2001, the situation regarding IPRs shows still a lot 
of shortcomings. Many western industrialized countries complain about the 
widespread copyright infringements (music, software etc.) and product piracy. 
Therefore, the United States regularly threatens China through announcing the 
withdrawal of the WTO basic principle of guaranteeing most favoured nation 
treatment. But until today, no dispute settlement has been launched against 
China in this regard. As stated by representatives of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the conditions in China have 
improved significantly during the last years: The legal framework as well as 
the needed institutions have been installed. However, especially in the prov-
inces the administration lacks money and human resources. With activities 
like the realization of the “Intellectual Property Protection Publicity Week“ in 
April 2004, China challenges the infringers of IPRs. 
Source:  Ermert (2004) 
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At present, the insufficient protection mechanisms are a growing concern 
among Vietnam’s trading partners and foreign investors. It is obvious that 
this problem will be solved only in the long run. However, WTO member-
ship will be an important step towards implementing the necessary re-
forms. In view of Vietnam’s accession to the WTO, the widespread in-
fringements in the area of copyright (music, software, designs) and coun-
terfeit goods will not be the major obstacle – as long as Vietnamese enter-
prises do not export copied products on a large scale. Especially in the 
Asian region, but also in developing and even in developed countries all 
over the world, copyright infringements occur day by day. Until now, no 
WTO Dispute Settlement has focused yet on these issues directly, because 
the WTO law does not directly refer to individual citizens’ behaviour, but 
only to government actions (or non-compliance). 
But this does not mean that the effort to control the current infringements 
of copyrights for music or software should slow down. However, what is 
more essential is the fight against counterfeit products which are danger-
ous for the life of human beings or the environment, such as the copying 
of pharmaceuticals or spare part for automobiles and airplanes.  
4.3.2 Challenges for Vietnam’s industrial policy  
One important aspect of industrial policy is technology policy. Technology 
policy has two objectives: to support the development of new technologies 
and related know-how and to distribute the results among the business 
sector. According to a study carried out by the Central Institute for Eco-
nomic Management (CIEM), a coherent government strategy for the de-
velopment of a science and technology market43 in Vietnam is missing. 
Urgent issues in that context are IPRs and investment in technological 
development by enterprises. 
                                                          
43 A market of science and technology is considered to be a place where scientific and 
technological products and services are traded. Furthermore, it is regarded as an impor-
tant channel in enabling enterprises to invest in technology renewal with a view to im-
proving productivity and competitiveness of their products. In addition, a market for 
science and technology is considered to be a necessary environment for encouraging 
creativeness and innovation to improve national competitiveness (Dinh / Hong 2004, 
65).   
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4.3.2.1 Influence of IPRs protection on industrial policy 
During early stages of industrialization of the now developed countries, 
copying, imitation and adaptation greatly enhanced the diffusion of tech-
nology in industrialising countries. For example, the United States and 
Germany made use of British manufacturing innovations without paying 
compensation, and Japan borrowed extensively from US technological 
innovations (Lee 2002, 8). These possibilities are no longer available with 
the TRIPS Agreement and the effective Dispute Settlement Procedures 
under the WTO. In the area of patents, TRIPS provides a general level of 
protection for 20 years. Patent protection is available for semiconductors, 
computer chips and other technologies that are necessary inputs to indus-
trial processes. Copyright laws include similar regulations for the protec-
tion of software and music, films and other artistic products.  
A more effective enforcement of IPR legislation as required by the TRIPS 
Agreement will have ambivalent consequences for technological upgrad-
ing on Vietnam’s industry. On the one hand, the practice of reverse engi-
neering which had been quite common in Asian NICs (and in Europe at an 
earlier stage of industrial development) will be illegal. Companies will 
have to pay license fees for imported technologies. On the other hand, 
more effective protection of IPRs is expected to facilitate commercial 
technology transfer between foreign and local firms and from multina-
tional companies to their subsidiaries in Vietnam. Foreign enterprises 
would feel more confident to apply latest technologies in the country 
without risking that everything new will be copied and used by local com-
petitors (Bora et al. 2000, 22). In the long run, effective IPR protection 
would also create incentives for domestic firms to innovate and gain com-
petitive advantages through new products and production methods. Since 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measure (SCM) 
allows subsidies for research and development, and the results of this 
process can be patented, this would be the most effective form of indus-
trial policy in compliance with WTO rules and agreement.   
Generally speaking, developing countries do not have a comparative ad-
vantage for innovation. Therefore, to develop certain industrial sectors, 
they have to rely heavily on technology transfer from developed countries 
instead of relying on domestic innovation. With Article 66.2, the TRIPS 
Agreement urges developed countries to promote technology transfer to 
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least developed countries. But this has not had much real value due to the 
lack of absorptive capacity in these countries (Bora et al. 2000, 22). With 
more effective IPR protection however, the international allocation of 
R&D capacities might fundamentally change. During the last years, more 
and more international firms have established R&D centres, or have ente-
red into collaboration agreements with existing R&D centres in China and 
in India. If Vietnam wants to participate in this “profound shift of the cen-
ter of gravity in the global economy” (Ernst 2006, 29), it will have to 
strengthen its IPR enforcement system.   
4.3.2.2 State of the art of technology policy in Vietnam  
As mentioned in the previous section, since the application to become a 
member of the WTO, Vietnam has made some ambitious steps regarding 
the issue of IPRs: Its national legislation on IPRs is at present almost com-
pliant with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. Nevertheless a 
major gap between written law and practice can be observed. On the one 
hand, respect for IPRs is low and people have not developed the habit of 
registering IPRs. In 2002, only 743 patents had been issued in the whole 
country (out of 1,211 applications), and 132 licenses of intellectual prop-
erty title transfer were certified in the relevant state management agency 
(Dinh / Hong 2004, 66). An ambivalent development can be assessed 
regarding the distribution between domestic and foreign registrations for 
IPRs in the period between 1990 and 2001. Although foreign invested 
companies still hold the majority in registering for granted patents for 
inventions, the situation becomes well balanced in the area of patents and 
trademarks. Vietnamese enterprises are one step ahead regarding granted 
patents for industrial designs compared to foreign enterprises (see Appen-
dix: Tables 6–9). 
But still, the overall number of registrations of IPRs by domestic enter-
prises is limited. In 2003, market transactions related to patents, useful 
innovations and model designs have been rare. There are various reasons 
for this situation: On the one hand, the existing management and policy 
mechanisms do not sufficiently encourage inventors of knowledge to reg-
ister for intellectual property protection. On the other hand, protecting 
their intellectual property can be costly for enterprises and individuals 
(Dinh / Hong 2004, 69). In addition, many companies interviewed in vari-
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ous industries (handicraft, textiles, shoes, furniture) claimed that register-
ing a patent is not worth the trouble because the products are copied too 
quickly, even before the patent procedure is finalised. The complicated 
registration procedures take at least six months. In addition, the high costs, 
up to three million VND, prevent business people from registering their 
products or trademarks. Especially for SMEs, but also for large companies 
including SOEs, this situation means a loss of profit with regard to time 
and money spent on the innovation of a new product.  
Regarding the area of trademarks, the Vietnamese business community 
seems to become more and more aware of the positive effects of register-
ing one’s own trademark, brand name or label for the selling on the do-
mestic market and for exporting. But still, most of the Vietnamese goods 
are exported under foreign trademarks. Only recently, Vietnamese trade-
marks like Trung Nguyen Coffee, PetroVietnam, Biti’s Shoes, 333 Beer 
have been stolen by foreign enterprises (Outlook March 2004, 22). 
A CIEM study demonstrates that the level of investment in new technolo-
gies made by Vietnamese enterprises is still very limited due to numerous 
reasons, related to the capacity of the enterprises on the one hand and to 
macro level policy on the other. The existing macroeconomic and business 
environment does not provide sufficient incentives for enterprises to invest 
in new technology. As long as there is no level playing field for different 
ownership types, subsidy mechanisms, existing privileges for selected 
enterprises, and uncertainties about policy changes, private entrepreneurs 
will be cautious to invest in R&D not knowing whether they will be able 
to reap the profits from successful inventions or technology improvements 
(Dinh / Hong 2004, 71). In addition to that, the private sector lacks capital, 
physical and human resources for investing in new technologies. 
With the unclear perspectives for the future of state-owned enterprises, 
SOEs which still play a leading role in the economy, will not have an 
incentive in investing into R&D, regardless of IPR protection. SOE man-
agers will rely more on government subsidies and protection against com-
petition from the private sector and international competitors. The foreign 
enterprise sector has not been sufficiently mobilised due to the lack of an 
appropriate policy mechanism to induce multinational corporations to 
invest in technology-based manufacturing and service areas. In addition, 
absorbing and promoting technology transfer from ongoing foreign-funded 
projects in Vietnam has not been successful (Dinh / Hong 2004, 72).  
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Although the Vietnamese government has made some efforts to stimulate 
technology transfer, its strategy is criticized, especially by foreign compa-
nies (Norris 2003, 93–99). The regulation on the conditions of technologi-
cal transfer (Decree No. 45) is strongly criticised for two reasons: on the 
one hand, a royalty rate, which may not exceed 5 % of the „net selling 
price“, is regarded as unreasonably low. On the other hand, the regula-
tion that the IPRs owner loses his rights to the transferee after a seven 
year period is regarded as being too short.” (Norris 2003, 93)  
In the twelve years from 1990 to 2002, only about 150 technology transfer 
agreements were approved by the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST), among them an increasing number with subsidiaries of foreign 
companies. As the term “technology transfer” has been defined very va-
guely (Norris 2003, 98), all contracts involving transfer of technology 
even for normal commercial licenses must be submitted for a review and 
approval by the MOST which can take years and may involve extensive 
interventions by consultants. At the moment, foreign entrepreneurs and 
international law experts feel that the current restrictions on technology 
transfer stifle Vietnam’s economic development and undermine its ability 
to develop its technology base.  
4.3.2.3 Conclusions for Vietnam’s future industrial policy 
Firstly, Vietnam’s macro level institutions should continue their efforts to 
strengthen the legal implementation of international IPR legislation. In 
addition, the identified shortcomings regarding the enforcement institu-
tions should be eliminated as soon as possible to guarantee effective pro-
cedures to register for IPRs and to prosecute infringements of IPRs.  
To enhance technology renewal and investment in new technologies by 
enterprises, the government should continue its macroeconomic and struc-
tural reforms. Therefore, market economy institutions should be improved 
to create a level playing field for businesses. The consequence will be a 
more competitive environment that will force enterprises to upgrade tech-
nologies and invest in R&D. In addition, the government should continue 
to implement its policies of restructuring and equitizing SOEs (reducing 
subsidies and monopoly protection). Foreign investment should be en-
couraged to bring technology renewal and R&D activities to Vietnam and 
to collaborate with domestic science and technology research institutions 
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and domestic enterprises. In addition, the government should assist SMEs 
with financial and technical support for technology renewal in production 
(Dinh / Hong 2004, 73).  
Secondly, the meso level institutions in the area of IPRs need more atten-
tion and support: At the moment, a wide variety of meso institutions is 
developing steadily in the area of IPRs, e. g. the Vietnamese Intellectual 
Property Association (VIPA) was founded in 2002 (see Box 11), and the 
Recording Industry Association of Vietnam was established in 2003. They 
already start to influence government policy as one interview partner of 
VIPA stated, e. g. through consultancy for new laws and regulations for 
the Ministry of Justice or the NOIP. Nevertheless there seems to be the 
need to strengthen their capacity to carry out measures of raising public 
awareness on IPRs and strengthen the representation of IPR holders’ inter-
ests in front of the government. In addition, business associations like the 
Association for Garment-Textile-Embroidery-Knitting (AGTEK) or the 
Vietnam National Textile and Garment Corporation (VINATEX) should 
be strengthened to continue with their awareness building courses on IPRs 
protection as well as on programs regarding technological innovation and 
creative education (e. g. design courses).  
Thirdly, the various business associations should provide more informa-
tion on the meaning and relevance of intellectual property protection to 
their members, and try to influence government policies in this area. For 
example, although the importance to establish one’s own trademark is 
widely known already, enterprises have to put more effort on this market-
ing possibility: Vietnamese companies should establish their own trade-
marks, brand names and labels in order to show their commitment to con-
sistent high quality and to gain consumer confidence in the long run. 
Thereby, they could increase their sales and profits, first on the domestic 
market and in the future on export markets as well. For example, raw cof-
fee gets just 38 cents per kg, but when the product is packaged and given a 
recognised brand name, it sells for US$16 in North America (Outlook, 
March 2004, 22.). 
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Box 11: The Vietnam Intellectual Property Association (VIPA) 
VIPA was established in May 2002. The non-governmental Organization aims 
at providing information about IPRs, especially for enterprises, Organizations 
and individuals working in the field of IPRs and to offer training courses on 
specific IPRs. In addition, the association has organised, in collaboration with 
the National University of Social Science and Humanity in Hanoi, a six months 
postgraduate course on IPRs. The pilot-course started in March 2004 with about 
100 participants. However, due to the lack of staff members (currently only 
seven) and self-funding, the capacity of the Organization is very limited. The 
important advantage of VIPA is that due to the 700 actual members, the Organi-
zation has a creative pool of knowledge on IPRs from various points of views 
(lawyers, creators, enterprises). 
Regarding the area of technology renewal, Vietnamese firms having a 
joint venture with a foreign partner should be more pro-active and build up 
the capacity to absorb the imported technology. In addition, the present 
weak link between private Vietnamese and foreign-invested enterprises, 
especially the supplier relationship, should gain more attention to be im-
proved in order to profit from the possibility of better technological trans-
fer (Dinh / Hong 2004, 72).  
5 Challenges for export promotion 
Until recently, Vietnam’s export success was based mainly on agricultural 
and mineral commodities, with some diversification taking place within 
the agricultural export sector. However, the high export growth rates of the 
past cannot be maintained by relying on agricultural exports alone. Viet-
nam has quickly gained major shares in world markets for agricultural 
commodities, and further expansion of the same exports may face dimin-
ishing returns. There will be a potential for higher value-added agricultural 
exports if Vietnamese producers and exporters will be able to produce 
constant high quality products and export them under premium brand 
names. But in the long run, further export expansion requires more diversi-
fication and will have to be based on manufactured exports. Like the ear-
lier industrializing countries in the region, Vietnam will have to diversify 
its exports by exporting more sophisticated products with higher value 
added allowing for an increasing per capita income. Thus, diversifying 
manufactured exports and raising the value added of exported products 
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becomes increasingly important (Van Arkadie / Mallon 2003, 201). How-
ever, trade liberalization on its own will not lead automatically to a rise of 
competitive export enterprises and industries. Export-oriented manufactur-
ing does not develop spontaneously with the availability of cheap labour 
and free trade. Active policies are necessary to support firms in their ef-
forts to export new products to new markets (Rodrik 2004). 
A common feature of industrial development in East Asian countries after 
the Second World War was that they did not stick to the traditional import 
substitution strategy for decades (as India, China and most Latin American 
countries had done). East Asian countries managed to combine some de-
gree of import protection for new industries with an early drive to venture 
into exports. Their macro-economic policies did facilitate exports, but East 
Asian governments relied not only on sound macro-economic policies, 
they applied additional selective measures to encourage and facilitate early 
exports of new industries and even individual companies (e. g. through 
export contests). With this government-backed export orientation, East 
Asian countries encouraged their industries to adopt the latest technolo-
gies, management and marketing concepts in order to expand their shares 
in world markets and to finance the next round of industrial development 
from their own foreign exchange revenues. The WTO Agreement on Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures, however, rules out the utilization of 
direct export subsidies, except for less developed countries, and Vietnam 
will not be exempted from the ban on export subsidies.44  
The first section of this chapter examines Vietnam’s export promotion 
policies in the light of WTO accession. Relevant export promotion instru-
ments include subsidies, the services of Trade Promotion Organizations 
and policies to attract FDI (e. g. infrastructure development, human capital 
formation, establishment of export processing zones).  
The second section deals with a special challenge for export promotion: 
the increasing relevance of technical regulations, standards and norms in 
                                                          
44  “Late industrializers may expect both discontinuity and continuity between GATT and 
WTO rules. The major difference between the two trade regimes from the viewpoint of 
late industrializers is the prohibition by the WTO of subsidies on exports. This prohibi-
tion terminates a very powerful developmental tool insofar as latecomers that made the 
transition from low technology into mid-technology industries after World War II made 
exporting, with subsidies, a condition for operating in protected domestic markets. Ex-
porting was a performance standard that contributed to efficiency and growth.” (Ams-
den 2005, 229-30) 
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international trade makes it necessary to bring Vietnam’s system of stan-
dardization in line with the international requirements and to provide Viet-
namese producers and exporters with the necessary information and with 
the testing and certification facilities they need to meet the quality re-
quirements of their export markets. Compliance with standards and norms 
on export markets is an essential precondition for exporting. Thus, helping 
exporting enterprises to fulfil these requirements can be regarded as an 
instrument of export promotion compatible with WTO rules. 
5.1 Vietnam’s export promotion policies in the light of 
WTO accession – The challenge of competitiveness 
without subsidies 
What will Vietnam’s accession to the WTO mean for its ability to promote 
industrial exports? What are the restrictions of promoting exports under 
WTO rules? What options remain and what can the Vietnamese govern-
ment do? In the process of WTO accession and integration into the global 
economy, the Vietnamese government is confronted with two main tasks: 
It has to adapt its export promotion policies to WTO rules and it has to 
improve existing export promotion measures in order to facilitate the in-
tegration into the global economy. Thus, the purpose of this section is:  
– to assess the WTO-compatibility of Vietnam’s export promotion poli-
cies (especially industrial subsidies) and to identify required adjust-
ments (section 5.1.1);  
– to make recommendations on how to pursue an effective and WTO-
consistent export promotion policy (section 5.1.2). 
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5.1.1 WTO-compatibility of Vietnam’s export promotion 
policies and required adjustments 
5.1.1.1 The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
The main WTO rules regarding export promotion are laid down in the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The 
SCM Agreement restricts the ability of WTO members to subsidise do-
mestic production in a way and to a degree that would affect trade, i. e. it 
limits the scope for direct subsidisation of exporting firms. Subsidies are 
defined as financial contributions by the government or governmental agen-
cies that provide a benefit to a specific enterprise, industry or region. There 
are different rules for three different categories of subsidies: Prohibited 
subsidies, actionable subsidies and permitted subsidies (Lee 2002, 6). 
Prohibited subsidies: The SCM prohibits export subsidies for all coun-
tries with a per capita income above US$ 1000. Furthermore, subsidies 
that encourage the use of domestic inputs rather than imported inputs are 
prohibited, as are subsidies that are conditional on export performance. 
Thus, setting export targets as a condition for subsidies is not allowed.  
Actionable subsidies: In a grey area of subsidies, called “actionable”, 
subsidies are allowed in principle. However, if another member country 
can prove that it is negatively affected as a result of the subsidy, it can take 
action through the WTO dispute settlement process or by imposing coun-
tervailing duties. 
Permitted subsidies: Three categories of subsidies are permitted: subsi-
dies to disadvantaged regions, subsidies for research and development 
(R&D), and subsidies for environmental purposes. These subsidies repre-
sent possible loopholes for a limited range of export promotion measures. 
For example, international competitiveness of industries may be strength-
ened in conformity with the SCM Agreement through subsidising their 
R&D activities.  
Special and differential treatment on subsidies 
WTO law recognises that subsidies may play an important role in the 
economic development of developing countries. Therefore, low-income 
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countries with a per capita income of less than US$ 1000 are exempted 
from the general prohibition of export subsidies. Once GDP per capita 
exceeds US$ 1000, export subsidies must be eliminated within eight years 
after WTO accession.  
Since Vietnam’s current per capita income is below US$ 1000, the general 
rule prohibiting subsidies would not apply. However, developing countries 
which have recently joined the WTO (e. g. China) were not able to negoti-
ate special and differential treatment on subsidies even if their per capita 
income was below US$ 1000. They accepted the obligation to rule out all 
existing export subsidies and not to introduce new ones in the future. The 
question whether Vietnam would be allowed to make use of the exemption 
clause allowing developing countries below US$ 1000 to apply export 
subsidies was debated controversially among the members of the Working 
Party on Vietnam’s WTO accession.45 In the end, however, Vietnam ac-
cepted to eliminate all prohibited subsidies as of the date of accession, 
with the exception of incentives contingent upon export performance that 
were granted under current export promotion programmes. These incen-
tives to current beneficiaries would be phased out over a five-year period 
beginning with the date of accession. 
Incentives to attract FDI 
Concerning WTO law, there is a grey area with respect to the use of incen-
tives to attract FDI. Competition between countries and even between 
provincial governments within one country for FDI is intense, and incenti-
                                                          
45  “Some members noted that Viet Nam considered itself a low-income developing country 
eligible to maintain export subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures (SCM). A Member expressed support for Viet Nam’s inclusion under 
Annex VII of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, owing to Viet 
Nam’s low per capita GDP (less than US$ 1,000). Another Member, however, noted 
that Article 27.2(a) of the Agreement was specific to developing countries referred to in 
Annex VII of the SCM, and this was not a self-nominated or expanding list of countries. 
Moreover, the provisions of Article 27.4 of the Agreement, available to developing 
countries with a small share of world export trade, would not be available to Viet Nam. 
While ready to consider some flexibility as to how Viet Nam would phase out its prohib-
ited export subsidies, this Member maintained that Viet Nam should have no recourse to 
provisions allowing the use of prohibited subsidies following its accession. Moreover, 
as Viet Nam would be acceding to the WTO after the expiry of the phase-out period for 
export subsidies by developing countries, Viet Nam should phase out its export subsidy 
schemes upon accession.” (WTO 2006b, 72, para. 283) 
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ves are used widely by governments of developed and developing count-
ries.46 Most FDI incentives – such as tax incentives, duty exemption or 
duty drawback for exporting companies – fall under the definition of sub-
sidies in the SCM. However, the concepts of the SCM Agreement were 
developed for subsidies affecting trade in goods and may not easily be 
applied to incentives for FDI (Bora et al. 2000, 21).  
5.1.1.2 Consequences for Vietnam  
For Vietnam, the concrete consequences of WTO rules on subsidies will 
depend on the outcome of the current negotiations in the WTO. Other 
WTO members of the Working Party on the accession of Vietnam have 
voiced concerns about the existing direct export subsidies. Therefore, 
Vietnam promised to phase out direct export payments contingent on ex-
port performance (export rewards) within five years of accession to the 
WTO and to scrap agricultural export subsidies immediately after WTO 
accession. However, Vietnam will maintain subsidies in the form of in-
vestment incentives for promoting development of new industries for 
another nine years.  
Prohibited subsidies: At present, subsidies for manufactured exports are 
very limited in Vietnam. The government maintains only very few benefits 
conditional on exports that are not allowed under WTO rules. For exam-
ple, the Export Reward Programme provides small benefits for successful 
exporters and is contingent on exports since the conditions for being re-
warded require that enterprises have an increase in export value (CIEM 
2004, 21). Hence, the government should be prepared to phase out the 
Export Reward Programme in accordance with WTO law.  
Actionable subsidies: It is difficult to predict whether a conflict might 
arise in the middle category of “actionable subsidies”. Other WTO mem-
ber countries have the right to ask for justification for this type of subsi-
                                                          
46  Multilateral disciplines on the use of incentives for attracting FDI would be in the 
interest of developing countries since this would level the international FDI playing 
field and prevent a waste of scarce resources when developing countries apply subsidies 
in competition for FDI. If Vietnam nevertheless intends to stimulate the development of 
a new industry through foreign investment, it would be a better policy to invest in at-
tractive infrastructure, efficient institutions and a qualified workforce so that foreign in-
vestors consider the advantage of investing here over other locations.  
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dies and for evidence that they do not distort trade severely. This might be 
relevant for Vietnam’s SOEs, which enjoy a number of production subsi-
dies and preferential credits. Although these subsidies are not conditional 
on export performance, they could be regarded as trade distorting as soon 
as SOEs engage in exports. If another country can prove that it is nega-
tively affected as a result of the subsidy, it can apply to the WTO dispute 
settlement or impose countervailing duties. This is not very likely to hap-
pen since the effect of production subsidies on trade is limited. However, 
production subsidies might pose a problem for SOEs producing textiles or 
garments. Thus, Vietnamese SOEs might face the charge of unfair compe-
tition if they receive any kind of state subsidy. Credit and tax preferences, 
debt rescheduling or debt cancellation for SOEs could be challenged by 
other WTO members. 
Incentives to attract FDI  
Incentives for FIEs are certainly one of the most controversial issues. As 
mentioned above, it is not clear if incentives to attract foreign investment 
fall under the category of prohibited subsidies. Tax holidays and preferen-
tial tax rates – as currently applied to FIEs in Export Processing Zones47 – 
as well as preferential credits, duty exemption or duty drawback for ex-
porting companies may all be considered – in principle – as subsidies 
                                                          
47  Export Processing Zones (EPZs) are not defined or referred to in WTO agreements. 
However, to the extent that trade-affecting subsidies are provided in an EPZ, the rules of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures apply. In general, restrictions 
on export subsidies under WTO law could limit the ability of countries to make use of 
EPZs in the future. Duty exemption, lower tax rates and special credit facilities could be 
contested by other countries because they represent subsidies to companies that are re-
quired to export a major share, if not all, of their output. However, there are other incen-
tives to foreign investors that can be provided in EPZs, e. g. better infrastructure facili-
ties and more flexible government regulations and services (taxation and customs pro-
cedures), which would still be allowed under the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO. In 
Vietnam, companies producing in and exporting from an EPZ enjoy tax breaks and dif-
ferent preferential tax rates, depending on their export orientation. It seems rather 
unlikely that Vietnam will have to phase out duty drawback schemes or incentives ap-
plied in Export Processing Zones (e. g. duty exemption, preferential tax rates). Although 
these incentives to attract FDI may not be fully consistent with WTO rules, they are still 
pursued by many countries all over the world. The Vietnamese government would do 
well to seek clarification on the compatibility of its EPZ policy with WTO rules and in 
this way avoid the possibility of future disputes with other countries. For an authorita-
tive assessment of the economic rationale of EPZs and their compliance with WTO 
rules and agreements see: World Trade Report 2006 (WTO 2006a, 77).  
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prohibited under the SCM Agreement (Thang 2004, 8) . In the negotia-
tions on Vietnam’s WTO accession, WTO members requested to phase 
out all such measures that are contingent on exports. Vietnam is resisting, 
stating that such measures are necessary incentives to attract FDI and that 
they are consistent with the SCM Agreement (World Trade Organization 
(2000b).  
5.1.2 Recommendations for an effective and WTO-
consistent export promotion policy 
Even if direct intervention by governments to support exports is increa-
singly restricted by WTO rules, this is not the end to an active export pro-
motion policy. Subsidizing exports of uncompetitive products over a long 
time is a waste of resources and does not help to develop competitive 
export industries. More important than subsidizing uncompetitive products 
for exports would be the provision of an attractive investment environment 
for exporters. Instead of subsidizing exports, Vietnam should focus on 
reducing the still existing anti-export bias and on levelling the playing 
field between SOEs, private companies and foreign firms. Improving the 
overall economic environment should be accompanied by increased efforts 
to attract FDI. In order to strengthen export capacities of domestic compa-
nies, the government should encourage intermediary institutions such as 
Vietrade, VCCI and other business associations to provide all kinds of 
technical assistance (information on export markets etc.) to exporters.  
5.1.2.1 Reducing the anti-export bias and levelling the 
playing field for private and state-owned enterprises 
Reducing the anti-export bias  
Efforts to increase industrial exports will only be successful if the overall 
economic framework is favourable for exports. A stable macroeconomic 
environment is essential if export strategies are to succeed. Vietnam has an 
excellent track record of maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment 
since the start of the economic reform programme in the late 1980s. Com-
bined with periodic downward adjustments of the nominal exchange rate 
by the Central Bank, this has helped to avert real exchange rate apprecia-
tion (Martin et al. 2002, 14). However, to facilitate integration into the 
Vietnam – the 150th WTO-member – Implications for industrial policy and export promotion 
German Development Institute 115
global economy, it is important to further reduce the still existing anti-
export bias and to level the playing field between state-owned and private 
enterprises.  
Trade regime: Despite considerable import liberalisation, Vietnam’s trade 
regime remains biased against exports. High import protection still creates 
incentives to sell to the domestic market and reduces incentives to export. 
In addition to that, efficient exporting can be handicapped by quantitative 
restrictions on imported inputs, by higher than world market prices of 
imported inputs, and by the diversion of resources to the protected and 
capital-intensive industries.  
Duty drawback: Well-functioning duty drawback systems are necessary 
until import tariffs are further reduced.48 Interviewed enterprises stated that 
the functioning of duty drawback schemes has been improved in recent 
years. Procedures are faster and more transparent than they used to be. 
However, enterprises that export only part of their output are still facing 
problems. Administrative and bureaucratic obstacles remain an important 
barrier. For example, for calculating the inputs, which may be imported 
duty free, customs officers often take a long time for identifying the pro-
portion exported out of the total output produced and the input-output 
ratios to be applied. There is obviously a need to shift from the current 
system of duty drawback, which is time-consuming and costly to an auto-
matic system, which is based on pre-announced import-export ratios that 
could be applied for reimbursement of paid import duties. This would 
minimise corruption and reduce administrative delays (Lord 2002, 19). 
Encouraging exports through facilitating access to world-class inputs from 
abroad is good policy. However, Vietnamese economic policy makers 
should be aware of possible negative effects on domestic suppliers to ex-
porting enterprises. If imported inputs are not taxed, whereas inputs from 
domestic suppliers are subjected to normal taxation, the latter are dis-
criminated in favour of imported inputs. If Vietnam’s small-scale indus-
tries are to become reliable and high quality suppliers to export oriented 
                                                          
48  Protection of intermediate products handicaps export industries because it raises their 
costs to levels that are higher than those of their competitors in world markets. A possi-
bility to offset this bias against exports is to allow exporting firms to import inputs and 
components at world prices through duty exemption or duty drawback. 
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foreign (and domestic) enterprises, they should enjoy the same tax rebates 
as imported inputs.49 
Regulatory framework: Vietnam has gradually liberalised its customs 
procedures and import and export licensing requirements. Today, all do-
mestic firms are allowed to export and import goods. Nevertheless, barri-
ers exist that discourage trading by non-state enterprises (Auffret 2003, 5). 
Excessive regulatory requirements for private enterprises prevent them 
from exporting, and even export licenses are still required to export certain 
products such as steel, iron, motorbikes, automobiles, paper, fertiliser or 
chemicals and minerals. Vietnam’s customs procedures are still too bu-
reaucratic. For both exporting and importing a series of vouchers and 
certificates is often required, such as package proceeding documents, cer-
tificates of origin, export/import licenses for certain products or documents 
of the legal status of the exporting firm. In order to facilitate trade, these 
export and import procedures should be simplified and unified (Ministry 
of Industry 2003, 8). 
Levelling the playing field between private and state-owned enterprises 
The experience of other successful East Asian exporters shows that the 
domestic private sector has to be strong and dynamic if rapid export 
growth is to be sustained over a long period of time. In Vietnam, growth of 
the formal domestic private sector will depend on how quickly the gov-
ernment provides a level playing field between state-owned enterprises 
and private firms. The environment for private domestic investments has 
improved already. However, there is still discrimination between private 
and public companies with regard to bureaucratic formalities, import-
ing/exporting possibilities, or access to capital and land (Dinh 2004, 21). 
Access to capital: Discrimination between state-owned and private enter-
prises can clearly be seen in their access to capital. The banking system 
has to become more responsive to the needs of domestic private firms that 
often have difficulties in getting access to credit. For private enterprises, it 
                                                          
49  “Another example of a misguided tax is the value added tax on domestic supplies sold to 
exporters. Since imports do not pay a VAT if they are used in exports, this virtually de-
stroys the ability of Vietnamese firms to become local suppliers. But local suppliers 
lower costs and help encourage the rapid buildup of export clusters. Here again, the 
revenue gained is trivial, but the cost of lost activity is huge.” (Dapice 2002, 15) 
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is also more difficult to borrow foreign currency than for SOEs. This is 
another barrier that hinders international trade activities of the private 
sector (Dinh 2004, 5). Vietnam has to create an independent banking sys-
tem without government involvement in lending decisions. Instead of 
giving SOEs priority access to credit, state-owned banks should extend 
lending to private exporting firms. In addition, credits to private exporters 
should be further promoted through measures such as the export support 
credits of the Development Assistance Fund. These facilities help to com-
pensate for the lack of a well-functioning financial system.  
Distribution of quotas for textile and garment exports: Private compa-
nies also face disadvantages in comparison to SOEs concerning adminis-
trative procedures. A concrete example is the distribution of quotas for 
textile and garment exports to domestic companies. Private companies 
stated that it is difficult for them to get quotas and that they feel disadvan-
taged in comparison to SOEs. More transparent distribution procedures 
could ensure equal access to export quotas. 
SOE reform: The reform of SOEs should be accelerated. Until today, 
SOEs, which are supposed to play a leading role in core sectors of the 
economy, enjoy significant state subsidies and protection. However, it 
remains unclear how these enterprises are to achieve competitiveness. 
While the protection might still be considered necessary to assist key in-
dustries of the economy, many other countries have experienced that the 
shorter the time, which is given to industries to adjust, the more likely the 
adjustment, will take place successfully.  
Reducing barriers to growth for private companies: Private enterprises 
are already engaged in exporting, especially in handicraft, processed agri-
cultural products as well as garments and leather products (CIEM 2004, 
17). The export competitiveness of these firms can be further increased 
through larger production volumes and lower unit costs (economies of 
scale). To this end, existing barriers to growth for private companies have 
to be reduced.  However, as long as the economic environment to invest 
and to do business remains in favour of SOEs, private enterprises face 
obstacles to grow and to become successful exporters. For example, in 
order to increase competitiveness through technological improvements and 
large production runs (economies of scale), private enterprises should be 
free to establish joint ventures with foreign partners. Private firms – with 
the involvement of foreign partners – have the potential to become export-
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ers if equal opportunities are provided and existing barriers to growth (e. g. 
access to credit and land) are reduced.  
5.1.2.2 Attracting FDI and strengthening export promotion 
through meso level institutions 
Attracting FDI 
Foreign companies already play a key role in increasing and diversifying 
Vietnam’s industrial exports. The contribution of FDI to the expansion of 
manufactured exports has been significant. Since the entry of foreign in-
vestors is essential for further export success, the promotion of FDI has to 
be a cornerstone of any export strategy. This is not to deny the importance 
of promoting exports by domestic enterprises either directly or indirectly 
as ancillary suppliers to exporting foreign enterprises.50 There are three 
tasks which are of special importance to make Vietnam more attractive for 
export-oriented FDI: Increasing consistency and predictability of eco-
nomic policies, improving the country’s export infrastructure and invest-
ing in human resource development.   
Increasing consistency and predictability of economic policies: Foreign 
investors regard Vietnam’s legal system and foreign investment policies as 
inconsistent and unstable and complain that policy changes can hardly be 
anticipated. For instance, they are concerned about changes in tax policies 
which reduce preferences enjoyed by enterprises in industrial and export 
processing zones and about the increase of the Value Added Tax applied 
to certain services provided for businesses in industrial and export process-
ing zones.  
Trust of foreign investors is hard to gain, but easy to loose. Thus, sudden 
policy changes regarding the framework for FDI should be avoided since 
they create uncertainties for FIEs. Companies cannot develop a long-term 
                                                          
50  Having a number of well-known international firms in each export sector creates the 
special advantage of having a lobby inside the importing countries against unfair treat-
ment of imports from Vietnam. The international networks of production and marketing 
that organize an increasing share of international trade are the best guarantee against 
major protectionist backlashes that would be a normal consequence of failed multilat-
eral trade negotiations as could be the case with the presently suspended Doha Devel-
opment Round in the WTO. 
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business strategy without stable government policies concerning, for in-
stance, taxation, customs, licensing or land acquisition. Laws need to be 
clear and their changes should be minimised. If changes are necessary, 
they should be predictable, consistent and not retroactive. The application 
of legislation and regulations should be reliable.  
Export infrastructure: A high-quality export infrastructure is necessary 
to increase export competitiveness and to attract more export oriented FDI. 
Although Vietnam has improved its infrastructure in recent years, the pace 
of improvement has not been as quick as in other countries in the region. 
As a result, many services have lower quality or higher prices. For exam-
ple, electricity costs and fees for using seaport and airport facilities are 
higher than those of other countries in the region, as are water charges and 
fuel prices. Pricing policies for these utilities should be examined and, to 
the extent possible, revised to bring costs in line with those of other 
ASEAN countries (Lord 2002, 17; Dinh 2004, 21).   
Human resources: Although the country’s human resources are recog-
nised to be comparatively well developed (compared to countries on the 
same per capita income level) and capable, they still fall short of the actual 
demands of investors. The shortage of high-skilled labour, such as manag-
ers or engineers is already becoming visible and might become even more 
severe in the future if the demand for high-skilled labour increases as a 
result of a stronger inflow of FDI (Vietnam Economic News, 13 April 
2004). Besides providing universal primary education, more can be done 
to strengthen human resource development. The government should pro-
vide more technical training and relevant secondary and tertiary education 
to meet the growing human capital needs of exporting firms. In addition, 
incentives should be offered to encourage in-house-training (Perkins 2001, 
485). 
The exports of Vietnam could profit from the know-how and networking 
expertise of Vietnamese living abroad. Other developing countries with 
overseas diasporas have made considerable efforts and concessions to tap 
their resources and contacts in the countries of residence. The Taiwanese 
example has demonstrated how enterprises have benefited from migrants 
willing to return from the US to Taiwan. These individuals were former 
Taiwanese citizens who had studied or worked in the US, many of them in 
responsible positions in well-known companies. By using such a reservoir 
of human capital abroad, Taiwan was able to accelerate its industrialisa-
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tion process. India is another country that has been increasingly successful 
in tapping the economic potential of its diaspora around the globe. On the 
one hand, they act as bridgeheads for Indian exporting companies in their 
countries of residence, on the other hand India has managed, through tax 
incentives and a steadily improving investment climate, to become attrac-
tive enough for Indian software experts and entrepreneurs to return from 
the US and other developed countries and invest their savings in new 
software enterprises in India which are well connected with international 
software networks and clients all over the world. Thus, India’s success in 
becoming one of the leading software exporting nations is based on a far-
sighted strategy to make use of its overseas diaspora.  
While copying such an approach might be difficult for Vietnam, it is for 
sure a path, which would allow it to effectively profit from the benefits of 
the educational and technological know-how in the US and in other devel-
oped countries. Furthermore, it induces synergies by combining highly 
skilled labour from abroad with newly trained workers from domestic 
educational facilities. The appropriate educational and vocational institu-
tions in Vietnam could then be upgraded more in line with the demands of 
the economy, thus making more efficient use of scarce national financial 
resources.  
Export Promotion through meso level institutions 
Attracting FDI is one instrument for expanding and diversifying industrial 
exports, supporting domestic companies through export promotion activi-
ties is another. Trade liberalization alone will not automatically make 
export industries competitive. Domestic firms are often unable to seize the 
opportunities of new export markets without specific support. Thus, active 
policies are necessary to support enterprises in their efforts to export to 
new markets. In this context, institutions at the meso level – such as Trade 
Promotion Organizations (TPO) and Business Associations – play an im-
portant role in assisting exporters by reducing transaction and information 
costs and initiating learning processes. They can provide, e. g., informa-
tion on conditions and requirements of foreign markets and services to 
foreign buyers.  
Currently, a lot of changes and new activities are on the way to improve 
promotion of Vietnamese exports. Considerable progress has been made. 
New trading centres are being opened (e. g. the Vietnam Trade Centre in 
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New York) and new Internet services (e-commerce, match-making) have 
been introduced (CIEM 2004, 21). Recently, 143 national key programmes 
on trade promotion have been approved by the Prime Minister. These 
projects include organising international exhibitions in Vietnam and for-
eign countries, researching foreign markets, providing market information, 
human resource training and promoting national trademarks. Thus, Viet-
nam’s trade promotion system is constantly improving. Nevertheless, to 
further increase effectiveness and efficiency, trade promotion institutions 
should focus on a variety of aspects:   
– Increased transparency of export promotion activities: Export 
promotion activities are currently being planned or carried out by 
many different institutions. In addition to VCCI, Vietrade and Invest-
ment and Trade Promotion Center (ITPC), there are several business 
associations engaged in trade promotion activities as well as 47 pro-
vincial trade promotion centres (Vietnam Economic News, 2 April 
2004). The first step to ensure the effectiveness of export promotion 
projects would be to make sure that information on these projects is 
made public. So far, accessible information on export promotion acti-
vities is limited and difficult to obtain. Information on export promo-
tion activities could be pooled, e. g. in only one Internet portal. This 
site would give an overview of all ongoing export promotion pro-
grammes of the government and the different institutions engaged in 
trade promotion. The pooling of information would facilitate access to 
export promotion and ensure that export promotion services are equal-
ly accessible for all exporters. It would be particularly relevant for 
new companies that are starting export activities and searching for 
government support.  
– Language skills: One problem concerning staff members of trade 
promotion Organizations as well as employees of exporting enter-
prises is insufficient command of English as the dominant language 
for international communication. For example, to make new business 
contacts with foreign buyers during trade fairs, good working know-
ledge of English is a necessary precondition. The impact of export 
promotion activities will be limited as long as this prerequisite is not 
met.  
Information on foreign markets: As many Vietnamese enterprises stated 
during interviews, they are not yet able to seize the opportunities of new 
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export markets due to a lack of information on prices, quality standards 
and regulations on these markets. High information costs are an important 
export barrier, especially for newcomers to the world markets. Thus, one 
area on which Vietnam’s export promotion should focus is the provision 
of market information, including forecasting of supply and demand, mar-
ket surveys and information on quality requirements. Collection and dis-
semination of information on foreign markets have to be further improved. 
For example, market information provided by the commercial sections of 
Vietnamese embassies abroad seems to be of limited value due to lack of 
experience in collecting information and limited financial resources (Asian 
Development Bank 2003, 261).  
Match-making: Information and transaction costs can also be reduced 
through lasting relationships between domestic companies and foreign 
buyers. Trade Promotion Organizations and business associations can play 
an important role in initiating contacts between Vietnamese suppliers and 
buyers from abroad (“match-making”). Foreign buyers provide necessary 
information on export markets and can assist domestic companies in im-
proving the quality of export products (improving design, quality control, 
introducing new production technologies etc.). Thus, through long-term 
relationships with international buyers, a virtuous circle of growing ex-
ports, higher quality of products and improved competitiveness of do-
mestic firms can emerge. However, some Vietnamese companies face 
problems in establishing longer-term commercial relations with buyers 
because the quality of their products is not consistent. Therefore, match-
making activities could be supported by export promotion initiatives aim-
ing at improving quality control.  
– Monitoring and evaluation: In order to decide whether the different 
export promotion activities merit further efforts, projects should be 
carefully monitored and reviewed. Monitoring and evaluation is im-
portant to improve the accountability and transparency of projects, to 
learn from experience and to redefine strategies.  
– Meso-level institutions as mediators between government and 
enterprises: Meso-level institutions have to perform two different 
tasks: On the one hand, they have to provide support, services and ad-
vice for exporting firms in order to reduce transaction and information 
costs for exporting. On the other hand, they should inform the gov-
ernment about the needs and concerns of exporting companies, influ-
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ence government policies and act as mediators between enterprises 
and the government. So far, existing institutions can fulfil these two 
tasks only to a limited extent. Firstly, institutional support for export-
ing firms is still insufficient. The range of activities of export promo-
tion organizations needs to be widened and their effectiveness and ef-
ficiency has to be improved. Secondly, the business community is on-
ly partially involved in the formulation and implementation of export 
promotion activities. Therefore, the government should aim at 
strengthening the dialogue with the business community, especially 
with private companies.  
Summing up this section, one can conclude that WTO rules and agree-
ments limit the scope for direct subsidization of exporting firms. Vietnam 
has agreed to phase out export subsides upon WTO accession, so that the 
government can no longer direct industrial development through the use of 
(export) subsidies. Efforts to increase industrial exports will only be suc-
cessful if the overall economic environment is favourable for exports. 
Internally, slow adjustment to changing global economic conditions, the 
lack of a dynamic private sector, and the inefficiency of state enterprises 
prevent Vietnam from improving its competitive position on major export 
markets (Lord 2002).  
The first step to raise export competitiveness would be to “release the 
brakes” by removing all existing obstacles for (potential) exporters. This 
means to reduce the still existing anti-export bias, to accelerate the reform 
of SOEs and to level the playing field for all enterprises. Some private 
companies already have the potential to become successful exporters if 
equal opportunities would be provided and existing barriers to growth 
would be reduced. The second step to raise export competitiveness would 
be to formulate and implement an export strategy, which has to be based 
on two pillars: On the one hand, the investment climate for FIEs should be 
further improved to attract more export-oriented FDI. On the other hand, 
export promotion activities should be pushed to support domestic compa-
nies in their effort to become successful exporters. 
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5.2 Meeting the quality requirements of export markets – 
The challenge of quality 
If export subsidies are ruled out by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures – with few exceptions for least developed coun-
tries and for the transitional period in which major developed countries 
will have to phase out their agricultural export subsidies – Vietnam will 
have to focus its export policies and export promotion activities on im-
proving the competitiveness of export products based on both cost advan-
tages due to low labour costs in combination with increasing productivity 
and on consistent good quality.51 There are already examples of Vietnam-
ese export products, which are achieving higher prices on export markets 
through consistently higher quality. If this is possible for agricultural 
commodities like pepper52 it will be even more relevant for manufactured 
goods for which quality aspects (design, functionality, reliability, safety 
etc.) play a greater role than for agricultural commodities. Vietnam seems 
to be in a good position to meet the quality requirements of export mar-
kets, and by aiming at high quality production for its exports it could dis-
tinguish itself from China’s “natural” comparative advantage in mass 
production of standardized goods.  
The quality of products can be defined and assessed. There is a widening 
range of sophisticated yardsticks for prescribing and measuring the quality 
of products, especially in the developed world. “We live in a world pro-
foundly reliant on product standards.” (WTO 2005b, 31) Standards for 
weight and length, specified properties and quality of goods have always 
been a fundamental precondition for market exchange. Industries develop 
standards so that complementary products fit together (camera and film, 
computer and software), and that division of labour and subcontracting 
within an industry is possible. Finally, quality conscious consumers de-
mand reliable information about the properties of the goods they buy, and 
product standards are an objective instrument to provide a wide range of 
                                                          
51  Even if Vietnam would not join the WTO, it will have to phase out its export subsidies. 
Other countries are becoming nervous with the large shares Vietnam has gained in rela-
tively short time in the world markets for coffee, pepper and some other commodities. 
Vietnamese exports have already faced anti-dumping charges (e. g. the catfish case with 
the US), and other commodity producing countries would complain if they feel that 
Vietnam’s dramatic export successes are based on artificial pricing and export subsidies. 
52  Cf. Clements-Hunt (2004). 
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information consumers need for making a rational choice, especially in 
view of avoiding health or environmental risks. They would not buy im-
ported goods if they had no guarantee that these products comply with the 
same health and safety standards that have been introduced in their own 
country as a result of increasing public awareness of health risks and envi-
ronmental degradation. Thus, technical regulations, standards and norms 
facilitate trade by providing both exporters and importers with reliable 
information about what they trade. On the other hand, standards can be-
come a major trade barrier. Imported products that do not meet the manda-
tory standards (technical regulations) set by the government can be re-
jected. And even if the exporter meets the standards, there are costs in-
volved in having the products tested and certified for compliance with the 
standards of the export market. With the general tariff reductions and 
dismantling of quantitative restrictions as a result of successful past, pre-
sent and future rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, standards are 
becoming increasingly important in international trade.53 
Vietnam’s exporters will have to learn about and adjust to the standards 
and technical regulations of export markets, even if the country would not 
become a WTO member. Importing countries impose their standards on 
any product, domestic and imported from any source. The only difference 
WTO membership makes in the area of technical regulations and standards 
is that the WTO provides certain rules and special agreements for the 
application of standards in international trade. Vietnamese exports will be 
subjected to the same standards and to the same procedures for conformity 
assessment as imports from any other WTO member state (most favoured 
nation principle), and its exports will be subject to the same standards and 
technical regulations as domestic products of the importing country (na-
tional treatment principle). Of course, WTO membership implies the re-
ciprocal commitment for Vietnam to respect the same principles when 
applying its own standards to imported goods and to implement the obliga-
tions of the relevant WTO agreements.  
Finally, WTO membership will make it even more urgent to improve the 
quality of Vietnam’s exports. Compliance with standards and norms on 
export markets is a precondition for making use of the improved market 
                                                          
53  Consequently, the WTO has dedicated its World Trade Report 2005 to “Exploring the 
links between trade, standards and the WTO” (WTO 2005b).  
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access conditions that Vietnam expects from WTO membership. If Viet-
nam’s exporters do not comply with the standards and norms of the im-
porting country, their products will either be rejected by customs or they 
will not be accepted by companies which use them as inputs for process-
ing, or by retailers demanding certain product qualities for their brands. In 
that case, Vietnam would experience only the negative repercussions of 
WTO membership (in terms of increasing import competition and a re-
stricted policy space) without earning the benefits (in terms of export 
growth and diversification).  
5.2.1 Increasing role of standards in international trade 
With the general trend towards increasing product differentiation, stan-
dards providing information about the properties and qualities of products 
play an ever more important role in market economies. Minimum stan-
dards, or technical regulations (specifications), are set by legislation or 
government ordinances, these standards are mandatory, i. e., they have to 
be met by any product of the same category. Mandatory standards are, 
above all, regulations concerning dangerous substances. For example, in 
1991 the German government introduced a ban of pentachlorophenol 
(PCP). PCP had been widely used as a preservative in wood products and 
in the leather industry. Immediately after that, products which did not meet 
the new very low ceiling on PCP content were rejected, e. g. leather jack-
ets from India. 
In many areas consumers demand higher quality and lower health and 
environmental risks. Industries and trading companies introduce voluntary 
standards for guaranteeing that their products meet certain criteria for 
safety, health or environment protection that are more stringent than the 
mandatory standards relevant for all products of the same category. Many 
consumers in Germany, e. g., feel a responsibility for environment protec-
tion and search for products with an eco-label. This gives industries a 
strong incentive to have their products tested for their environmental im-
pact and to qualify for eco-labels. The information on voluntary standards 
is often given by a label that facilitates the search of consumers for prod-
ucts that meet their quality requirements. Labels as private standards have 
been accepted by the GATT and the WTO as a fact of life in international 
trade, because the consumers should be given whatever information they 
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need to decide which products to buy and whether to buy domestic or 
imported goods.54 If a foreign firm producing in Vietnam for export mar-
kets is committed to such a voluntary standard, its Vietnamese suppliers 
have to comply with the same standard (Wiemann et al. 1998, 4; Wiemann 
et al. 1994, 5). Foreign buyers will give the companies from which they 
buy detailed prescriptions for the standards to comply with.  
Another distinction between types of standards is especially relevant in 
international trade law: the distinction between product standards (e. g. 
ceilings on the content of hazardous chemicals or limits on the pollution of 
motor vehicles) and production process standards (e. g. emission controls, 
social standards like SA 8000 or ISO standards). Product standards are 
compatible with the GATT and WTO agreements, provided some precon-
ditions are given: they have to be applied to domestic and imported goods 
alike (national treatment) and they have to be applied to all foreign prod-
ucts regardless of the country of origin (most-favoured nation principle). 
Process standards on the other hand, which specify the characteristics of a 
production process can generally not be imposed by the importing country 
on producers in the exporting country. If the importing country would 
prescribe to exporters in another country how to produce, this would vio-
late the sovereignty of the exporting country. As long as the quality of the 
products is not affected, product inspection at the border does not provide 
information about the quality of the production process. If the importing 
country would require certain production process standards to be met by 
foreign exporters, it would have to send its own industry inspectors to the 
production plants of the exporting country. This is only justified in case of 
production processes which affect the quality of the traded products (e. g. 
hygiene standards for food processing or production of pharmaceuticals).   
The issue of process standards is highly contested in the international 
debate on trade liberalization and globalization. Environmentalists and 
trade unions in the developed world campaign against trade liberalization 
and globalization because they fear a race to the bottom in which produc-
ers in developing countries and countries with less stringent environmental 
                                                          
54  In the 1991 dispute between United States and Mexico on US import prohibitions for 
Mexican tuna caught with nets which kill marine mammals (dolphins), the GATT Panel 
decided that the US import restrictions were not justified under Art. XX GATT, but it 
allowed labelling canned tuna products with a “dolphin safe” label in order to leave it to 
consumers to decide whether they choose higher priced products for the sake of envi-
ronment protection (cf. GATT, 1991, 51).  
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and social standards enjoy a cost advantage over their competitors in coun-
tries with higher standards. Up to now the coalition of trading interests in 
the developed countries and governments of developing countries has been 
able to prevent the introduction of environmental and social standards, i. e. 
production process standards, into the WTO legal system. In fact, empiri-
cal studies have not shown that a race to the bottom takes place on a large 
scale, because other factors are even more relevant for international com-
petitiveness of industries than environmental and social standards, e. g. 
productivity and reliability as a result of the technological capacity and 
infrastructure of a country, the availability of a skilled workforce, political 
stability etc.   
In the era of globalization however, the distinction between product stan-
dards that can be enforced by importing countries and process standards 
that are not subject to foreign monitoring and intervention becomes in-
creasingly blurred. There are too many concerns with global externalities, 
i. e. repercussions of production processes and standards in one country on 
the rest of the world. This is especially true for the impact of production 
processes on the environment (river and ocean pollution, climate change), 
for the risk of contagious diseases spreading around the world if certain 
hygiene standards are not met (e. g. avian flu), and even for the neglect of 
minimum social standards which might provoke social unrest and emigra-
tion of workers causing problems in the countries of immigration. There-
fore, an increasing number of voluntary standards and labels requiring 
compliance with certain environmental and social standards in the produc-
tion process have been developed in order to respond to the concerns of 
responsible consumers in the developed world. Since the monitoring of 
compliance is done by local NGOs or by buying agents and other repre-
sentatives of importing companies, the governments of importing coun-
tries are not involved, and there is no conflict with WTO principles and 
agreements.  
For a country like Vietnam aiming at higher quality exports, it will be 
advisable not only to comply with the product standards of export markets 
but also to improve the environmental and social standards of export pro-
duction in both agriculture and industry. This would give Vietnam’s ex-
porters a competitive advantage over other countries with lower standards, 
especially when aiming at affluent consumers who often care most for 
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these issues and who are prepared and have the means to pay a higher 
price for products from “responsible sources”.  
5.2.2 The role of GATT articles and WTO agreements 
The principles for dealing with standards in international trade are con-
tained in GATT Article III which says that imported products – after cus-
toms duties have been paid – may not be treated less favourably than the 
same domestic products (no other internal taxes or technical regulations 
can be applied that would discriminate imported against domestic goods). 
Thus, technical regulations and standards may not be used as a protection-
ist instrument in disguise. GATT Article XI rules out quantitative restric-
tions and import bans with the exception of import and export restrictions 
necessary for the implementation of standards. Finally, GATT Art. XX 
contains a number of exceptions to the general obligation to rule out quan-
titative import restrictions and other non-tariff barriers. Trade restrictions 
and other measures are allowed if necessary (among others) “to protect 
public morals, to protect human, animal or plant life or health, for the 
protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of 
deceptive practices, relating to the products of prison labour, and relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” (GATT, Art. XX).55 
These basic provisions of relevant GATT Articles have been spelled out in 
more detail in two agreements related to standards in international trade: 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the 
Agreement of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).   
The TBT Agreement, which had been concluded during the Tokyo Round 
already, refers to “technical regulations” (mandatory standards imposed by 
governments and legislations), “standards” (guidelines for products or 
processes for which the compliance is not mandatory), and to “conformity 
assessments” (procedures by which the compliance of products with tech-
nical regulations or standards is tested and certified). In addition to the 
principle of non-discrimination and national treatment, the TBT Agree-
ment urges members to apply relevant international standards as a basis 
for their technical regulations whenever possible. Therefore, members 
                                                          
55  Thus, a reference to intellectual property protection, to social standards (prison labour) 
and to environmental protection (conservation of exhaustible natural resources) is al-
ready contained in the GATT. 
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should actively participate in international standardization processes and 
Organizations. In order to reduce the potential for conflicts over different 
national technical regulations, members are encouraged to accept equiva-
lent regulations of other members when these fulfil the same objective as 
the own domestic regulations (the principle of mutual recognition of na-
tional technical regulations has been adopted by the EU in preparing for a 
fully liberalized market, the Single European Market). The TBT Agree-
ment aims at increasing transparency in the area of technical standards by 
obliging members to inform others in advance on new regulations so that 
trade conflicts can be avoided, and to have all technical regulations pub-
lished so that every exporter from another country can adjust his products 
to the regulations of the importing country. If an exporter would have to 
obtain conformity assessments in each of the countries to which he wants 
to export this would be a serious cost disadvantage in comparison to do-
mestic producers. Therefore, the TBT Agreement obliges members to 
accept each other’s conformity assessments provided they are based on the 
same procedures and carried out by reliable institutions. This encourages 
international accreditation of national testing laboratories and certification 
institutions. 
The SPS Agreement which had been negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round and has become binding for all WTO members as part of the single 
undertaking of the Uruguay Round package of Agreements (the TBT 
Agreement which had been a plurilateral agreement until the end of the 
Uruguay Round, signed mainly by developed countries, has also become 
binding for all WTO members as part of the single undertaking) refers to 
the especially relevant issues of sanitary and phytosanitary measures ap-
plied for the protection of human, animal or plant life and health against 
pests, diseases and risks from additives, contaminants, toxins etc. in foods, 
beverages and animal feedstuffs. Since the emotionally highly charged 
issues of contaminated food causing diseases can easily be exploited by 
protectionist interests, the SPS Agreement requires that the measures have 
to be based on scientific principles; in case of conflict a protective measure 
can only be maintained if sufficient scientific evidence is provided that it 
is indispensable to achieve the objective of protecting human or animal 
health. This requirement however, can be overruled again in case of emer-
gency or by inferring to the precautionary principle giving a member the 
right to apply a measure in anticipation of future scientific evidence for its 
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need (e. g. EU-US disputes over hormone beef and genetically modified 
organisms).   
Thus, the WTO provides some protection against misuse of standards and 
norms for protectionist purposes. To give a hypothetical example: in case 
the Vietnamese government could provide evidence that the EU had im-
posed a new environmental or health standard only with the aim of keep-
ing certain products originating from Vietnam off the EU markets, it could 
take even the EU “to court”, i. e. to the WTO Dispute Settlement Proce-
dure. The EU would then have to prove scientifically that the measure is 
necessary for protecting European consumers. 
5.2.3 Vietnam’s institutional capacity in the field of 
standards and technical regulations 
Vietnam has a relatively elaborate system of standards and technical regu-
lations. Standardization began in 1962 already with the establishment of 
the Institute for Standardization and Metrology in North Vietnam. The 
first Vietnam Standards (TCVN) were developed and published in 1963 – 
today there are more than 5600 TCVNs. The Vietnamese standard system 
had been developed in the central planning era, and is now in transition to 
a more flexible system geared to the needs of an open market economy. In 
the old days, “Vietnam’s standards were based on Soviet norms, which 
were typically mandatory but largely ignored (…). The move towards non-
mandatory standards and technical regulations, and shifting much of the 
quality responsibility away from the government, is part of the ‘second 
stage’ of transition for economies like Vietnam, China, Russia and the 
Ukraine.” (McCarty 2000, 16) This has two aspects: First, Vietnamese 
standards have to be based more on the relevant international standards; 
this is imperative both in view of WTO membership and for facilitating 
access of Vietnamese products to Western export markets. Second, the 
standardization system has to change its role from a government system 
operating with decrees and direct steering of state-owned industries to a 
market economy in which standards are developed in close cooperation 
between government and private business.  
On paper and Internet websites, Vietnam’s system looks well organised 
with all functions covered by specialised institutions. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be a lack of capacity for covering the needs of a fast developing 
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and opening economy in which the private business sector has to learn the 
importance of technical regulations, standards and labels, especially in 
international trade, and in which the government standard institutes must 
change their attitude from a top-down approach to a more cooperative and 
service oriented interaction with the business community. 
The top government body for standardization policy is the Directorate for 
Standards and Quality (STAMEQ) under the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST). STAMEQ prepares the rules and regulations on 
standardization, establishes the organizational system for standard setting 
and implementation, for quality control and quality management, conducts 
studies and provides training in the field of standardization. These activi-
ties are based on Vietnam’s 1991 Act on Product Quality. The concrete 
development of Vietnamese standards (TCVN) is the task of the Vietnam 
Standard Centre (VSC), which is a branch of STAMEQ. The VSC organ-
ises the various technical committees and subcommittees that are prepar-
ing new or reforming existing the standards. There are two technical insti-
tutions under STAMEQ for conformity assessment (testing) and certifica-
tion of products that meet the required standards: QUATEST and 
QUACERT. Finally, the Bureau of Accreditation under STAMEQ oper-
ates various accreditation schemes for laboratories, certification and in-
spection bodies. 
To increase transparency of technical regulations and SPS measures, WTO 
members are required to establish TBT and SPS Offices as enquiry points 
(Wilson 2002, 434). In view of WTO accession, Vietnam has established a 
National Enquiry Point on technical barriers to trade (www.tbtvn.org) 
through which trading partners can obtain information on Vietnam’s stan-
dards and technical regulations and on the standardization system. The 
Enquiry Point operated by STAMEQ offers information in both directions: 
domestic parties can also contact it for information on TBT issues of other 
WTO members. The Enquiry Point will function as a notification point in 
the sense of the TBT Agreement only after WTO accession. In the meet-
ings of the Working Party on Vietnam’s accession to the WTO, “the rep-
resentative of Viet Nam confirmed that Viet Nam would comply with all 
the obligations under the TBT Agreement from the date of accession with-
out recourse to any transitional period.” (WTO 2006b, 78, para. 303) It 
was also confirmed that Vietnam “would comply with the requirements of 
the SPS Agreement upon accession without recourse to any transitional 
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arrangements.” (Ibid, 84, para. 327) Vietnam (STAMEQ) is member of 
the major international and regional standardization Organizations, ISO, 
CODEX Alimentarius, ASEAN Consultative Committee for Standards and 
Quality etc.   
Although the Vietnamese system for standardization, conformity assess-
ment and accreditation looks well organised with the different functions 
given to different bodies, there are doubts about its effectiveness and its 
preparedness for the new challenges of WTO membership and interna-
tional competition. In 2006, the debate in the National Assembly about a 
new law on standards and technical specifications brought to the fore some 
shortcomings of Vietnam’s standards in view of what will be required 
from a WTO member state. According to the Chairman of the National 
Assembly’s Committee for Science, Technology and Environment, “stan-
dardization activities in Vietnam are backward and ineffective.” Only 
24 % of Vietnam’s standards are in line with international standards (Viet-
nam Net Bridge 24 Feb. 2006). It is hoped that the new law on standardi-
zation (which will come into effect in 2007) will make the system more 
efficient and thereby raise the competitiveness of the economy and help to 
expand exports and attract foreign investment. Similar to the problem with 
intellectual property rights, the major problem in the area of standardiza-
tion may not be legislation but effective implementation and enforcement. 
The national testing and certification infrastructure does not yet meet the 
needs of Vietnam’s expanding and diversifying export business.  
Conformity tests are necessary to prove that a product meets the quality 
criteria set by either a technical regulation or a voluntary standard. De-
pending on which properties of a product have to be tested, more or less 
sophisticated laboratory equipment is needed. This equipment can be ex-
tremely costly, and it has to be operated by highly skilled staff in order to 
make the tests reliable and compliant with international standards for test-
ing. Developing countries face severe problems in complying with the 
standards of their export markets because they do not have the testing 
laboratories needed for an ever wider range of criteria demanded by the 
importing developed countries. In that case, the conformity assessment can 
be done only by international testing laboratories or by laboratories in the 
importing country. This raises the costs and involves the risk of products 
being rejected for non-conformity after shipment.  
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Although Vietnam does have a diversified institutional infrastructure for 
inspection, testing and certification of (export) products, there are still 
some shortcomings. A number of firms interviewed reported that they had 
to send export products for testing abroad, to Germany or Taiwan. For 
some chemicals there are no laboratories with the specific machines, 
which are very expensive. For example, wood processing and some prop-
erties of seafood cannot be tested in Vietnam. Another problem seems to 
be a lack of confidence in the quality of inspection services because of 
“fierce competition between inspection activities in the market (…). As a 
result, there is an urgent need for a mechanism to bring back the confi-
dence in these activities.” (APLAC News Notes No. 076, October 2004, 5) 
If foreign buyers do not have confidence in the testing and certification of 
Vietnamese institutions, they will prefer to do their own testing. They will 
send their representatives to the supplier’s factory to do inspection on the 
spot and avoid the risk of rejection after shipment. Smaller buyers, who 
cannot send their own inspection staff, will rely on the services of foreign 
firms like TÜV Rheinland (Germany) or SGS (Switzerland) which offer 
pre-shipment inspection, testing and certification. 
Testing alone is necessary but not sufficient for gaining access to foreign 
markets and confidence with buyers and consumers abroad. The customers 
must have confidence in the quality of the tests and the reliability of the 
certificates issued by the testing agency. Certification institutions often 
have commercial interests and may be interested in selling as many certifi-
cates as possible. Thus, there is a conflict between “selling certificates” 
and “ensuring quality”. This conflict can be solved by independent ac-
creditation institutions. The quality and reliability of a testing laboratory/ 
agency can be certified by having it accredited with an impartial Organiza-
tion in which the customers trust. Of course, they will trust most in their 
national accreditation Organizations and in international ones. The task of 
an accreditation institution can be described as “certifying the certification 
institution”. 
In order to ensure reliability, the accreditation institution has to be inde-
pendent from the certification institution. In Vietnam, there seems to be a 
problem with the institutional independence of testing and accreditation 
institutions. The institution responsible for accreditation in is the Bureau 
of Accreditation, which belongs to STAMEQ. Therefore, it may be ques-
tioned whether it is independent enough from the certification institutes to 
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accredit them a reliable way.56 What is even more relevant, there seems to 
be a lack of international recognition of the accreditation STAMEQ gives 
to domestic laboratories.57 
5.2.4 Quality consciousness of the business community  
Even though some industries in Vietnam have already reached high quality 
levels, there seems to be a lack of awareness of the importance of meeting 
the quality requirements of export markets. Companies with own export 
activities or frequent contacts with foreign buyers are quite aware of these 
requirements, others less. Companies that want to venture into export 
production should be given early information and training about the tech-
nical regulations, quality standards, eco labels etc. that are relevant for 
their export business in the target markets.  
Visiting industrial areas and individual companies in Vietnam, one gets 
the impression of an inflation of ISO-Standards like ISO 9000 or ISO 
1400058 among Vietnamese companies. A few enterprises also have SA 
8000.59 Thus, it seems to become fashionable and part of marketing strate-
gies to show the quality commitment through these labels. However, these 
standards indicate the quality of management and of respecting environ-
mental standards in the production process. They are production process 
standards and not product standards. Thus, they may be regarded by over-
seas customers as a first indicator for a reliable supplier, but they do not 
provide information about the quality and reliability of the products. Com-
                                                          
56  The problem of the lack of separation of the policy-making role of STAMEQ from its 
functions of certification and accreditation was discussed in the Working Party on Viet-
nam’s accession to the WTO (WTO 2006b, 74, para. 290).  
57  According to a 2003 joint document of the Ministry of Science and Technology and 
UNIDO, “no laboratory in Vietnam is as yet accredited by an international body.” 
(MOST / UNIDO 2003, 18.) 
58  ISO 9000 is primarily concerned with “quality management”. It refers to customer’s 
quality requirements and applicable regulatory requirements for example. ISO 14000 is 
primarily concerned with “environmental management”. It refers to the minimization of 
harmful effects on the environment for example (see International Organization for 
Standardization: http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/ISOOnline.frontpage (assessed: 14 April 2004)). 
59  SA8000 is a social standard. It is based on international workplace norms in the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Convention on Rights of the Child (see Social Accountability International; 
online: http://www.cepaa.org/SA8000/SA8000.htm (assessed: 14 May 2004)) 
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panies having these general quality management labels face the same 
market entry barriers as others if their export products do not comply with 
the relevant technical regulations of the importing country.  
For European buyers in particular, ISO 9000 would be only a first indica-
tor of the commitment of a company to quality management. The more 
ISO 9000 labels one sees at every company entrance, the more suspicious 
buyers may become of the real meaning of this label, especially if one 
hears about fierce competition among certification agencies. European 
buyers will prefer to visit the companies themselves to assess with their 
own criteria whether they are committed to quality management. What is 
really important is the quality of the final product. It is important that it 
meets the mandatory standards in Europe and, on top of that, the voluntary 
standards of certain quality or environmental labels and of individual buy-
ers, like German departmental stores and mail order houses. 
By providing assistance to enterprises, foreign buyers can raise awareness 
and encourage implementation of standards by their suppliers in Vietnam. 
Thus, exports can be promoted through inviting more buyers from Europe 
and other developed regions to put up their buying offices in Vietnam. 
They have a commercial interest to find reliable suppliers with whom they 
share their market information and whom they may even give technical 
assistance for meeting the quality standards of their home market. More 
and more Vietnamese products show up in departmental stores and furni-
ture store chains in Europe, indicating that it is possible in Vietnam to 
manufacture the quality required on European markets. Foreign enterprises 
manufacturing in Vietnam for export markets are another source of infor-
mation on technical regulations and standards to be met by their local 
suppliers. Some of them provide written information on quality require-
ments to their suppliers. Furthermore, many of them have detailed talks 
with their future suppliers before starting the co-operation and they work 
out corrective action plans in co-operation with them. Some foreign enter-
prises send their Vietnamese employees to training abroad, so that they 
gain a better awareness of the standards and quality needed for satisfying 
the customers. 
Besides the direct business channels, information on technical regulations 
and standards relevant for export production and marketing is offered by a 
number of institutions like, for example, the Vietnam Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry (VCCI), the Investment and Trade Promotion Centre 
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of the People’s Committee of HCM City (ITPC) and the Vietnam Direc-
torate for Standards and Quality (STAMEQ). Furthermore, there are also 
various Vietnamese business associations providing information and tech-
nical assistance. Apart from the Vietnamese institutions in this area, there 
are foreign agencies offering all types of information on European mar-
kets, like the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Coun-
tries (CBI) (Netherlands)60 and foreign Chambers of Commerce like the 
European Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam.  
Vietnamese exporters should regard the challenge of high standards on 
export markets as an opportunity to demonstrate high and consistent qual-
ity of their products. Quality of products, and higher environmental and 
social standards of production processes could become a competitive ad-
vantage of Vietnam in comparison with, e. g., China. In these areas Viet-
nam on the whole seems to perform better than other countries in the re-
gion. Some industries, like garment and furniture, are already character-
ised by the high quality of their products, but others have not yet reached 
this high level.61  
The Vietnamese government should focus its industrial policy activities on 
providing the best services possible for stimulating and supporting a strat-
egy of quality exports of Vietnamese industries. To conclude, one can say 
that by improving awareness of product standards, by building up more 
testing and certification agencies and by improving reliability of the ac-
creditation institution, Vietnamese enterprises will have better opportuni-
ties to succeed in exporting to the developed countries, especially in 
Europe. 
                                                          
60  The Dutch trade promotion agency CBI in particular provides a lot of information and 
assistance concerning the compliance with international standards and standards on ex-
port markets. One can get a short overview on its web-page www.cbi.nl. 
61  “There have been cases where access to export markets was denied due to sanitary or 
phytosanitary issues, resulting in substantial costs in terms of lost sales and market 
share. But rising standards also serve to accentuate underlying supply chain strengths 
and weaknesses and thus impact differently on the competitive position of individual 
countries. Some countries are able to use high quality and safety standards to reposition 
themselves in global markets.” (WTO 2005b, 160) 
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6 Conclusions on Vietnam’s industrial policy and 
recommendations for trade-related development  
cooperation 
6.1 Adapting industrial policy to the WTO framework 
It has been shown that there is a need to reform industrial policy according 
to WTO provisions. Reforming industrial policy instruments is of special 
importance since there will probably be little room for exemptions (special 
& differential treatment), only longer transition periods might be negotia-
ble. To comply with WTO rules, the most important prerequisite for indus-
trial policy instruments is to avoid trade distortions. Trading partners can 
apply to the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure if trade is negatively 
affected by policy instruments of other countries. Furthermore, equal 
treatment (ownership neutrality) regarding private, state-owned and for-
eign invested enterprises has to be implemented as a basic principle of 
policy-making. Therefore, generic policy instruments instead of specific 
interventions should be pursued. In the concluding remarks, the direction 
and challenges of an industrial policy shift in Vietnam are summed up 
briefly for the macro level, the meso level and the business sector. 
6.1.1 Macro level: How to provide a level playing field? 
On the macro level, providing a level playing field for private, state-owned 
and foreign invested enterprises will probably be the most important task. 
Therefore, it is advisable for the Vietnamese government to complete the 
paradigm shift from activist and specific industrial policy to neutral and 
incentive based policies. As shown in the study, the necessity of a change 
in policy instruments is most obvious in the case of import liberalisation 
and localisation policy. Regarding the latter, the traditional policy tool of 
local content requirements that has to be removed according to WTO law 
could be replaced by incentives for establishing and improving domestic 
ancillary industries so that they become attractive for domestic sourcing of 
foreign investors. Regarding trade liberalisation, tariff reductions required 
for WTO accession will force the Vietnamese government to make use of 
other incentive measures than selective protection to support industrial 
development. Therefore, it is advisable to focus on sustaining and building 
up a sound macroeconomic framework, an attractive investment climate 
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and a level playing field for all economic actors. According to the findings 
of this study, the most important ingredients for a paradigm shift in indus-
try policy would be the following: 
– Providing an efficient infrastructure is a challenging task for the 
Vietnamese government: First of all, physical infrastructure like 
roads, railways and ports need to be improved. Second, improvement 
of trade-related services through privatisation and opening for foreign 
investors can have the same positive effect on efficiency of exporting 
as the physical infrastructure. So far, private and foreign enterprises 
have limited access to banking services and financial sources due to 
either specific regulations or differential treatment of private vis-à-vis 
state-owned enterprises. Opening the financial sector to private and 
foreign investors will have to be complemented by a modern banking 
regulation and supervisory system that stimulates competition and a-
voids the spread of financial crises through irresponsible lending. An 
efficient physical and services infrastructure is an important precondi-
tion for Vietnam to attract more FDI that will play a key role for de-
veloping and diversifying Vietnamese exports. And, finally, Vietnam-
ese exporters also need an efficient infrastructure for product testing 
and certification, which is already working well in Vietnam but still 
leaves room for improvement in terms of quantity and quality. 
– Human resource development is a second challenge. There is an inc-
reasing shortage of high skilled labour. Vietnam already has a good 
basic education system that should be maintained and improved, too. 
On the one hand, human resource development will be a prerequisite 
for attracting more technologically advanced FDI to Vietnam. Gov-
ernment support for human resource development is also a prerequi-
site for enabling domestic ancillary industries and exporting firms to 
absorb modern technologies and production concepts so that they be-
come reliable partners for international firms both in Vietnam and 
outside. 
– Supporting research and development (R&D) within companies, uni-
versities and research Organizations is a third instrument of industrial 
policy that is in conformity with WTO rules and agreements. Re-
search and development is not yet a common practice of competition 
among Vietnamese enterprises. Since this is a precondition for com-
peting in international markets and adapting to changes in demand 
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and product development, the government should support R&D acti-
vities together with technology transfer to the business sector. Gov-
ernment assistance to R&D and to improving technological capacities 
of domestic industries is an indirect instrument to improve the quality 
and competitiveness of exports. And it would make Vietnam a more 
attractive location for export oriented FDI that are searching for local 
suppliers of high quality inputs. Close cooperation between foreign 
companies and local ancillary industries manufacturing according the 
technological and to quality requirements of the foreign firms is a-
nother stimulus for permanent technological upgrading of Vietnam’s 
industry that works even without strong local content requirements. 
To support engagement in technology development and renewal, the 
protection of IPRs and registration facilities have to be strengthened. 
– Vietnam already has a sound record of economic and political stabil-
ity. However, the government has to prepare itself for policy changes 
as a consequence of economic liberalisation and the commitment to 
global integration. For example, more transparent policy making pro-
cesses and a reliable decision making process are two elements that 
need to be improved in the near future. This is of particular importan-
ce for attracting more foreign investors and for promoting exports in 
the future. For example, the distribution of garment export quotas to 
EU markets is said to be intransparent thus restricting competitive en-
terprises from further trade profits. However, it became clear during 
the interviews that reliability does not only depend on the political and 
juridical process, but also on efficient and transparent administrative 
and juridical implementation procedures. This is particularly relevant 
for the enforcement of IPRs where a large gap between law and prac-
tice prevails. Exporting modern manufactured goods requires easy and 
timely access to imported inputs. Therefore, improvement of admi-
nistrative procedures at the customs offices is especially important for 
exporting firms. In both fields, delays and cumbersome procedures 
prevent the private business sector from gaining competitiveness on 
international markets. 
In brief, many of the efforts that have to be made with regard to WTO 
accession, focus on the development of a modern industrial policy that 
prepares and supports the country and its businesses for global integration.  
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6.1.2 Meso level: How to influence government policies? 
According to the interviews, meso level institutions like the Vietnamese 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), the Hanoi Union Associa-
tions of Industry and Commerce (HUAIC) or the Vietnamese Intellectual 
Property Association (VIPA) already act as intermediate institutions be-
tween the business sector and the government level. Business associations 
already channel proposals for improvement from member companies to 
decision makers in the government. In addition, some institutions act as 
consultants in the development of new legislations. This concerns, e. g., 
the enforcement of IPRs but also tax and tariff policies of the government. 
Especially in these two areas, suggestions from intermediary institutions 
have been considered by the government, whereas in other areas and other 
cases, the government did not take the critique into account. The commu-
nication process between government and intermediary institutions seems 
to be steadily improving and becoming more transparent. But there is 
always room for improvement, especially if the government wants to im-
plement a modern industrial policy and export promotion, which takes the 
needs of export industries and enterprises into account. 
Business associations already play an important role in distributing infor-
mation about political decisions, legislative changes and regional and 
international integration. In these areas, they provide a range of training 
activities, e. g. on standards and norms on export markets or on the crea-
tion of new designs for the companies concerned. However, many enter-
prises complain about a lack of information and a lack of practical orienta-
tion of training facilities. Thus, further training facilities have to be devel-
oped in order to support the business sector adequately in competing in 
international markets. On the one hand, some intermediary institutions 
themselves lack information in their respective field of activity; for in-
stance, many training institutions for standards and norms are not aware of 
the importance of product standards. On the other hand, many intermedi-
ary institutions lack financial resources to provide appropriate training 
facilities; for instance in the field of export promotion, there is still much 
room for improvement in terms of professional marketing, information, 
etc.  
In a market economy, business associations and other intermediate institu-
tions play a vital role in policy networks between government and industry 
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representatives. Effective communication channels are needed for devel-
oping a vision for Vietnam’s industrial strategy and its future place in 
international markets that is shared by all stakeholders in Vietnam’s eco-
nomic modernisation, private industry, state owned enterprises, foreign 
investors and the government. If today many firms still do not make use of 
the potential role of business associations as information channels, a better 
publicity and further political independence seems to be needed so that 
intermediary institutions can play an effective role in shaping industrial 
policy in Vietnam. The government could support the development of 
independent intermediary institutions, particularly for export promotion 
activities, helping domestic firms to discover new export markets and 
informing foreign buyers about the potential of the Vietnamese enterprises 
and the domestic market. 
6.1.3 Micro level: How to increase competitiveness? 
Further development of already promising and vigorous private sector 
activities in Vietnam is still restricted through intransparent and unpredict-
able policy making of the government. Numerous formal and informal 
obstacles for business development through uneven treatment and lack of 
information prevent entrepreneurs from profitable investment. Some pri-
vate enterprises already have the potential to become successful exporters 
if equal opportunities were provided and existing barriers to growth re-
duced. 
However, Vietnamese private businesses (mainly SME) themselves could 
invest more time and effort in exploring foreign markets and developing 
new marketing activities and R&D geared to develop products suitable to 
the quality requirements of export markets. In particular, firms should 
learn more about the meaning and importance of IPRs and trademarks as 
marketing instruments. On the other hand, private business could influence 
government policy to a larger extent through intermediary institutions like 
business associations as communication channels.  
Furthermore, a large number of SOEs are still relying on support and pro-
tection from the government. Due to trade liberalisation and cuts in subsi-
dies, they will face severe adjustment problems with negative conse-
quences for the banking sector and the labour market. The major challenge 
is to equitise the remaining SOEs against the opposition of strong lobby 
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groups in the government and SOEs themselves. However, some SOEs 
have already shown that profitable adjustments are possible. 
The majority of FIEs in Vietnam strongly supports the efforts that are 
being made to establish a level playing field. However, some import-
substituting FIEs in specific industries rely on government protection (e. g. 
in the automotive industry). They will have to adjust to increasing import 
competition and improve their international competitiveness. In general, 
FIEs play a vital role in the technology development of Vietnamese busi-
nesses but their links with private Vietnamese SMEs are still relatively 
weak. The government can play an important role in stimulating buyer-
supplier relationships between FIEs and domestic ancillary industries by 
creating incentives for private enterprises to invest in new technologies 
and R&D to be able to meet the technical standards and quality require-
ments of the foreign enterprises. 
Summing up, the analysis of the five areas for adjustment to WTO rules 
and other requirements for international economic integration shows that 
the uneven treatment of state-owned, private owned and foreign invested 
enterprises will be a major obstacle for a modern industrial policy empha-
sizing competition instead of protection and subsidies. The combination of 
high import tariffs and other import barriers with subsidies to state owned 
enterprises had created the typical anti-export bias of the traditional import 
substitution strategy. Both domestic and foreign enterprises producing for 
the protected domestic market had little incentive to venture into export 
marketing where profit margins are lower and risks are higher. The reduc-
tion of import tariffs and other import barriers required by WTO accession 
will remove the anti-export bias by increasing competition on the domestic 
market, which will force domestic industry to upgrade their product, and 
processing technologies and invest in R&D and quality improvement. 
Firms that are exposed to international competition on their home market 
will find it easier to meet the requirements of foreign buyers and to start 
their own export marketing activities. The government can support this by 
removing existing obstacles to efficient manufacturing and exporting and 
by providing the infrastructure and financial services needed for modern 
exports In general, providing a level playing field for Vietnamese busi-
nesses means equal distribution of financial and other resources for in-
vestment, for example in technology, in R&D activities, in marketing etc. 
Then, investment decisions can be taken independently and competitive 
 Jürgen Wiemann et al. 
 German Development Institute 144
industries may be able to develop. Therefore, reducing market entry barri-
ers for different forms of enterprises through the provision of a level play-
ing field accompanied by appropriate adjustment policies (e. g. a social 
security system etc.) is the most important step towards WTO accession 
and global integration of Vietnam. 
Vietnam will not be able to follow the development path of its East Asian 
neighbours with a high degree of state intervention and strategic planning 
of economic development (Perkins 2001, 260). On the one hand, WTO 
rules simply restrict Vietnam from following the active industrial policy 
approach of the East Asian Miracle countries. On the other hand, it is an 
open question whether this would be the appropriate industrial policy 
approach for Vietnam in the present era of globalisation. The industrial 
policy strategy of the East Asian economies required a highly strategic 
approach to industrial policy making. It seems doubtful whether this stra-
tegic orientation can be achieved in Vietnam. In addition to that, in today’s 
globalizing economy in which many developing countries have developed 
the same industries, strategic planning of industrial development for a 
latecomer like Vietnam would be even more demanding than for the front-
runners of the East Asian Miracle. Vietnam’s East Asian neighbours are 
also reforming their industrial policies with respect to WTO and the re-
quirements of international production networks (Lall 2005). With the 
increasing importance of global production and marketing networks, the 
goal for industrial policy of developing countries can no longer be to de-
velop fully integrated industries in one country, but to provide a suitable 
framework for enabling local producers – and foreign investors – to plug 
into these international production networks.   
Therefore, the government may focus on the provision of a sound eco-
nomic framework and an attractive investment climate with adequate ad-
justment policies in terms of social security, employment structure etc. and 
modern competition policy. This may replace specific “active” policy 
interventions that implicitly overestimate the planning capacity of the 
government. Based on this new focus, more intense exchange of ideas 
with different actors on the meso and the micro level could be fruitful for 
industrial policy making. 
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6.2 Possible Areas for Donor Activities 
There can be no doubt that some important challenges for a successful 
integration into the global economy still remain for the Vietnamese gov-
ernment, the meso institutions and the business sector. The donor commu-
nity already supports the Vietnamese efforts to a large extent and in vari-
ous ways on the different levels (see below 6.3.2). In the following, some 
areas of technical assistance related to the five WTO topics discussed in 
this study are presented. The table below shows possible intervention areas 
for donors regarding trade-related measures in general. This study focuses 
on activities in the areas where implementing WTO obligations are re-
quired on the macro, meso and micro level (column 2), as well as on the 
improvement of trade capacities (column 3). 
Table 4:  Intervention areas and levels for trade-related development  
cooperation 
Intervention 
area of the 
donor commu-
nity 
Negotiating of 
multilateral trade 
agreements 
Implementation of 
agreed obligations 
Improvement of 
trade capacities 
Macro level 
(government, 
ministries etc.) 
Country specific 
consultation about 
the economic, 
social and political 
implications of 
negotiation issues; 
extension of the 
exchange between 
negotiation delega-
tions from devel-
oping countries 
Consultancy and 
training measures 
for administrative 
staff, e. g. working 
in the area of im-
plementing the 
TRIPS Agreement 
Consultancy to 
simplify export 
and import meas-
ures (e. g. customs 
clearance) in order 
to decrease trans-
action costs  
Meso level 
(institutions) 
Support of network 
co-operation be-
tween enterprises 
through work-
shops, establish-
ment of round 
tables; support of  
Support of associa-
tions and private 
service institutions 
to inform the do-
mestic industries 
about the new 
challenges, e. g.  
Creation of Con-
sultancy Services 
to profit from new 
export opportuni-
ties; to increase the 
added value in the 
country by build- 
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interest identifica-
tion and articula-
tion with the objec-
tive that the gov-
ernment is taking 
note of their con-
cerns during nego-
tiations 
new ecological 
standards 
ing up further 
processing indus-
tries 
Micro level 
(enterprises) 
Offering informa-
tion about the 
issues of bi- an 
multilateral nego-
tiations to increase 
transparency 
Making informa-
tion available 
about quality re-
quirements result-
ing from new 
treaties, e. g. SPS 
measures 
Support of partner-
ships with enter-
prises, which con-
sult and teach 
providers in issues 
like design, quality 
safety, new pro-
duction technolo-
gies 
Source:  BMZ (2004) 
Firstly, multilateral co-operation should focus on supporting Vietnam’s 
government institutions in order to implement WTO obligations on all 
administrative levels. Consultancy and training measures for administra-
tive staff in particular, should be strengthened. Taking the customs offices 
as an example, existing training programmes62 have to be upgraded in 
accordance with international standards and experiences. Additionally, 
training facilities need to be improved to implement the required customs 
valuation system and to increase the know-how about the protection of 
intellectual property rights.  
Secondly, the interviews revealed that a lot remains to be done in the de-
velopment of independent intermediary institutions like business associa-
tions or non-governmental Organizations in order to enable them to in-
form domestic industries about new challenges through changing govern-
ment policies on the one hand and to act as interlinking bodies to influence 
                                                          
62  During the interviews, Vietnamese government officials as well as enterprises empha-
sised that they need practically oriented training courses and a better co-ordination of 
donor activities regarding the training measure in different areas, e. g. education on 
IPRs or standards and norms. 
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policy formulation on the other. Although many enterprises in Vietnam are 
organised in and represented by business associations, they still face a lack 
of knowledge about current changes in the trade regime of Vietnam: about 
the challenges they will face as well as about the benefits they might gain. 
On the one hand, this calls for building up adequate training facilities to 
inform enterprises in a practical manner. On the other hand, the institu-
tions should be supported to develop a stronger voice and discover chan-
nels for representing the interests of the business sector more effectively at 
macro level institutions.  
In the field of import policy, this would concern proposals from the busi-
ness sector on tax reform, business registration procedures etc. to the rele-
vant government institutions. In the field of enforcement of IPRs, newly 
established representative institutions like the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of Vietnam or VIPA should be supported in order to ensure that their 
voices are taken into account regarding the formulation of laws and poli-
cies. In addition, the capacity of these meso institutions should be 
strengthened to support their efforts to raise public awareness about IPRs. 
In the area of export promotion, institutions like VCCI and export promo-
tion agencies should be given support to actively encourage enterprises to 
export to foreign markets and advise private and state-owned companies in 
marketing issues. In addition, in the area of standards and norms, training 
courses and train-the-trainer seminars especially for the Investment and 
Trade Promotion Centre (ITPC) and STAMEQ should be increased. The 
courses should focus more on product standards and less on production 
process standards as the interviews showed a lack of awareness among 
enterprises of the importance of product standards for exporting. Efforts in 
this field should be strengthened so that ITPC and STAMEQ can spread 
the relevant knowledge among enterprises. Additionally, the awareness 
about the importance of reliable testing and certification institutions and 
independent accreditation institutions can thus be increased. In conse-
quence, this may also pressure the Vietnamese testing, certification and 
accreditation institutions to improve their performance. 
Thirdly, although some international support programmes on SME devel-
opment have been implemented in the past, targeted support for SME 
development still seems to be needed. On the one hand it is advisable to 
build up quality oriented suppliers for private Vietnamese and foreign 
invested enterprises, e. g. in the area of textiles and garments. On the other 
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hand, this also means to support the government in removing existing 
barriers to growth for efficient SMEs so that they can reach international 
levels of economies of scale. Adequate measures for a better export per-
formance of SMEs could be: better distribution of information about the 
requirements of export markets; improvement of marketing performance 
focusing on international markets, awareness raising among enterprises 
regarding the importance of IPRs, especially the registering of trademarks 
as a marketing instrument; training courses for companies about product 
standard requirements on international markets. In order to support enter-
prises in the latter area, donors could establish programmes to sponsor the 
implementation of product standards. 
A major conclusion of this report is that the most important prerequisite 
for making Vietnam’s industry capable of competing with increasing im-
ports and finding new export markets will be to provide a level playing 
field for the different types of enterprises. Therefore, SOE reform is an-
other important task in the field of business and private sector develop-
ment in Vietnam. Not only the equitization process, but also the develop-
ment of adequate complementary adjustment policies (social security pol-
icy, unemployment insurance, banking reform etc.) should be supported by 
multilateral co-operation projects. 
6.3 The role of development assistance 
Trade-related technical assistance will have to play an important role in 
facilitating Vietnam’s adjustment to the multilateral rules-based system of 
the WTO and its integration into the global economy. Vietnam has already 
received a multitude of donor activities since the late 1990s supporting the 
preparations for WTO accession and the implementation of the obligations 
resulting from other regional and bilateral trade agreements. Some of these 
programmes will phase out before WTO accession, but there is an increas-
ing awareness of both the Vietnamese government and the donors that 
once Vietnam will have become a WTO member, there will be even more 
need for capacity development and training. Reforms of legislation in 
accordance with WTO requirements will be only the first step, and most of 
the legislative reforms will have been achieved by the time of WTO acces-
sion, but the new laws will have to be enforced and trade-related institu-
tional reforms implemented. Capacity building of the relevant institutions 
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and training of their staff, especially the judiciary applying the new legis-
lation will require a wide range of technical assistance for quite some time. 
In addition to that, Vietnam will have to develop and implement the eco-
nomic and social reforms necessary to enable its economy to meet the 
challenges of international competition, to make use of the new opportuni-
ties of improved access to global and regional markets, and to facilitate the 
structural adjustments resulting from international competition.  
6.3.1 Donors’ commitment to increase aid for trade in the 
Doha Round 
The international conditions for increasing aid for trade are favourable. In 
November 2001, the Doha Ministerial Conference of the WTO launched a 
new round of multilateral trade negotiations. It was given the label Devel-
opment Round to indicate that in this round for the first time, development 
issues would be given high priority on the agenda. Within the development 
issues, aid for trade is a central pillar. The Doha Ministerial Declaration 
states that “that technical cooperation and capacity building are core 
elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system.” 
(WTO 2001b, para. 38) This was reconfirmed in the July 2004 package by 
which the round was launched again after the failure of the Cancún Minis-
terial Conference in September 2003: “The General Council recognizes 
the progress that has been made since the Doha Ministerial Conference in 
expanding Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) to developing 
countries and low-income countries in transition. In furthering this effort 
the Council affirms that such countries, and in particular least-developed 
countries, should be provided with enhanced TRTA and capacity building, 
to increase their effective participation in the negotiations, to facilitate 
their implementation of WTO rules, and to enable them to adjust and di-
versify their economies.” (WTO 2004b, 2) 
There is a growing consensus between the trade and the aid communities 
that trade liberalisation alone, as expected from the Doha Round and other 
regional or bilateral trade negotiations, will not automatically lead to in-
creasing exports by all developing countries (Stiglitz / Charlton 2006). A 
host of supply-side constraints and bottlenecks prevent especially the less 
developed countries from expanding and diversifying their exports in 
response to more open markets of developed countries. There is even the 
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risk that they will face considerable adjustment costs from increasing 
import competition and from the erosion of trade preferences for their 
exports before they will be able to balance the costs of trade liberalisation 
through increasing exports. Therefore, trade policy has to be comple-
mented by additional and more effective aid for trade in various forms. 
Basically, aid for trade aims at strengthening the role of developing coun-
tries, especially Least Developed Countries (LDCs), to play a more active 
role in multilateral trade negotiations, helping them to implement new 
obligations resulting from WTO negotiations, to adjust to changing inter-
national competition and to improve the supply-side capacities of their 
export sectors in order to benefit effectively from improved access to ex-
port markets. Encouraging developing countries to introduce social safety 
nets and adjustment measures for those negatively affected by increasing 
import competition is especially relevant for mobilising political support 
for active participation in multilateral trade negotiations. In principle, it 
should be possible to generate more resources for additional aid for trade 
because the gains to OECD countries from effective multilateral trade 
liberalisation resulting from a successful conclusion of the Doha Round 
would be higher than present overall aid budgets (Hoekman 2004; Hoek-
man / Prowse 2005, 20; Prowse 2005, 18).  
In addition to the general case for more aid for trade, developing countries 
with preferential access to major OECD markets, especially the EU and 
the US, may claim compensation for the loss of preferences that will result 
from multilateral trade liberalisation. The lower the tariffs, the lower are 
the preference margins for those exporters who do not have to pay the 
MFN tariffs. Thus, trade preferences have the perverse effect of making 
the beneficiary countries interested in keeping tariffs in OECD countries 
high because only this gives them an advantage over MFN imports from 
countries without preferential access. This perverse incentive for a large 
group of countries could make negotiations on general trade liberalisation 
difficult, and therefore the OECD countries are advised to think about 
compensation for preference erosion through additional aid.63 It is widely 
recognised today that trade preferences had limited effect in stimulating 
                                                          
63  As a country that does not have special preferential access to OECD markets as many 
less developed countries have, Vietnam would benefit most from multilateral trade lib-
eralisation which would bring Vietnamese exports on an equal footing to the same ex-
ports from preference receiving countries.  
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trade development and diversification especially for least developed coun-
tries. Market access is not the major problem for these countries, but the 
host of supply side bottlenecks and lack of competitiveness of export sec-
tors. These problems will be solved, if at all, by effective aid programmes, 
and not through trade preferences which only prevent the beneficiary 
countries from joining a grand coalition with the more advanced develop-
ing countries for effective multilateral trade liberalisation. 
Another motivation for increasing aid for trade could be to “buy” agree-
ment from developing countries to a less ambitious outcome of the Doha 
Development Round than expected, e. g. in the field of agriculture. Of 
course, this possibility was explicitly rejected by a Special DAC Meeting 
on Aid for Trade on 27 October 2005: “The challenge for the aid and 
trade communities is to use the momentum behind both the DDA and the 
MDGs to successfully conclude the Doha Round. Evidently, aid for trade 
should not be used as a compensation for a DDA outcome that falls short 
of its ambitions.” (OECD/DAC 2005, para. 21) But the fact that this possi-
bility is mentioned in an official OECD document shows that offering 
more aid could be an easy compromise to bring a development round to an 
end that does not meet the expectations of developing countries.  
The WTO itself provides technical assistance, mainly in the form of train-
ing programmes for government officials, especially from least developed 
countries, countries in transition and accession countries. The larger part 
of total trade-related technical assistance is provided by bilateral OECD 
donors and the World Bank. Consequently, the Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion states: “We underscore the urgent necessity for the effective coordi-
nated delivery of technical assistance with bilateral donors, in the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee and relevant international and re-
gional intergovernmental institutions, within a coherent policy framework 
and timetable.” (OECD/DAC 2005, para. 39)  
In order to support coordination among bilateral and multilateral donors in 
the field of trade-related aid, a Trade Capacity Building Database 
(TCBDB) was launched by the Secretariats of the WTO and the OECD in 
November 2002. Based on this database, the 2005 WTO / OECD Joint 
Report on Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building 
(TRTA/CB) calculates that the share of TRTA/CB in total aid commit-
ments of OECD donors was 4.4 %, plus 25 % of total aid that is allocated 
to infrastructure, which also has an effect on trade development (WTO / 
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OECD 2005, 5). Thus, bilateral donors and multilateral agencies have 
become much more active in TRTA/CB over the last few years. Donors 
have become more “aware of the importance of TRTA/CB for develop-
ment and poverty reduction”, and the dialogue between development and 
trade practitioners has strengthened. The major donors and multilateral 
agencies have pledged to increase their budgets for trade-related projects 
and programmes.  
The Joint Report distinguishes between two main categories of TRTA/CB: 
– “Trade policy and regulations covers support to aid recipients’ effec-
tive participation in multilateral trade negotiations, analysis and im-
plementation of multilateral trade agreements, trade policy main-
streaming and technical standards, trade facilitation including tariff 
structures and customs regimes, support to regional trade arrange-
ments and human resources development in trade. 
– Trade development covers business development and activities aimed 
at improving the business climate, access to trade finance, and trade 
promotion in the productive sectors (agriculture, forestry, fishing, in-
dustry, mining, tourism, services) including at the institutional and 
enterprise level.” (WTO / OECD 2005, 7)  
Activities in the field of infrastructure development are not included in the 
TRTA/CB database, because it would be impossible to define and calcu-
late the contribution of infrastructure projects to trade development. 
There is a special link between trade-related technical assistance and one 
of the negotiating issues of the Doha Development Round: Trade facilita-
tion is one of the four new negotiating issues that were mentioned at the 
first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore, December 1996 to be 
further investigated and negotiated in a coming WTO round. The four 
Singapore issues were trade and investment, trade and competition policy, 
transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. After the 
failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, September 2003, 
the first three Singapore issues were dropped from the Doha Development 
Agenda due to resistance of most developing countries to accept new 
commitments before some of the imbalances they saw as a result of the 
Uruguay Round would have been removed. Trade facilitation remained on 
the agenda because developing countries were convinced that they would 
benefit most from the removal of administrative trade barriers like intrans-
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parent customs procedures, and from the simplification and harmonisation 
of international trade procedures, especially if they would be given techni-
cal assistance for the necessary reforms and capacity development, e. g. 
modernisation of customs procedures. “Technical assistance and capacity 
building (TA/CB) for trade facilitation is defined as support for the ‘sim-
plification and harmonisation of international trade procedures. Trade 
procedures include the activities, practices and formalities involved in 
collecting, presenting, communicating and processing data and other 
information required for the movement of goods in international trade.’ 
This definition excludes donor support for issues closely linked to trade 
facilitation, such as assistance for understanding and compliance with 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade; 
transport and storage or revenue-enhancement reforms.” (OECD 2005, 
17–18) 
Interestingly, the 2001 DAC Guidelines on ‘Strengthening Trade Capacity 
for Development’ diagnoses not only the usual lack of capacity on the side 
of developing countries to manage trade policy effectively and to make 
use of the opportunities of international trade liberalisation, but with re-
spect to the scaling up of donor activities in trade-related development co-
operation activities, the DAC sees the need for donors themselves to 
strengthen their own trade-related capacities. “Donors need to enhance 
their range of skills and knowledge. Expertise in building institutions 
(public, private and hybrid) and consultative mechanisms will be espe-
cially important. So will that for nurturing policy and support networks. In 
addition, strengthening stakeholder consultation and policy co-ordination 
will require better facilitation skills, especially in the field – and greater 
understanding of multilateral and regional trade issues.” (OECD 2001, 
15) 
The 2001 DAC Guidelines on ‘Strengthening Trade Capacity for Devel-
opment’ underlines the need to integrate aid for trade activities into na-
tional development strategies, such as Poverty Reduction Strategies. They 
should be aligned with an inclusive trade policy dialogue in which the 
government, the private sector, academia and civil society identify the 
supply side problems to be tackled and the agenda for negotiating in the 
multilateral arena and in regional and bilateral trade negotiations. One 
problem seems to be that there is often a lack of leadership and ownership 
on the side of the recipient country because the trade ministries are less 
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powerful than the traditional planning ministries responsible for aid alloca-
tion and negotiations with the donors. 
In 2005, the principles for effective cooperation between donors and re-
cipient countries have been agreed with the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. It gives priority to partner country ownership and leader-
ship, donor alignment and harmonisation, capacity development, manag-
ing for results and mutual accountability. These new principles for effec-
tive aid apply to trade-related technical assistance as well. Of course, the 
application of these principles requires high-level political will and com-
mitment to reform on the side of the recipient country. The constituency 
for trade facilitation must be strengthened in partner countries, especially 
the business community. Both policymakers and stakeholders in trade 
facilitation must understand and agree upon the road map to trade facilitat-
ing reforms. Needs assessment must be done for each country to identify 
the specific national needs and circumstances and to align donor activities 
better with national development strategies. Dialogue forums between 
government, the customs authorities and other stakeholders must be used 
for aligning donor programmes with the needs and strategies of the recipi-
ent country. Since trade facilitation can make import and export activities 
more profitable, the business community participating in the programmes 
may bear at least part of the costs. 
In Vietnam, donors and the government have agreed upon the same prin-
ciples: At the Mid-term Consultative Group Meeting for Vietnam in Can 
Tho on June 2–3, 2005, the Government of Vietnam and the development 
partners agreed upon the principles of ownership, alignment harmonisation 
and simplification, managing for results and mutual accountability, as 
declared in the Hanoi Core Statement on Aid Effectiveness. 
6.3.2 Overview of past and current technical assistance 
programs related to Vietnam’s WTO accession 
A first survey on donors’ activities and good practices in capacity devel-
opment for trade in Vietnam was done for a DAC workshop in May 2000 
(OECD / DAC 2000). The report praises Vietnam for its dramatic trade 
policy changes during the last decade, but states that more reforms will 
have to be done on the way toward WTO accession. There was a lack of 
support institutions for Vietnamese exporters, especially since it was diffi-
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cult to establish private sector business associations. In view of the obsta-
cles to exporting and the lack of institutional support, the rapid growth of 
Vietnam’s exports was seen as “even more surprising.” (page 10) The 
reasons given in the report for Vietnam’s export miracle are worth quoting 
here: “Several factors seem to account for this competitive advantage: a 
strong work ethic, relatively high levels of education, a willingness to 
focus on the longer term, and high levels of entrepreneurship. In light of 
the substantial obstacles that government policies still pose to exports, 
Vietnam’s recent trade performance is testimony to the resourcefulness 
and improvisational skills of Vietnamese entrepreneurs.” (OECD / DAC 
2000, 12) 
The report presents an overall positive assessment of donor performance in 
the trade-related technical assistance programmes. It underlines the fact 
that Vietnamese officials take their own decision on trade policy matters 
independent of the donors’ and their consultants’ advice. In view of their 
historical experience, the Vietnamese take pride in arriving independently 
at the right decisions. And there is unanimous support from all donors for 
Vietnam’s policy of gradually opening its economy to international com-
petition, foreign direct investment and export orientation within the 
framework of ASEAN, of the bilateral trade agreements with the US and 
the EU and, finally, its decision to apply for WTO membership. On the 
basis of a common understanding of Vietnam’s needs for trade-related 
technical assistance and capacity building, donor co-ordination was re-
ported to be excellent, with several consultative group meetings, some of 
which reaching out even to the business community and to NGOs. Donor 
coordination was facilitated by the fact that there is strong recipient coun-
try ownership for aid projects and programmes in Vietnam, and the proj-
ects are selected by the Vietnamese according to their real needs. A major 
problem was getting Vietnamese private business involved. There seems 
to be a general suspicion among Vietnamese government officials of the 
motives of private entrepreneurs preventing to see them as the most impor-
tant agents for a successful export drive. “…in fact, Vietnam’s private 
sector suffers from a serious image problem. The general public does not 
trust the entrepreneurs who open and operate the country’s new private 
companies and is consistently ready to think the worst of them.” 
(OECD / DAC 2000, 20) 
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The Vietnam Partnership Report 2005 (World Bank Hanoi 2005) contains 
a 12-pages table (65–76) listing no less than 80 trade related technical 
assistance (TA) programs of bilateral donors and multilateral agencies – 
including two by an NGO (OXFAM) – that have been implemented since 
1999 or are planned for the coming years. The projects range from single 
activities like workshops to multi-year training programmes for Vietnam-
ese officials in the various ministries and government agencies concerned 
with WTO-related issues. Their objectives are to improve the capacity of 
Vietnam’s administration to implement the various legal and institutional 
reforms required for WTO membership, to help Vietnam’s policy makers 
assessing the implications of WTO rules and agreements for economic 
development and poverty reduction, and to strengthen the capacity of 
Vietnam’s agricultural and industrial producers / exporters to understand 
and adjust to the requirements of export markets, in particular through 
strengthening the capacity of Vietnam’s standards and certification bodies 
to carry out the necessary testing and certification of export products. 
The synopsis of trade- and WTO-related donor activities shows a wide 
array of themes and areas of support for capacity development. The need 
for trade-related assistance will not end with Vietnam’s WTO accession. 
Even if most of the new legislation and adjustments of existing legislation 
in accordance with the rules and agreements of the WTO will have been 
done by 2007, it will be a long and arduous way to implement them effec-
tively. The lack of capacity for dealing with the new challenges of WTO 
rules and of international competition will require training programmes for 
the various ministries and government agencies involved, but they should 
also include the business community with its associations and other civil 
society Organizations, and the universities and research institutes. There is 
a general need for integrating trade policy matters and issues of economic 
globalisation in the curricula of economics and law faculties of Vietnam-
ese universities and academies. The judiciary in particular needs training 
in many new areas of commercial law and intellectual property protection. 
There will be a special and urgent need for training and capacity building 
in the area of technical standards (safety, health, environment) for export 
products, because these will be the major barriers to entry into export 
markets for Vietnamese products. 
As a legacy from the socialist central planning era, there seems to be a 
lack of communication between the government and the business commu-
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nity and civil society about the implications of globalisation and WTO 
membership and other trade agreements like ASEAN or bilateral trade 
agreements with the US and the EU. In the socialist era the government 
had exclusive control of foreign trade, and until today, trade policy has 
remained the domain of the central government and the Communist Party. 
In an open economy, however, trade policy, especially with the new 
agreements on agriculture, on services and on intellectual property rights, 
has implications not only for exporters and import competing industries, 
but also for almost every Vietnamese (e. g. intellectual property protec-
tion). This will have to be reflected in trade policy making.  
Vietnam will have to broaden the constituency for trade policy making. It 
can no longer be defined and implemented by the Commerce Ministry 
alone, other ministries have to be involved, but what is more important, 
the business community and other civil society groups that have a stake in 
trade-related economic policy making, will have to be involved too. There 
is a need to establish and improve communication channels and forums for 
exchange of information between the government and the business com-
munity and other social groups, so that the government develops a clearer 
understanding of the views and interests of the business community and 
other groups with respect to trade policy matters; the reverse flow of in-
formation from the government to the business community is no less rele-
vant for the companies’ early preparation for changes in the conditions for 
international competition (Stiglitz / Charlton 2005, 168). Therefore, the 
capacity development and training programmes supported by technical 
assistance will have to include the business community with its associa-
tions, the trade unions and other civil society groups. 
The donors can encourage the development of an inclusive system of dis-
cussion on trade policy matters. This is also the result of a new needs as-
sessment commissioned by the Delegation of the European Commission in 
Vietnam. The report states as a central finding, “that the contribution of 
business, research and civil society to trade policy formulation is very 
weak. Without a systematic and open dialogue between decision makers 
and other players, Government bodies cannot dispose of all information 
which is needed for optimal trade policy decisions.” (European Commis-
sion, Delegation Hanoi 2005, 10) If the business community and their 
associations and other civil society associations will have to contribute 
effectively to the debate on trade policy and to defining Vietnam’s posi-
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tion in WTO negotiations and negotiations on other trade agreements, they 
will also need capacity building assistance and training programmes from 
donors.  
Therefore, both donors and the Vietnamese government should think of 
complementing the technical and technocratic elements – which will be 
the core of the capacity building and training programs – with some form 
of awareness raising programmes (or programme elements) which give 
room to a critical discussion of the present state of globalisation and of the 
trade policy framework as represented not only by the WTO but also by 
regional and bilateral trade agreements. By inviting representatives of the 
business communities, trade unions and other civil society groups from the 
developed countries to workshops and training programmes with Viet-
namese officials and representatives of the respective Organizations, the 
Vietnamese would better understand what forces are shaping the multilat-
eral trade policy, why trade unions in the West demand social standards to 
be incorporated into the WTO system, and why civil society Organizations 
demand new and ever more stringent health, safety and environmental 
standards and norms for all products on the market which leads to the 
difficulties of compliance for exporters in developing countries. Debating 
face to face with representatives of different interest groups from devel-
oped countries about the challenges and opportunities of globalisation and 
about the importance of rules to establish conditions for freer and fair trade 
would create a deeper and more realistic understanding of the common 
challenges of globalisation and of the multilateral trading system.  
A special theme for international workshops, seminars and training pro-
grammes for Vietnamese officials and business representatives could be 
the remaining (industrial) policy space under the WTO. How do other 
countries define their industrial policy objectives, what measures do they 
apply, and what conflicts have they experienced with trade interests of 
other countries? In this area it would be especially relevant for Vietnamese 
officials to learn from the experience of the more advanced East Asian 
countries who had to adjust their active and selective industrial policies to 
the narrower policy space as defined by the new WTO agreements and 
general trade liberalisation obligations. A special lesson to be learnt from 
the successful East Asian industrialising countries like South Korea, Tai-
wan, Thailand or Malaysia would be how these countries have organised 
an efficient dialogue between industrial policy makers in the government 
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and specialised government agencies on the one hand and the business 
community on the other. 
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Table 1: Nominal tariff rates and dispersion in selected East Asian coun-
tries in per cent 
 China 
(2001)
Indonesia 
(2001) 
Malaysia 
(2001) 
Philippines
(2001) 
Thailand 
(2002) 
Vietnam 
(Sept. 
2003) 
Total lines 5,098 5,110 5,106 5,112 5,056 10,689 
Tariff bands 57 52 45 38 45 16 
Range tariff 1-122 0-170 0-1195 0-60 0-80 0-150 
Average tariff 17.48 8.43 10.2 7.6 18.48 18.53 
Dispersion 
rate (CV) 
71.3 127.8 340.3 93.9 84.4 120.78 
Source: Athukorala (2004, 76) 
 
Table 2: Problems faced by private firms in Vietnamese textile and gar-
ment industry (2002) 
Task Distribution of firms by the difficulties encountered* 
 Not at all Somewhat To an important 
degree 
Obtaining import 
licences 
58.5 36.6 4.9 
Custom proce-
dures 
27.3 58.0 14.7 
Port service 63.4 30.5 6.1 
Duty rebate 42.9 32.5 24.6 
Source:   Athukorala (2002, 49) Note: * Excluding non-respondent firms 
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Table 3: Merchandise exports by commodity (in per cent of growth in the 
value of exports) 
Export 
items 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Crude oil 15.6 13.2 18.1 24.2 20.8 19.6 19.0 
Coal 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 
Rubber 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.9 
Rice 9.5 10.9 8.9 4.6 4.2 4.3 3.6 
Coffee 5.4 6.3 5.1 3.5 2.6 1.9 2.5 
Marine 
products 
8.6 9.2 8.4 10.2 11.8 12.1 10.9 
Garments 16.4 15.5 15.1 13.1 13.1 16.5 17.9 
Footwear 10.7 11.0 12.0 10.2 10.4 11.2 11.2 
Handicrafts 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.0 
Electronic 
goods and 
components 
4.8 5.3 5.1 5.5 4.0 2.9 4.2 
Other 27.2 21.3 24.0 25.9 25.1 23.0 25.9 
Source: IMF (2003, Tab. 25); IMF (2006, Tab. 24) 
 
Table 4: Export composition in 2003 by continent 
Continent Percentage of total export value 
Asia 48.3 % 
America 22.3 % 
Europe 21.4 % 
Australasia 7.5 % 
Africa 0.5 % 
Source: CIEM (2004, 22) 
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Table 5: Nominal tariff rates and dispersion in selected East Asian countries 
(in per cent) 
 China 
(2001) 
Indonesia 
(2001) 
Malaysia 
(2001) 
Philippines 
(2001) 
Thailand 
(2002) 
Vietnam 
(Sept. 
2003) 
Total lines 5,098 5,110 5,106 5,112 5,056 10,689 
Tariff bands 57 52 45 38 45 16 
Range tariff 1-122 0-170 0-1195 0-60 0-80 0-150 
Average 
tariff 
17.48 8.43 10.2 7.6 18.48 18.53 
Dispersion-
rate (CV) 
71.3 127.8 340.3 93.9 84.4 120.78 
Source:  Athukorala (2004, 76) 
 
Table 6:  Granted patents for inventions between 1990 and 2001 
 Year To Vietnamese To foreigners Total 
 1990 11 (62)* 3 (17) 14 (79) 
 1991 14 (39) 13 (25) 27 (64) 
 1992 19 (34) 16 (49) 35 (83) 
 1993 3 (33) 13 (194) 16 (227) 
 1994 5 (22) 14 (270) 19 (292) 
 1995 3 (23) 53 (659) 56 (682) 
 1996 4 (37) 58 (971) 62 (1008) 
 1997 0 (30) 111 (1234) 111 (1264) 
 1998 5 (25) 343 (1080) 348 (1105) 
 1999 13 (35) 322 (1107) 335 (1142) 
 2000 10 (34) 620 (1205) 630 (1239) 
 2001 7 (52) 776 (1234) 783 (1286) 
 Total 94 (426) 2342 (8045) 2436 (8471) 
Source: NOIP (2002, 46) *Numbers in parenthesis are the application numbers 
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Table 7: Granted patents for utility solutions between 1990 and 2001 
 Year To Vietnamese To foreigners Total 
 1990 23 (39)* 0 (25) 23 (64) 
 1991 44 (52) 1 (1) 45 (53) 
 1992 23 (32) 1 (1) 24 (33) 
 1993 9 (38) 1 (20) 10 (58) 
 1994 18 (34) 9 (24) 27 (58) 
 1995 8 (26) 16 (39) 24 (65) 
 1996 5 (41) 6 (38) 11 (79) 
 1997 8 (24) 12 (42) 20 (66) 
 1998 3 (15) 14 (13) 17 (28) 
 1999 6 (28) 12 (14) 18 (42) 
 2000 10 (35) 13 (58) 23 (93) 
 2001 17 (35) 9 (47) 26 (82) 
 Total 174 (399) 94 (322) 268 (721) 
Source: NOIP (2002, 47) *Numbers in parenthesis are the application num-
bers 
 
Table 8: Granted patents for industrial designs between 1990 
 and 2001 
 Year To Vietnamese To foreigners Total 
 1990 91 (194)* 9 (6) 100 (200) 
 1991 219 (420) 5 (2) 224 (422) 
 1992 433 (674) 6 (14) 439 (688) 
 1993 528 (896) 21 (50) 549 (946) 
 1994 524 (643) 27 (73) 551 (716) 
 1995 626 (1023) 85 (108) 711 (1131) 
 1996 798 (1516) 68 (131) 866 (1647) 
 1997 261 (999) 62 (157) 323 (1156) 
 1998 728 (931) 94 (126) 822 (1057) 
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 1999 841 (899) 94 (137) 935 (1036) 
 2000 526 (1084) 119 (119) 645 (1203) 
 2001 333 (810) 43 (242) 376 (1052) 
 Total 5908 (10089) 633 (1165) 6541 (11254) 
Source: NOIP (2002, 50) *Numbers in parenthesis are the application num-
bers 
 
Table 9: Registered trademarks between 1990 and 2001 
 Year To Vietnamese To foreigners Total 
 1990 423 (890)* 265 (592) 688 (1482) 
 1991 1525 (1747) 388 (613) 1913 (2360) 
 1992 1487 (1595) 1821 (3022) 3308 (4617) 
 1993 1395 (2270) 2137 (3866) 3532 (6136) 
 1994 1744 (1419) 2342 (2712) 4086 (4131) 
 1995 1627 (2217) 2965 (3416) 4592 (5633) 
 1996 1383 (2323) 2548 (3118) 3931 (5441) 
 1997 980 (1645) 1506 (3165) 2486 (4810) 
 1998 1095 (1614) 2016 (2028) 3111 (3642) 
 1999 1299 (2380) 2499 (1786) 3798 (4166) 
 2000 1423 (3483) 1453 (2399) 2876 (5882) 
 2001 2085 (3095) 1554 (3250) 3639 (6345) 
 Total 16466 (24678) 21494 (29967) 37969 (54645) 
Source: NOIP (2002, 53) *Numbers in parenthesis are the application 
numbers 
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Table 10:  Overview of interviews 
No Date Place Organization Interview Partner 
01 19.02.04 Hanoi German Embassy Katrin Oellers-Reis 
02 19.02.04 Hanoi GTZ Dr. Monika Midl 
03 19.02.04 Hanoi CIM Thomas Ganslmayer 
04 19.02.04 Hanoi GTZ-SME-Projekt Corinna Kuesel 
05 23.02.04 Hanoi Oxfam Eduardo Klien 
06 24.02.04 Hanoi KfW Dr. Klaus Mueller 
07 24.02.04 Hanoi DIHK/AHK, Hanoi Mr. Le Tranh 
08 25.02.04 Hanoi CIEM Mr. Thanh 
09 25.02.04 Hanoi EU Joachim Leckscheidt 
10 25.02.04 Hanoi CIEM Dr. Cung 
11 26.02.04 Hanoi CIEM Dr. Tran Tien Cuong 
12 26.02.04 Hanoi EU Delegation Mr. Felipe Palacios 
Sureda 
13 26.02.04 Hanoi Advisor to the MPI-
Minister 
Mr. Le Dang Doangh 
14 27.02.04 Hanoi Social Security Le Thi Hong Phuong 
15 27.02.04 Hanoi NCIEC Mrs. Le Thi Huong 
Giang, Mr. Nguyen Son
16 27.02.04 Hanoi German Embassy Dr. Oliver Schnaken-
berg 
17 01.03.04 Hanoi Institute of Economics Dr. Ha Huy Thanh 
18 01.03.04 Hanoi Institute of World Econ-
omy 
Prof. Do Duc Dinh 
19 01.03.04 Hanoi Foreign Investment 
Agency (FIA), MPI 
Dr. Nguyen Anh Tuan 
20 02.03.04 Hanoi MoT, Vice-Minister Mr.Loung Van Tu 
21 02.03.04 Hanoi MPI Mr. Dr. Nguyen Le 
Trung 
22 02.03.04 Hanoi MPI Mr. Tran Hong Ky 
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23 03.03.04 Hanoi HUAIC Mr. Thai 
24 03.03.04 Hanoi Vietnam Cooperative 
Alliance 
Mr. Dr. Nguyen Tien 
Quan 
25 03.03.04 Hanoi VCCI, SME Mrs. Hang 
26 04.03.04 Hanoi Ministry of Industry Mr. Huynh Dac Thang 
27 04.03.04 Hanoi DEG Mrs. Daniele Soehngen 
28 04.03.04 Hanoi USAID, Star Project Mr. Steve Parker 
29 05.03.04 Hanoi Garment Factory No. 10 Mr. Dang Phuong 
Dzung 
30 08.03.04 Hanoi Lisohaka Motor Joint 
Stock 
Mr. Vu Manh Ha 
31 09.03.04 Hanoi Computer Communica-
tion (CMC) 
Mr. Hà The Minh 
32 09.03.04 Hanoi Baker&McKenzie Mr. Oliver Massmann 
33 09.03.04 Hanoi Xuan Kien Automobiles Mr. Huyen 
34 10.03.04 Hanoi Mekong Economics. Ltd Mr. Adam McCarthy 
35 11.03.04 Hanoi  Copyright Department, 
MOCI 
Mr. Do Khac Chien 
36 11.03.04 Hanoi Vinexad Ms. Pham Thi Hai Yen 
37 12.03.04 Hanoi NOIP, MOST Mr. Tran Quia Khanh,  
Mrs. Nguyen Thi Than 
Ha  
38 12.03.04 Hanoi EU-Mutrap Mrs. Hang 
39 15.03.04 HCMC ITPC Mr. Le Truong Son; 
Mrs Nguyen Thi Ngan 
Giang 
40 15.03.04 HCMC German Consulate Mr. Winkler 
41 16.03.04 HCMC TÜV Rheinland Mr. Klaus Ehret 
42 16.03.04 HCMC Young People´s Business 
Accosiation 
Mr. Tran Thanh Binh 
43 16.03.04 HCMC Mr. Cuu 
44 17.03.04 HCMC Dr. Nguyen Chon 
Trung, 
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45 17.03.04 HCMC Vietgoods Nguyen Duy Thuan 
46 18.03.04 HCMC European Chamber of 
Commerce in Vietnam 
Mr. Chris Wijnberg 
47 18.03.04 HCMC KarstadtQuelle Mrs. Guhlmann 
48 19.03.04 HCMC German Business Ass. Mr. Bischoff 
49 19.03.04 HCMC Meeting between HCMC 
People´s Committee and 
Consulting Companies 
 
50 19.03.04 HCMC Nidek TOSOK (Viet 
Nam) CO., LDT 
Mr. Kunihiko Nishi-
hara,  
Mr. Dao Thanh Quyet 
51 22.03.04 HCMC STAMEQ Dr. Nguyen Huu Thien 
52 22.03.04 HCMC ITPC, Trade Promotion Mr. Vu Xuan Duc 
53 22.03.04 HCMC Department of Science 
and Technology of 
HCMC 
Mrs. Hoang To Nhu 
54 22.03.04 HCMC Former Vice Director 
Artex Vietnam 
Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Tho 
55 22.03.04 HCMC Translater Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Tho 
56 23.03.04 HCMC Euroasiatic Mr. Hetzert 
57 23.03.04 HCMC Freetrend Mr. Chen 
58 23.03.04 HCMC adidasSalomon Mr. Joel Enderle 
59 24.03.04 HCMC Association of Garment-
Textile-Embroidery-
Knitting 
Mr. Bui Trong Nguyen 
60 24.03.04 HCMC VCCI, Patent and 
Trademark Bureau 
Mrs. Vo Thi Minh Tam 
61 24.03.04 HCMC Stinnes Logistic Mr. Braunbach 
62 24.03.04 HCMC KD Feddersen Mr. Stechmann 
63 24.03.04 HCMC Mountech Mr. Thuere 
64 24.03.04 HCMC VCCI, Deputy General 
Director 
Mr. Nguyen The Hung 
65 25.03.04 HCMC VCCI, Trade Promotion Mr. Nguyen Thanh 
Binh 
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66 25.03.04 HCMC Artex Saigon Mr. Canh 
67 25.03.04 HCMC Mekong Auto Mr. An 
68 25.03.04 HCMC Business Women Club Mrs. Nguyen Thi 
Huong et al 
69 26.03.04 HCMC Huy Hoang Garment Mr. Le Nu Thuy 
Duong 
70 26.03.04 HCMC Saigon High Tech Park Mr. Pham Chanh Truc 
71 26.03.04 HCMC Amanda Foods Mr. Emmanuel Anton 
72 26.03.04 HCMC Anam Electronics (VN) 
Ltd 
Mr. Beat H. Waefler 
73 29.03.04 HCMC Taphuco Textiles and 
Garments 
Mr. Nguyen Van Thuy 
74 29.03.04 HCMC Cholimex Mrs. Tran 
75 29.03.04 HCMC Sadaco Mrs. Nguyen Thi Tram 
76 29.03.04 HCMA Digitexx Mr. Schellenberg 
77 29.03.04 HCMC Minh Dat Textiles Mr. Kha Duc 
78 01.04.04 HCMC People´s Committee  Dr. Nguyen Thien 
Nhan 
79 01.04.04 HCMC SES Mrs. Nguyen Thi Minh 
Phuong 
80 05.04.04 HCMC Mercedes-Benz Mr. Rapp 
81 08.04.04 Hanoi Vitas  
82 14.04.04 Hanoi VIPA Mr. An Khang 
83 19.04.04 Hanoi ADB Mr. Ramesh Adhikari 
84 19.04.04 Hanoi Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Mrs. Nguyen Hong 
Bac, 
Mr. Chu Cong Hoang 
85 19.04.04 Hanoi World Bank Mr. Klaus Rohland 
86 23.04.04 Hanoi Ministry of Industry Dr. Cao Quoc Hing  
87 27.04.04 Hanoi Ministry of Industry Mr. Hoa 
88 27.04.04 Hanoi Ministry of Finance Mr. Dang Tuan Hiep 
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Table 11:  Time schedule of the research period in Vietnam 
Time Place Activities 
17.02.2004 Hanoi – Arrival in Vietnam  
18.02.–12.03.2004 Hanoi – General orientation and introduction 
– Testing of questionnaire material with 
counterpart  
– Interviews with ministry employees, 
meso level institutions, enterprises and 
donors 
12.03.–05.04.2004 Ho Chi Minh 
City 
– Interviews with meso level institutions, 
enterprises 
– Analysis and interpretation of inter-
view results 
05.04.–27.04.2004 Hanoi – Interviews with ministry employees 
and meso level institutions 
– Finalising summary of findings 
– Preparation of  two workshops on the 
basis of the results 
28.04.2004 Hanoi  – Presentation of results to the Ho Chi 
Minh Political Academy 
29.04.2004 Hanoi – Presentation of results to CIEM and 
other Vietnamese stakeholders and 
donors 
30.04.2004 Hanoi – Departure from Vietnam 
03.05–31.05.2004 Bonn – Final draft period 
25.05.2004 Bonn – Presentation of report at the GDI 
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